A DISCOVRSE OF CIVILL LIFE:

Containing the Ethike part *of Morall Philoſophie.*

Fit for the inſtructing of a Gentleman *in the courſe of a vertuous life.*

By Lod: Br.

Virtute, ſumma: Catera Fortunâ.



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TO THE RIGHT HONORABLE, HIS SINGVLAR GOOD LORD,

ROBERT Earle of Salisbury, Vicount Cranborne, Lord *Cecill* Baron of Eſſenden, Principall *Secretarie to his Maieſtie, Knight of the moſt noble order of the Garter, &c.*

THis booke treating of the Morall vertues, being now to come vnder the cenſure of the world, doth ſummon me of it ſelf to craue protection from your Lordſhips honorable fauour, as the perſonage, who knowing beſt their worth, may beſt protect him from the iniury of any that ſhould attempt to carpe the ſame. And my priuate obligations for your manifold fauours (among which, the great benefite of my libertie, and redeeming from a miſerable captiuitie euer freſh in my remembrance) doth make me hope, not onely of your Honors willingneſſe to

patronize both my ſelfe and my labour; but alſo that you wil be pleaſed therein to accept of the humble and deuoted affection, wherwith moſt reuerently I preſent it vnto your Lordſhippe. Vouchſafe therefore (my moſt honored good Lord) to yeeld me the comfort of ſo gracious an addition to your former fauors and benefits: and to giue to all the yong Gentlemen of England encouragement to embrace willingly that good which they may receiue by reading a booke of ſo good a ſubiect, the title whereof bearing in front your noble name, ſhall giue them cauſe to think it worthy to be paſſed with the approbation of your graue iudgement. VVhich being the moſt deſired frute of my endeuour, I will acknowledge as none of the leaſt of your great graces,

and euer reſt

Your Lordſhips moſt bounden and humbly deuoted,

LOD: BRYSKETT.

TO

TO THE GENTLE and discreet Reader.

RIght well saith the Wise man, that there is nothing new vnder the Sunne; and further, that there is no end of writing bookes. For howsoeuer in a generalitie the subiect of any knowledge be declared; yet the particulars that may be gathered out of the same, be so many, as new matter may be produced out of the same to write thereof againe: so great is the capacitie of mans vnderstanding able to attaine further knowledge then any reading can affoord him. And therefore Horace *also affirmeth, that it is hard to treate of any subiect that hath not bene formerly handled by some other. Yet do we see dayly men seeke, partly by new additions, and partly with ornaments of stile, to out-go those that haue gone before them: which haply some atchieue, but many moe rest farre behind. This hath bred the infiniteneſſe of bookes, which hath introduced the distinction of good from bad, vsed in best Commonweales, to prohibite such as corrupt manners, and to giue approbation to the good. For that the simpler sort by the former drinke their bane in steed of medicine, and in lieu of truth (the proper obiect of mans vnderstanding) they introduce falshood decked in truths ornaments, to delude the vnheedful Reader. Whereas on the other side, the benefite which we receiue by the reading of good books being exceeding great, they deserue commendation that offer their endeuours to the benefiting of others with books of better matter. Which hath made me resolue to present vnto thy view this discourse of Morall Philosophie, tending to the wel ordering and composing of thy mind,*

mind, that through the knowledge and exercise of the vertues therein expressed, thou mayst frame thy selfe the better to attaine to that further perfection which the profession of a Christian requireth; and that euerlasting felicitie, which, assisted with Gods grace (neuer refused to them that humbly and sincerely call for the same) thou mayst assuredly purchase. As my meaning herein is thy good chiefly: so let thy fauourable censure thankfully acknowledge my labor and goodwil, which may moue me to impart after vnto thee another treating of the Politike part of Morall Philosophie, which I haue likewise prepared to follow this, if I shall find the fauourable acceptation hereof such as may encourage me thereunto. The booke written first for my priuate exercise, and meant to be imparted to that honorable personage, qui nobis hæc otia fecit, *hath long layne by me, as not meaning (he being gone) to communicate the same to others. But partly through the perswasion of friends, and partly by a regard not to burie that which might profit many, I haue bin drawne to consent to the publishing thereof. Gather out of it what good thou canst: and whatsoeuer thou mayst find therein vnperfect or defectiue, impute charitably to my insufficiencie and weakenesse; and let not small faults blemish my trauell and desire to benefite thee.*

But say to thy selfe with that worthy bright light of our age Sir Philip Sidney, Let vs loue men for the good is in them, and not hate them for their euill.

Farewell.

A DISCOVRSE, CONTAINING THE ETHICKE PART OF MORALL PHILOSOPHIE: FIT TO INstruct a Gentleman in the course of a vertuous life.

Written to the right Honorable ARTHVR *late Lord Grey of Wilton : By* LOD: BRYSKETT.

WHen it pleased you (my good Lord) vpon the decease of maister *Iohn Chaloner*, her Maiesties Secretarie of this State, which you then gouerned as Lord Deputie of this Realme, to make choice of me to supply that place, and to recommend me by your honorable letters to that effect, I receiued a very sufficient testimonie of your good opinion and fauourable inclination towards me. And albeit your intention and desire in that behalfe tooke not effect, whether through my vnworthinesse, or by the labour and practise of others: yet because your testimonie was to me *instar multorum Iudicum*; and because that repulse serued you as an occasion to do me after a greater fauor, I haue euermore sithens caried a continual desire to shew my selfe thankfull to your Lordship. For when at my

humble ſute, you vouchſafed to graunt me libertie without offence, to reſigne the office which I had then held ſeuen yeares, as Clerke of this Councell, and to withdraw my ſelfe from that thankleſſe toyle to the quietnes of my intermitted ſtudies, I muſt needes confeſſe, I held my ſelfe more bound vnto you therefore, then for all other the benefits which you had beſtowed vpon me, and all the declarations of honorable affection, whereof you had giuen me many teſtimonies before. And therefore being now freed by your Lordſhips meane from that trouble and diſquiet of mind, and enioying from your ſpeciall fauour the ſweetneſſe and contentment of my Muſes; I haue thought it the fitteſt meanes I could deuiſe, to ſhew my thankfulnes, to offer to you the firſt fruites that they haue yeelded me, as due vnto you, from whom onely I acknowledge ſo great a good. That they will be acceptable vnto you, I make no doubt, were it but in regard of the true and ſincere affection of the giuer; who in admiring and reuerencing your vertues, giueth place to no man aliue. Howbeit there will be other reſpects alſo (I doubt not) to moue your liking and acceptance of the ſame. For if the trauell and induſtrie of thoſe men be commendable, who curiouſly ſeeke to tranſport from farre and forraine countries, either for the health and vſe of the bodie, or for the pleaſing of the exterior ſenſes, the ſtrange grafts, plants and flowers, which excell, either for any medicinable qualitie, or for delight of the eye, the taſte, or the ſmell: how much more will you eſteeme of my endeuour, and be delighted with my tranſlation of theſe choice grafts and flowers, taken from the Greeke and Latine Philoſophie, and ingrafted vpon the ſtocke of our mother Engliſh-tongue? Eſpecially being ſuch as will not onely promiſe delight and pleaſing

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to the ſenſes, but aſſuredly yeeld health and comfort to the mind oppreſſed and diſeaſed? Neither is it vnlikely but that the receiuing of ſo vnlooked for a preſent out of this barbarous countrie of Ireland, will be ſome occaſion to hold it the dearer, as a thing rare in ſuch a place, where almoſt no trace of learning is to be ſeene, and where the documents of Philoſophie are the more needfull, becauſe they are ſo geaſon. Perhaps the want of that ſame ſweeter taſt & reliſh, which thoſe Clymes of *Athens* and *Rome* could giue vnto them, and ours here of England and Ireland cannot affoord, may make them ſeem vnto your Lordſhip at the firſt ſomewhat harſh and vnpleaſing: But the wholſomneſſe of their fruite will eaſily ſupply the deſire of the pleaſing taſte, and ſatisfie you rather with that it hath, then miſlike you for lacke of that it cannot haue. For although our Engliſh tongue haue not that copiouſneſſe and ſweetnes that both the Greeke and the Latine haue aboue all others: yet is it not therefore altogether ſo barren or ſo defectiue, but that it is capable enough of termes and phraſes meete to expreſſe all thoſe conceits which may be needfull for the treating and the diſcourſing of morall Philoſophie. And the doctrine and conſent of the wiſeſt and beſt learned Philoſophers being truly ſet downe and declared, though it be not done with that flowing eloquence wherewith *Plato* and *Tullie* did vtter their learning, hauing the vſe of two ſuch noble and flouriſhing languages: yet will not the appearing of this faire virgin-ſtranger in her homely weeds and attire, be any impediment (I preſume) why ſhe ſhould not be as welcome and as willingly embraced as if ſhe had come decked in all her gorgeous ornaments and apparell. For of her nakednes I do not feare ſhe ſhall need to be aſhamed, though of her pompe and garniſh-

ments ſhee haue no cauſe to be proud and haughtie. That your Lordſhip will not reiect her, but courteouſly entertaine her, though ſhe be but the hand-maide of the doctrine of Grace, I do the rather aſſure my ſelfe becauſe I haue bene an admitted teſtimonie, how often and very willingly you were pleaſed to recreate your ſelfe with her companie, at ſuch times as either the waightie affaires of this your gouernement would ſpare you, or that you foũd cauſe to refreſh your mind by drawing it from the depth of your other ſtudies. For if I did perſwade my ſelf that you wold, as ſoone as you ſaw her, frowne and auert your countenance from her, as ſome men of this our age do, and ſay, that, where her Ladie and miſtris is, ſhe is not onely needleſſe, but alſo perillous; I would truly haue kept her from your preſence, contenting my ſelfe alone with her companie, and preſuming that my familiaritie with her ſhould neither inueigle me to like the leſſe of her ſaid Ladie and miſtris, or to vſe her otherwiſe then as the ſeruant and hand-maide, fit to make her Ladie the more reuerenced and the more honored. To your Lordſhip therefore I now direct her, that vnder your honorable fauour and patronage ſhe may be denizened: For I nothing doubt but that the example of your courteous entertaining of her, will eaſily draw many others to delight in her conuerſation, and to feele the true taſte of the healthfull and delicious fruites which ſhe hath brought with her to furniſh this our Engliſh ſoile & clime withal. Whereby we may with the leſſe labour and coſt henceforth haue them to delight and nouriſh our minds, ſince we ſhall not be conſtrained to fetch them from *Athens* or from *Rome*, but may find them growing at home with our ſelues, if our owne negligence and ſloth cauſe vs not to foreſlow the culturation and manuring of the ſame.

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The courſe which I hold in this treatiſe, is by way of dialogue (which I haue choſen as beſt pleaſing my minde) to diſcourſe vpon the morall vertues, yet not omitting the intellectuall, to the end to frame a gentleman fit for ciuill conuerſation, and to ſet him in the direct way that leadeth him to his ciuill felicitie. Wherein though I haue (I feare me) hazarded my ſelfe to be reprehended by ſuch as looke after formalitie in all things: yet becauſe my intention is to giue light as well to the meaner learned (whoſe iudgements can be content to buſie it ſelfe rather to learne what they know not, then to find faults) as to the learneder critiques that ſpend their eyes to find a haire vpon an egge; I haue the more boldly followed mine owne liking: making account, that if I may purchaſe your liking and allowance of my labour, to whoſe ſatisfaction I do moſt recommend it; I ſhall the leſſe eſteeme the cenſure of any that may hap to carpe or miſlike whatſoeuer part of the ſame. For as I can be content to acknowledge my infirmitie and weaknes, and to confeſſe and take vpon me thoſe faults which I may haue committed, when they are ciuilly and without malice diſcouered and made knowne vnto me: euen ſo ſhall the ouer-curious ſearcher of errors or eſcapes, to make them faults, very little moleſt me; being reſolued to content mine own mind with the good that I hope wil be found in the work, rather then to diſmay my ſelfe or be grieued becauſe I cannot do a thing in that high degree of excellencie, that there were no fault to be found by any man in the ſame. The occaſion of the diſcourſe grew by the viſitation of certaine gentlemen comming to me to my little cottage which I had newly built neare vnto Dublin at ſuch a time, as rather to preuent ſickneſſe, then for any preſent griefe, I had in the ſpring of the yeare begunne

a courſe to take ſome phyſicke during a few dayes. Among which, Doctor *Long* Primate of *Ardmagh*, Sir *Robert Dillon* Knight, M. *Dormer* the Queenes Sollicitor, Capt. *Chriſtopher Carleil*, Capt. *Thomas Norreis*, Capt. *Warham*, S^t *Leger*, Capt. *Nicolas Dawtrey*, & M. *Edmond Spenſer* late your Lordſhips Secretary, & *Th. Smith* Apothecary. Theſe coming of their curteſie to paſſe the time with me, and chauncing to meete there one day, when M. *Smith* the Apothecary was come to viſit me alſo, and to vnderſtand what ſucceſſe the phyſick he had prepared for me did take; Sir *Robert Dillon* with a ſmiling countenance asked of him to what intent (I being to all their iudgements in health and well) he with his drugs ſhould make me ſick, and force me to keepe the houſe, whereby neither I could come to the citie, nor they being come to me might haue my company to walke about the grounds, to take the pleaſure of ſeeing how the workes of my hands did proſper, now that the ſeaſon of the yeare filling the plants and all other liuing things with the naturall humor, which the ſharpe cold of the winter had reſtrained and kept within the inwardeſt parts, did bud and breake forth, to giue proofe and tokens of their proſpering.

To which M. *Smith* anſwered, that he had miniſtred nothing to me but what my ſelf had preſcribed: and that if I was ſicke therewith, it was mine owne doing and not his, who by his trade and profeſſion could not refuſe to compound and miniſter ſuch phyſick as ſhould be required at his hands. But to tell you the truth ſir (quoth he) I could find in my heart to giue him a potion that ſhould purge him of his melancholy humor, becauſe he hath no ſmall need thereof in my opinion.

And whereby perceiue you any ſuch humor to raigne in

in him, replied ſir *Robert Dillon*; for in my iudgment neither his complexion accuſeth him of any diſpoſition thereunto, nor his behauiour and manner of life giueth any token of ſadneſſe or deſire of ſolitarineſſe, which commonly all melancholy men are much giuen vnto: whereas he is not onely deſirous of good companie, but alwayes chearefull and pleaſant among his friends.

Yea marry (ſaid M. *Smith*) thereof he may thanke you and theſe other gentlemen his friends, that by comming often to viſit him do keepe from him thoſe fits which otherwiſe it is likely enough he would fall into; whether that his complexiō draw him to it or no, which oft times deceiueth the moſt cunning Phyſitions, or whether it proceed of any accidentall cauſe. But (I pray you) for proofe of my words, who but one more then halfe mad or in a frenſie, would of his owne accord, not being compelled thereunto, haue giuen ouer ſuch an office as he hath reſigned? which beſides, that it was of good reputation and profit, gaue him the meanes to pleaſure many of his friends, and kept him ſtill in the boſome of the State, whereby he might in time haue riſen to better place, and more abilitie to do himſelfe and his friends both pleaſure & good? All which in a melancholy mood he hath let ſlip, or rather put from him: for which I, among other that loue him, could find in my heart to diſple him very well.

In troth (quoth ſir *Robert Dillon* turning to me) maſter *Smith* ſeemeth to haue ſpoken more like a Phyſition, or rather like a Counſeller, then like an Apothecary: and it will behoue you to ſatisfie him wel, leſt we all begin to thinke of you as he doth, and agree with him that it were expedient to giue you a doſe of Ellebore, which the Phy-

Phyſitions ſay, hath a peculiar property to purge the melancholy humour. And therefore you ſhall do very well (I think) to declare vnto him, what reaſons induced you to reſigne that office, wherein I my ſelfe can teſtifie with how good contentment of all the table you did ſerue ſo many yeares. For withall ſome of vs, that haue not yet vnderſtood vpon what foundation this reſolution of yours is ſet and grounded, ſhall in like ſort reſt the better ſatisfied, if from your ſelfe they ſhall be made capable of ſome reaſonable cauſe that might induce you therunto. And henceforth beleeue, it hath bin well done, not becauſe you did it, but becauſe you haue done it with reaſon and iudgment: which although we be all ſufficiently perſwaded you take to be your guides in al your actions, yet theſe words of maſter *Smiths*, and the like diſcourſes, which we heare very often among ſome that loue you and wiſh you wel, doth make vs ſometimes halfe doubtfull to allow of this retiring your ſelfe from the State. Becauſe we ſuppoſe that a man of your condition and qualities ſhould rather ſeeke to be employed, and to aduance himſelfe in credit and reputation, then to hide his talent, and withdraw himſelfe from action, in which the chiefe commendation of vertue doth conſiſt. And to ſay truly what I thinke, a man of your ſort, bred and trained (as it ſeemeth you haue bin) in learning, and that hath thereto added the experience and knowledge, which trauell and obſeruation of many things in forraine countries muſt breed in him that hath ſeene many places, and the maners, orders, and policies of ſundry nations, ought rather to ſeeke to employ his ability and ſufficiency in the ſeruice of his Prince and country, then apply them to his peculiar benefit or contentment. For you that were in ſo good a way to raiſe your ſelfe to credite

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and better employment, whereunto that office was but the firſt ſtep and triall of what is in you, to forſake ſuddenly ſo direct a path, leading you to preferment, and to betake your ſelfe to a ſolitary courſe of life, or a priuate at the leaſt, ſeemeth a thing not agreeable to that opinio which euery man that knoweth you, had conceiued of your proofe: and that of you it may be ſaid, *Grauior eſt culpa clara principia deſerentis, quàm non incipientis; Non enim magna aggredi, ſed perſeuerare difficile.* What is the end of parents in the education of their children, wherin they beſtow ſo much care, and ſpend their wealth to purchaſe them learning and knowledge; but a deſire to make them able to be employed, and a hope to ſee them raiſed to credit and dignitie in the common-wealth? Or who is he that doth not ſtriue by all the meanes he can to aduance himſelfe, and to preſſe forward ſtill euen to the higheſt places of authoritie, and fauour vnder his Prince, though oftentimes with no ſmall hazard and danger, if he may once lay hold vpon that locke, which, men ſay, Occaſion hath growing on her forehead, being bald behind; ſhewing thereby how fooliſh a thing it is to let her ſlip after ſhe hath once preſented her ſelfe to be apprehended? No doubt but this folly will be layd to your charge by many, and not without good apparance of reaſon, ſince you hauing had the occaſion offered vnto you, as well to enrich your ſelfe, as to riſe in credite and reputation, haue neuertheleſſe let her go, after you had faſt hand in her foretop, and abandoned ſo great a hope, nay, ſo aſſured a reward propoſed to you for your labour and paines, to be ſuſtained ſome while in that place.

Sir (quoth I) to haue anſwered M. *Smiths* imputation, I ſuppoſe would haue bin very eaſie, ſince the greateſt

matter therein was the neglecting of my profit, and the abandoning a meane to pleaſure my friends. For the firſt is rather a commendation (though not ſo conceiued by him) then any iuſt blame: and the other is no more but a partiall complaint of him and others of his diſpoſition, that looke to their owne priuate intereſt, and conſider onely what they may miſſe, by not hauing a friend in ſuch a place, who might ſtand them in ſtead, and regard no whit the contentment or diſcontentment of their friend, which they are not able to meaſure; as wanting the generall rule by which it ought to be meaſured according to reaſon; and ſo conſequently frame the meaſure according to their owne minds: vſing their owne iudgements, euen as the auncient Greekes were wont to ſay of the Lesbian rule, which being made of lead, the work-men would bend and fit to their worke, and not frame their worke by a right rule. But hauing added to his obiection your owne cenſure of me, whoſe iudgement and prudence is ſo wel knowne, and ſo much by me to be reſpected, I can no leſſe do, then make ſome further Apologie for my ſelfe touching that point, and open ſo much of my counſell and purpoſe in that behalf as I ſhall thinke needfull to giue you and others, that will prefer reaſon before their opinions, ſufficient ſatisfaction. And firſt where you ſay, that my ſeruice in the place was acceptable vnto you all, I cannot but therein acknowledge my good hap, rather then impute it to any ſufficiencie in my ſelfe. Neither would I, in regard of that great courteſie and fauour which I receiued therein, haue willingly done any thing whereby I might haue ſeemed vnthankfull, or to haue made ſo ſmall eſtimation of ſo worthy a fauour. But my not hauing bin brought vp or vſed to much writing and long ſtanding, (which of ordinary

dinary that office doth requir̃)beſides the extraordinary occaſions which the ſeruice bringeth forth, to trauell, to ſit vp late, and diſorder the body, had bred ſuch an increaſe of rheume in me, and of infirmities cauſed therby, as I could not without manifeſt and certaine peril of ſhortning my dayes haue continued the exercíſe of that place. Whereupon hauing in dutifull ſort made knowne the cauſe of my deſire to reſigne the office to the Lord Deputy, who was in like ſort priuy to ſome other iuſt occaſion I had to further that my reſolution; it pleaſed him with his accuſtomed prudence and fauour towards me, to conſider and to allow of my requeſt, and to grant me his honorable conſent to the accompliſhmẽt of the ſame. Neither can this be rightly termed in me a retiring my ſelfe from the State, or a withdrawing from action to hide my talent. For leauing aſide the vncertaintie and vaine iſſue for the moſt part of thoſe hopes that commonly draw men on into ambitious heauing & ſhouing for dignities and places of credit and commoditie; from which to be freed, little do men know or beleeue what gaine it is; as of things that, when they obtaine them not, vexe and torment their minds, and when they obtaine them, do ſoone glut and weary them. What compariſon can a man of reaſon & iudgement make betweene them, and that contentednes which a well tempered and a moderate mind doth feele in a priuate life, employed to the bettering and amending of the principall part, which diſtinguiſheth him from brute beaſts? Surely for my part I confeſſe frankly vnto you, and proteſt I ſpeake truly, I haue found more quietnes and ſatisfaction in this ſmall time that I haue liued to my ſelfe, and enioyed the conuerſation of my bookes, when the care of my little building and husbandry hath giuen me that ordinary inter-

miſſion which it muſt haue, then I did before in all the time that I ſpent in ſeruice about the State: the toile whereof was farre too high a price for the profit I might make of my place, and the expectation which was left me of riſing to any better. Which neuertheleſſe, ſuppoſe it had bin much greater then euer I conceiued, or then you haue ſeemed to make the ſame: ſo free am I from ambition or couetiſe (howſoeuer M. *Smith* would haue me to frame my mind thereto) as I am not only content not to flatter my ſelfe with the ſhew of good, which the beſt hopes might haue preſented vnto me; but reſolued alſo to put from me and tread vnder foot whatſoeuer deſire or inclination, that either nature, ill cuſtome, or daily example might vrge me vnto, or ſtirre vp within me. It is a perillous thing for men of weake braines to ſtand in high places, their heads will ſo ſoone be giddie, and all cilmbing is ſubiect to falling. Let men of great ſpirits, of high birth, and of excellent vertues, poſſeſſe in Gods name thoſe dignities and preferments, which the fauour of the Prince and their ſufficiencie may purchaſe vnto them: for it is they, that (as the Poet ſayth) *Poſuêre in montibus vrbem:* and of whom you might iuſtly ſay, *Grauior eſt culpa &c.* For as for me, I am one of thoſe of whom the ſame Poet ſayd, *Habitabant vallibus imis.* And ſo I had rather to do ſtill, then to forſake my ſtudies which I haue now begunne to renew againe: hauing applied my endeuour to lay hold vpon the foretop, which Lady Occaſion hath offered me to that effect: for to any other intent, ſhe neuer yet did ſo much as once ſhew her ſelfe to me a farre off, much leſſe preſent her ſelfe to me ſo neare as I might reach to catch her, or faſten my hand in her golden locke. I wiſh my friends therefore rather to allow, and giue their conſents to this my reſolution,

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grounded (as I thinke) vpon a reaſonable conſideration, and an exact weighing of mine owne abilitie and diſpoſition, then to concurre with M. *Smith* in opinion, or with any others that would lay to my charge folly, or lacke of iudgement for the ſame. And that generally all men would beleeue the Italian prouerbe, which ſayth, that the foole knoweth better what is good and meet for himſelfe, then doth the wiſe man what is fit for another man. Not that I would thereby reiect good counſell and friendly aduice, which I know well enough how beneficiall a thing it is to all men in matters of doubt and difficultie: but my meaning is onely to reſerue to a mans owne vnderſtãding the iudgement of ſuch particular and priuate determinations, as concerne the contentment or diſcontentment of his mind; the circumſtances of which perhaps are not meete to be communicated to others. The example whereof *Paulus Æmilius* hath giuen vs, with that graue and wiſe anſwer he made vnto his friends that wold needs reprehend him for repudiating his wife, alledging her many good qualities, as her beautie, her modeſtie, her nobilitie, and other ſuch like: when putting forth his leg, he ſhewed them his buskin, and ſayd; You ſee this buskin is wel and handſomly made, of good leather, and to your ſeeming fit enough for my foote and leg, yet none of you knoweth (I am ſure) where it doth wring me. Euen ſo my ſelfe may haply ſay to any whom my former anſwer may not fully ſatisfie, that although to their ſeeming my ſtate and condition was better by holding that office, not onely in reſpect of the benefit and commoditie my ſelfe and my friends might reape thereby; but alſo in regard of the expectation of preferment & aduancement that I might haue had by the exerciſe of the ſame: yet is it to them vnknowne what o-

ther particulars might moue me to conceiue thereof o-otherwiſe, and to like rather of the priuat life I now leade, then of all thoſe benefits and commodities which the o-ther could promiſe vnto me.

Although the reaſons by you before alledged, might well enough be anſwered, quoth ſir *Robert Dillon*, yet this laſt obiection you haue made to conclude your ſpeech withall, is ſuch, as I ſhould hold him vnwiſe that would go about to remoue you frō your determination. For it were a point of ouermuch curioſitie, to ſearch ſo farre into your mind and drift in that behalfe. But ſince it ſeemeth that your deſire is now bent to the renewing of your ſtudies, and to apply your ſelfe to the bettering (as you ſay) of that part which is proper vnto man, which is the mind, or reaſonable power of the ſoule, from whence indeed all operations worthy commenda-tion do proceed, I pray you let vs heare from you what kind of ſtudie that is, by which you intend to purchaſe to your ſelfe this ſo great a good. For it is not euery ſcience that can affoord the ſame, ſince we ſee oftentimes men of great learning in ſundry profeſſions, to be neuerthe-les rude and ignorant in things that concerne their cari-age and behauiour: inſomuch as it hath bin fitly vſed for a prouerbe among vs, that the greateſt clerkes are not al-wayes the wiſeſt men. And as I for one, am deſirous to know your determination and opinion touching that point: ſo do I think that the reſt of theſe gentlemen here, wil be willing and glad to ſpend this time which we haue all diſpoſed to viſit you and keepe you companie, in hea-ring you diſcourſe vpon ſo good a Theme, by which there cannot but ariſe ſome good and profit to euery of vs. Becauſe we nothing doubt, but that, as you haue ma-turely debated with your ſelfe the reaſons that haue in-

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duced you to take vpon you this reſolution; ſo you can declare the ſame, and make vs partakers with you of ſo much of your contentment, as the loue and good will we beare you, will thereby faſten vpon vs.

Sir (ſaid I) you haue right well alledged and applied our common prouerbe, in my opinion: for it is not indeed euery kind of knowledge and ſtudie that bettereth the mind of man, as dayly experience teacheth vs: ſince we ſee many men vſe the ſame as an inſtrument to worke their miſchiefe and wickednes withall the more artificially and the more dangerouſly. For though nature hath engrafted in euery man a feruent deſire of knowledge, which diſcouereth it ſelfe in children, euen in their infancie; yet haue we all from the corruption of her, a diſpoſition likewiſe to abuſe the ſame, and to turne it rather to euill than to goodneſſe, if ſpeciall grace, or an excellent education (which cãnot be without grace) do not faſhiõ and frame the mind to the right vſe thereof. The general ſcope of parents, when they ſet their children to learning, tendeth only to the enabling of them, thereby to attaine ſome meanes to liue by the profeſſion either of Law, of Phyſicke, or of Diuinitie: for of the meaner intentions I wil not ſpeake. And too common an error it is in ſcholers themſelues, whẽ they are entred into the Arts, which are called liberal, to ſpend their time in curious ſearching of ſubtilties, friuolous, and to no vſe: or els in purchaſing rather an apparance of learning in the ſcience they apply their ſtudies vnto, thereby to win the ſhorter way to profit, then the profound and exact knowledge of ſciences themſelues; whereof euery one neuertheleſſe being thoroughly attained, would yeeld no ſmal helpe and furtherance to that bettering of the mind, which I haue ſpoken of.

But who is he that in the profeſſion of the Law, aymeth at any other marke, then at ſufficiencie to pleade well at the barre, to draw him the more clients, or to riſe to ſuch dignities as thereby others climbe vnto: or in Phyſick, then to haue a reputation of skil, to procure him much practiſe to inrich himſelfe: or in Diuinitie, then to be accounted a good Preacher, whereby he may get a fruitful benefice, or be inueſted with ſome Biſhopricke and title of honor? Or which of them do we ſee, that when he hath hit the marke he ſhot at, and is come to the height that his profeſſion can raiſe him vnto, doth ſhew himſelfe ſincere, or incorrupt of mind, or ſo maſter ouer his owne paſſions, as either through couetouſnes, or ambition, or loue, or hatred, he will not forget the dutie which he oweth to that place, whereunto he is called, and to him that hath giuen him the gift as well of the meane as of the thing it ſelfe?

To anſwer you therefore directly what kind of ſtudie I affect or thinke may moſt better my mind, I will ſay that it is none of theſe before mentioned: for albeit I acknowledge the true ſtudy of Diuinitie to include all that knowledge, which may any way be required for the perfection of mans life: yet becauſe there is a more ſpeciall calling thereunto, then to any other, and ought to be applied in a more reuerent maner, and to a further end, then that euery man might preſume to take it in hand, I dare not venture to make my ſelfe a profeſſor of it. As for the profeſſion of the Law, I will not in theſe yeares, and with this mind, alienated from troubles and buſineſſe, giue my ſelfe to the ſame, it being the principall meane and high way to leade me againe into the labyrinth which I deſire moſt to eſchew and voide. To Phyſicke I was by my fathers choice appointed; for the performance

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of whoſe wil, as became me in dutie and obedience, all the time I ſpent by his direction in ſtudie, I employed in the knowlegde of the principles thereof: and ſithens, as well for the vſe thereof to mine owne behoofe, as for the delightfulneſſe, which the diſcouery of the ſecret operations and effects of nature worketh (I ſuppoſe) in euery man as it doth in me, I haue (when time and leiſure would permit) bent my moſt ſtudy and reading to the authors of that ſcience; but intention to profeſſe it, or to practiſe it, in very deed as yet had I neuer none. For how ſoeuer the prouidence of my father, or mine owne induſtry had faſhioned me to be meete to make a Phyſition, yet the higher prouidence had otherwiſe determined, making me to take another courſe of life, which before was neuer ſo much as once thought of by either of vs, and made me of a ſcholer to become a ſeruant. By which occaſion being drawne into this countrey, and left my ſtudies, I haue ſo many yeares led my life here in ſuch ſort as you haue ſeene. But hauing now withdrawne my ſelfe from the toileſome place I held, and gathered my ſelfe into a little compaſſe, as a ſnaile into his ſhell, my purpoſe is (if God ſhall pleaſe to giue me his gracious aſſiſtance) to ſpend my time in reading ſuch bookes, as I ſhall find fitteſt to increaſe my knowledge in the duties of a Chriſtian man, and direct me in the right path of vertue, without tying my ſelfe to any particular kind. And as I haue (God be thanked) ſome ſtore of all ſorts; ſo ſhall I diſpenſe my time accordingly, ſometime in peruſing ſuch as may inſtruct me more and more in the true maner of ſeruing God; ſometime in reading of hiſtories, which are as mirrours or looking-glaſſes for euery man to ſee the good and euill actions of all ages, the better to ſquare his life to the rule of vertue, by the examples of o-

thers; and ſometimes, and that for the moſt part (as thus aduiſed) in the ſtudy of Morall Philoſophie, which frameth men fitteſt for ciuill conuerſation, teaching them orderly what morall vertues are, and particularly what is the proper action of euery one, and likewiſe what vice is, and how vnſeemly a thing, and how harmefull to a good mind the ſpot and contagion thereof is. To this haue I euer had a ſpeciall inclination, and a greedy deſire to inſtruct my ſelfe fully therein; which hitherto, partly through the courſe I held whiles I was a ſcholer (as before I ſaid) I could not wel do, and euer ſithens my continuall buſines and attendance about mine office, haue diuerted me therefro. And to profeſſe plainly the truth, not any one thing hath ſo much preuailed to make me reſolue the giuing ouer that place, as the longing I had, and haue to returne to the courſe of reading Morall Philoſophy, which I was euen then newly entred into, when I was called to be employed in that office; and the delight whereof was ſo great vnto me, for that little which I had begun to reade, and the expectation ſuch, which I had conceiued of the vſe thereof (as by which a man learneth not onely to know how to carry himſelfe vertuouſly in his priuat actions, but alſo to guide and order his family, and moreouer, to become meete for the ſeruice of his Prince and countrey, when occaſion of employment may be offered vnto him) that I was halfe doubtfull when I was ſummoned to come and take the place, whether I ſhould accept thereof or no.

Then ſaid M. *Dormer*, Yea but it ſeemeth to me that theſe your words imply a contradiction, when ſaying that you haue ſo earneſtly deſired to withdraw your ſelfe from the exerciſe of your office, wherin you had ſo good meanes, not only to make ſhew of your owne ſufficiency

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and vertue, and to do your Prince and countrey ſeruice, and withall to pleaſure many of your friends, you ſeeme neuertheles to direct your ſtudies to ſuch an end, as aimeth not onely at the knowledge of vertue, but alſo at the practiſe thereof, whereby a man is made fit and enabled for ſuch employments as the Prince or State ſhall lay vpon him. For indeed it is an approoued ſaying among Philoſophers, *Virtutis laus, actio*: and you know what *Tullie* ſaith, and *Plato* before him, *Non nobis nati ſumus, partem patria, partem parentes, partem amici ſibi vendicant.* So as M. *Smiths* accuſation (for ought I ſee) may be held as yet very reaſonable againſt you, vnles you can alledge vs ſome better reaſon in your defence then hitherto you haue done.

In faith (quoth I) if you be all againſt me, I ſhall haue much adoe to defend my ſelfe, ſince the old prouerbe is, that, *Ne Hercules quidem contra duos:* and how can I then reſiſt ſo many? But I hope that ſome of this companie will take my part, though he haue foreſtalled me of the two chiefe men, whoſe patronage might beſt haue ſerued me, hauing gotten you two lawyers to pleade for him. Yet becauſe I ſuppoſe you haue not bin entertained by him for that purpoſe with any fee, and that you are here, not as lawyers or aduocates to maintaine his cauſe, but rather as indifferent Iudges, to determine who hath the beſt right on his ſide; I hope that vpon better information, you will be drawne to iudge vprightly, and not be caried away with apparances, which oftentimes hide and caſt a cloud ouer the truth. And to anſwer therefore to your obiection, which carieth with it ſome probabilitie, I would eaſily confeſſe my ſelfe in fault, if this reſigning of my office had bin an abſolute retiring my ſelfe from action, or that I had (as they ſay) forſworne any

employment for the ſeruice of the State or my Prince. But if you pleaſe to conſider how this my reſolution hath bin grounded vpon a deſire to be freed onely from a place of ſuch continuall toile and attendance, as ſuffered me to haue no time to ſpare, wherein I might almoſt breathe, or take any reaſonable recreation; and not to liue idle, or ſequeſtred ſo from action, as I ſhould onely ſpend my time in reading or contemplation, I doubt not but you wil find my words to agree wel inough without any contradiction, and my courſe of life well enough fitting a man that meaneth not to liue to himſelfe alone. For if ſuch had bin my purpoſe, I would haue ſought out a meeter dwelling then this ſo neare the citie, and I could well enough haue deuiſed to haue bin farre from ſuch cõptrollers as M. *Smith*, and to haue auoided this iudgement that I am now ſubiect vnto, not without hazard of my reputation, hauing two ſuch perſons to aſſiſt my accuſer, and beare vp his cauſe. You ſee that I haue not ſo eſtranged my ſelfe from all employments, but that I can be content to take paine in the increaſing of her Maieſties reuenue, by the care I haue of her impoſt: I refuſe not any other ordinary employments, as of trauelling in ſuch commiſſions as the Lord Deputie and Councel ofttimes direct vnto me for the examining of ſundrie cauſes: neither do I ſo giue my ſelfe to be priuate, but that you and other my friends, who vouchſafe of their courteſie ſometimes to viſite me, find me apt enough to keep them companie, either here at home, or elſe abroad: ſo as though I deſire to know how to do theſe things as perfectly well as I might, and to that end frame my ſelfe as much to ſtudy as conueniently I can, yet do I not therin contradict the reaſonable and iuſt diſpoſition I haue to employ my ſelfe for the ſeruice of her Maieſtie, when occaſion

caſion ſerueth: neither doth my endeuour in that behalf any way oppoſe it ſelfe to my deſire, of retiring from a painefull employment to a more quiet life, which now (I thanke God) I enioy: wherein I may frankly and truly proteſt vnto you, I find more ſweetnes and contentment in one dayes expence, then I could taſte in ſeuen yeares before, whiles I was Clerke of the Councell. And were it but in regard of that ſame contentment, I know not what man of reaſonable ſenſe and vnderſtanding, would not eſteeme the purchaſe thereof at a farre higher rate then any office in Ireland whatſoeuer. M. *Smith* therfore may well enough put vp his pipes, and hold his peace henceforth, and I hope not onely yee two, but all the reſt of this companie will hold him ſufficiently put to ſilence, and begin to allow of this my reſolution, eſpecially ſeeing it aimeth at ſo high a marke as humane felicitie.

At which word the Primate ſeemed as it were to ſtart, & ſaid, what ſir? though we can be content to admit your reaſons againſt M. *Smith*, and to allow of your reſolutiõ, as hauing choſen (as our Sauiour ſaid to *Martha* of her ſiſter) the better part; yet muſt you not thinke that we will let euery thing go with you which you ſay: but by your leaue, plucke you a little backe by the ſleeue, when we ſee you preſſe forward preſumptuouſly, as now in my opinion you do, when you ſeeme to ſhoote at ſuch a marke as humane felicitie, which is without, not your reach onely, but all mens, whiles they are here in this low and muddie world: for I wis that is no where to be found but aboue the ſtars: mans felicity is placed only in heauẽ, where God of his mercie hath appointed it for him to be found, and not here on earth. I ſay of his mercie, becauſe albeit he had ordained the ſame for man from before all ages; yet our firſt father by his diſobedience depriuing

himſelfe and all his poſteritie of all poſſibilitie thereof, the ſame was eftſoones by the infinite goodnes and mercie of God purchaſed to him againe at a deare price, euen the precious bloud of his deareſt Son, which he was content to ſhed for the ranſome of mankind, entrapped by the diuell, and taken captiue, whereby he might returne into his heauenly countrie againe, to enioy that happie inheritance prepared there for him. Whoſoeuer therfore ſhall ſeeke to get his felicitie here in this world, will find himſelfe deceiued: and although it be ſaid to ſome purpoſe fitly, that he that ſhooteth at a ſtarre, aimeth higher then he that ſhooteth at a furbuſh: yet well ye wot, that to ſhoot vp to the ſtarres, is but meere follie and vanitie; and no leſſe do I hold your aiming at ſo high a marke to be, which is ſo farre out of your reach.

I crie you mercie, my Lord, quoth I, if I haue ſtepped into your marches before I were aware. But I may the better be excuſed, becauſe I had no intention or purpoſe ſo to do; but ſimply, and after the cõmon maner of ſpeech haue vſed the general word in ſtead of the particular. For though I ſaid I aimed at the high marke of humane felicitie, yet for ſo little as I haue read in Morall Philoſophy, I haue learned that *Plato* hath made mention of two diſtinct felicities of man (and others beſides him) the one a contemplatiue felicitie (which ſome men haply draw neare vnto, but cannot perfectly attaine in this life;) the other an actiue or practicke felicitie, conſiſting in vertuous actions, and reducing of a mans paſſions vnder the rule of reaſon. Which practicke felicitie may not onely be atchieued here on earth by mans endeuour, aſſiſted with Gods grace and fauour: but is alſo a great helpe and meane for ſuch as obtaine the ſame, to bring them after this life vnto the other in heauen. Of this latter, the rules whereof

whereof are to be taken from you Church-men and Diuines; I meant not when I ſaid, I aymed ſo high, at the leſtwiſe my purpoſe was not properly to ſay, that I ſhot at that marke by my ſtudie, for then I ſhould haue contradicted my former words, when I proteſted I durſt not preſume to the ſtudie of Diuinitie, which (I well vnderſtood) required a particular calling. But onely my meaning was to get your approbation, in that I had reſolued by the ſtudy of Morall Philoſophie to compaſſe, ſo farre forth as my endeuours could preuaile, that humane practicke felicitie, which of all men in all ages hath bene ſo highly eſteemed; and for the directing of men wherunto, ſo many great learned Philoſophers haue taken ſo great trauell and paines to find out the ready way vnto it, and by their writings to make the ſame knowne to others: whereby not onely particular perſons might in this life attaine to liue happily, but alſo purchaſe the ſame happines to their families, yea to whole Cities and Commonwealths. This felicitie (I think) euery wel diſpoſed man is to labor for in this life; & the better he is borne, the more ought he to bend his ſtudy to learne by what meanes the ſame is to be attained: and by working accordingly, to prepare himſelfe to be fit and capable of that other when ſoeuer he ſhall be called out of this world, knowing how aſſured promiſes therof are giuen to them that in this life liue vertuouſly; and how certain he may be, that the further that good which his vertuous actions ſhall extend to the benefite of others in this life, the greater ſhall be his reward in the life to come, where that felicitie is prepared for them, that by the treading downe of their paſſions and ſenſual appetites, ſhal endeuour to reduce their ſoule to that pureneſſe and cleannes which is required in them to whom that euerlaſting bliſſe and felicitie is promiſed.

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For my part, the thing which I moſt earneſtly deſire, is to learne the ſhorteſt way to compaſſe the ſame: and happpie ſhould I thinke my ſelfe if I could find any man whoſe knowledge and learning might helpe me to direct my ſtudy to that end; becauſe I know right well how hard it is for a man by his owne labour to ſearch out the ready way to vnderſtand thoſe precepts, which haue bin ſet downe in the learned writings of Philoſophers that haue treated of that matter, eſpecially in the Greeke and Latine tongues, in which it hath bin ſubſtantially handled. For although I cannot truly pretend ignorance in the Latine, in which the workes of *Plato* and *Ariſtotle* are to be read: yet I confeſſe that I do not find that facilitie in the conceiuing of their writings, as I could wiſh, or as the greedineſſe of my deſire to apprehend might ouertake. For *Plato* hath couched his ſenſe thereof ſo diſperſedly in his dialogues, as I thinke he muſt be a man of great learning and exact iudgement that ſhall picke them out, and ſeuer them from the other parts of Philoſophie, which he indeed moſt diuinely diſcourſeth vpon. And *Ariſtotle* is not to me ſo cleare nor ſo eaſily vnderſtood without deepe ſtudy, as my meane capacitie would require; ſpecially without the interpretation of ſome better ſcholer then my ſelfe. And herein do I greatly enuie the happineſſe of the Italians, who haue in their mother-tongue late writers, that haue with a ſingular eaſie method, taught all that which *Plato* or *Ariſtotle* haue confuſedly or obſcurely left written. Of which, ſome I haue begun to reade with no ſmall delight, as *Alexander Piccolomini*, *Gio. Baptiſta Giraldi*, and *Guazzo*, all three hauing written vpon the Ethick part of Morall Philoſopie both exactly and perſpicuouſly. And would God that ſome of our countrimen wold ſhew themſelues ſo wel affected

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to the good of their countrie (whereof one principall and moſt important part conſiſteth in the inſtructing of men to vertue) as to ſet downe in Engliſh the precepts of thoſe parts of Morall Philoſophy, whereby our youth might without ſpending of ſo much time, as the learning of thoſe other languages require, ſpeedily enter into the right courſe of vertuous life. In the meane while I muſt ſtruggle with thoſe bookes which I vnderſtand, and content my ſelfe to plod vpon them, in hope that God (who knoweth the ſincereneſſe of my deſire) will be pleaſed to open my vnderſtanding, ſo as I may reape that profit of my reading, which I trauell for. Yet is there a gentleman in this company, whom I haue had often a purpoſe to intreate, that as his leiſure might ſerue him, he would vouchſafe to ſpend ſome time with me to inſtruct me in ſome hard points which I cannot of my ſelfe vnderſtand: knowing him to be not onely perfect in the Greek tongue, but alſo very well read in Philoſophie, both morall and naturall. Neuertheles ſuch is my baſhfulnes, as I neuer yet durſt open my mouth to diſcloſe this my deſire vnto him, though I haue not wanted ſome hartning thereunto from himſelfe. For of his loue and kindnes to me, he encouraged me long ſithens to follow the reading of the Greeke tongue, and offered me his helpe to make me vnderſtand it. But now that ſo good an oportunitie is offered vnto me, to ſatisfie in ſome ſort my deſire; I thinke I ſhould commit a great fault, not to my ſelfe alone, but to all this company, if I ſhould not enter my requeſt thus farre, as to moue him to ſpend this time which we haue now deſtined to familiar diſcourſe and conuerſation, in declaring vnto vs the great benefites which men obtaine by the knowledge of Morall Philoſophie, and in making vs to know what the ſame is, what

be the parts thereof, whereby vertues are to be diſtinguiſhed from vices: and finally that he will be pleaſed to run ouer in ſuch order as he ſhall thinke good, ſuch and ſo many principles and rules thereof, as ſhall ſerue not only for my better inſtructiō, but alſo for the contentmēt and ſatisfaction of you al. For I nothing doubt, but that euery one of you will be glad to heare ſo profitable a diſcourſe, and thinke the time very wel ſpent, wherin ſo excellent a knowledge ſhal be reuealed vnto you, from which euery one may be aſſured to gather ſome fruit as wel as my ſelf. Therfore (ſaid I) turning my ſelfe to M. *Spenſer*, It is you ſir, to whom it pertaineth to ſhew your ſelfe courteous now vnto vs all, and to make vs all beholding vnto you for the pleaſure and profit which we ſhall gather from your ſpeeches, if you ſhall vouchſafe to open vnto vs the goodly cabinet, in which this excellent treaſure of vertues lieth locked vp from the vulgar ſort. And thereof in the behalfe of all, as for my ſelfe, I do moſt earneſtly intreate you not to ſay vs nay. Vnto which words of mine euery man applauding moſt with like words of requeſt, and the reſt with geſture and countenances expreſſing as much, M. *Spenſer* anſwered in this maner.

Though it may ſeeme hard for me to refuſe the requeſt made by you all, whom, euery one alone, I ſhould for many reſpects be willing to gratifie: yet as the caſe ſtandeth, I doubt not but with the conſent of the moſt part of you, I ſhall be excuſed at this time of this taske which would be laid vpon me. For ſure I am, that it is not vnknowne vnto you, that I haue already vndertaken a work tēding to the ſame effect, which is in *heroical verſe*, vnder the title of a *Faerie Queene*, to repreſent all the moral vertues, aſſigning to euery vertue, a Knight to be the patron and defender of the ſame: in whoſe actions and feates

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of armes and chiualry, the operations of that vertue, whereof he is the protector, are to be expreſſed, and the vices & vnruly appetites that oppoſe themſelues againſt the ſame, to be beatē downe & ouercome. Which work, as I haue already well entred into, if God ſhall pleaſe to ſpare me life that I may finiſh it according to my mind, your wiſh (M. *Bryſkett*) will be in ſome ſort accompliſhed, though perhaps not ſo effectually as you could deſire. And the ſame may very well ſerue for my excuſe, if at this time I craue to be forborne in this your requeſt, ſince any diſcourſe, that I might make thus on the ſudden in ſuch a ſubiect, would be but ſimple, and little to your ſatisfactions. For it would require good aduiſement and premeditation for any man to vndertake the declaration of theſe points that you haue propoſed, containing in effect the Ethicke part of Morall Philoſophie. Whereof ſince I haue taken in hand to diſcourſe at large in my poeme before ſpoken, I hope the expectation of that work may ſerue to free me at this time from ſpeaking in that matter, notwithſtanding your motion and all your intreaties. But I will tell you, how I thinke by himſelfe he may very well excuſe my ſpeech, and yet ſatisfie all you in this matter. I haue ſeene (as he knoweth) a tranſlation made by himſelfe out of the Italian tongue, of a dialogue comprehending all the Ethick part of Moral Philoſophy, written by one of thoſe three he formerly mentioned, and that is by *Giraldi*, vnder the title of a dialogue of ciuil life. If it pleaſe him to bring vs forth that tranſlation to be here read among vs, or otherwiſe to deliuer to vs, as his memory may ſerue him, the contents of the ſame; he ſhal (I warrant you) ſatisfie you all at the ful, and himſelfe wil haue no cauſe but to thinke the time well ſpent in reuiewing his labors, eſpecially in the company of ſo many

his friends, who may thereby reape much profit, and the tranſlation happily fare the better by ſome mending it may receiue in the peruſing, as all writings elſe may do by the oftē exàminatiō of the ſame. Neither let it trouble him, that I ſo turne ouer to him againe the taske he wold haue put me to: for it falleth out fit for him to verifie the principall part of all this Apologie, euen now made for himſelfe; becauſe thereby it will appeare that he hath not withdrawne himſelf from ſeruice of the State, to liue idle or wholy priuate to himſelfe, but hath ſpent ſome time in doing that which may greatly benefit others, and hath ſerued not a little to the bettering of his owne mind, and increaſing of his knowledge, though he for modeſty pretend much ignorance, and pleade want in wealth, much like ſome rich beggars, who either of cuſtom, or for couetouſnes, go to begge of others thoſe things whereof they haue no want at home.

With this anſwer of M. *Spenſers*, it ſeemed that all the company were wel ſatisfied: for after ſome few ſpeeches, whereby they had ſhewed an extreme longing after his worke of the *Faerie Queene*, whereof ſome parcels had bin by ſome of them ſeene, they all began to preſſe me to produce my tranſlation mentioned by M. *Spenſer*, that it might be peruſed among them; or elſe that I ſhould (as neare as I could) deliuer vnto them the contents of the ſame, ſuppoſing that my memory would not much faile me in a thing ſo ſtudied, and aduiſedly ſet downe in writing, as a tranſlation muſt be. And albeit I alledged for mine excuſe, that I had done it but for mine exerciſe in both languages, not with purpoſe to haue it ſeene, nor ſo aduiſedly, as had bin needful to come vnder their cenſures: yet would they haue no nay, but without protracting time in excuſes, I muſt needs fulfill their

their deſires; and ſo with a courteous force they made me riſe from where I ſate to go fetch my papers. Which being brought before them, I ſaid: Loe, here you may ſee by the manner of theſe looſe ſheetes, how farre I meant this labour of mine ſhould come to light: and the confuſed lying of them, and the blots and interlinings which you ſee, may giue you well enough to vnderſtand, how hard a thing it is to haue it read before you, as you pretended. Beſides that, it is of ſuch a bulke and volume, as you may eaſily vnderſtand, it cannot in a ſhort time be runne ouer. And therefore ſince you haue ſo eaſily acquited M. *Spenſer* of that charge which you all with me ſeemed ſo deſirous to impoſe vpon him: you may do wel in like courteous manner to diſcharge me of the like burthen that you would lay vpon me.

Then ſaid ſir *Robert Dillon*, though it appeare indeed vnto vs, that the loſe and diſorderly placing of the papers with the interlinings, do make it vnfit to be read as we deſired, and that the often interrupting of the ſenſe to find out and match the places, would take away the beſt part of the delight which the ſubiect might yeeld vs: yet becauſe we know that you, hauing tranſlated the whole, may eaſily with your memory ſupply the defects of the papers; I for my part do thinke, and ſo I ſuppoſe do the reſt here preſent, that it is no ſufficient reaſon to free you from ſo profitable a labour, as this, whereby you may acquaint vs with thoſe worthy conceits in our owne language, which you haue in the Italian found to be ſo delightfull, and fit to be communicated by your trauell to others. Therfore if you ſhal not think it good to reade it vnto vs as it is ſet downe in the tranſlation preciſely; at the leaſt yet this we will vrge you vnto, that you will be content to deliuer vnto vs the general points of the ſame,

marſhalling them in their order, though in the circumſtances of the dialogue and perſons you follow not exactly the forme of the author; and our diſpenſation in that caſe ſhall ſerue to deliuer you from the blame, that otherwiſe as an interpreter you might be ſubiect vnto. For being done to vs, and at our requeſt, we ſhall be your warrants, notwithſtanding any law or cuſtome to the contrary. Be you onely willing to gratifie vs, and for the reſt feare you no danger; ſince we ſit not here as in the courts, to examine whether there be as well due forme, as ſufficient matter in bills & pleadings that are brought before vs: but are here to paſſe the time with you in honeſt and vertuous conuerſation. And the drift of our ſpeeches hauing growne to this iſſue, that we ſhould ſpend this ſhort ſpace which we may be together, in the diſcourſing vpon the Ethick part of Morall Philoſophie, and you hauing the ſubiect ſo ready at hand, in Gods name we pray you, delay vs not by loſing time in friuolous excuſes, but begin to open to vs this treaſure, which you would ſo faine hide from our eyes.

Here they began all to ſecond his ſpeeches, and ſo importunatly to intreate me to accompliſh their deſire, that being no further able to ſay them nay: I anſwered.

Since ſuch is your will, I can no longer reſiſt you: onely thus much I muſt proteſt vnto you, that you are guiltie, not onely of whatſoeuer fault or error I ſhal commit againſt the lawes of an interpreter, but alſo of breach of the law of hoſpitalitie, in ouerruling me in mine owne houſe. And as for this I may iuſtly complaine of violéce, yet perhaps find no redreſſe, ſo if any ſhal find fault with me for not obſeruing the preciſe rules of a tranſlator, let him impute the ſame not to me, but vnto you, hauing ſome compaſſion vpon me, that beſides being conſtrai-

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ned to produce that which I purpoſed to haue kept to my ſelfe, I am alſo forced to do it, not according to mine owne choice, but in ſuch ſort as it hath pleaſed you to cõpell me. Well then, to gaine as much time as may be, I wil omit the introduction of the author to his dialogue, as a thing depending vpon former matter and occaſion, by which the perſons introduced by him are fitted for his purpoſe, & ſuppoſing this preſent companie to be as apt to conceiue the reaſons by him ſet downe, & to make as pertinent obiections as they did, I will begin euen there where he, following the courſe of moſt others that haue writtẽ vpon that ſubiect, maketh entry into his diſcourſe. But with this prouiſo, that, becauſe this day will not ſerue vs to runne ouer the whole, you wil be content, that, as he hath deuided his whole work into three dialogues, ſo we may meete here three ſeuerall dayes, to giue euery ſeueral dialogue of his one day to explane the ſame: for ſo much (I think) may well be performed euery day. To which they all agreeing, I tooke my looſe papers in hand, and began in this manner following. I muſt now preſuppoſe that ye, whõ I eſteeme to be as thoſe gentlemen introduced by this author, haue likewiſe moued the ſame queſtion, which they did, to wit, what maner of life a gentlemã is to vndertake and propoſe to himſelfe, to attaine to that end in this world, which among wiſemen hath bene, and is accounted the beſt; beginning frõ the day of his birth, and ſo guiding him therein vntill he be meet to purchaſe the ſame end. And likewiſe where any occaſion of doubt or queſtion, for the better vnderſtanding may happen in the diſcourſe, that ſome one of you deſiring to be reſolued therein, wil demaund ſuch queſtions as ſhal be needfull. Wherein you ſhall find this author plentifully to ſatisfie your expectations, not tying himſelfe abſolutely

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to follow neither *Plato* nor *Ariſtotle*, but gathering from both, and from other excellent writers beſides, ſo much as may yeeld you the greater and fuller ſatisfaction. Giue eare therefore vnto his words.

THe end in all things that men do in this world, is the firſt that is cõſidered, though afterwards it be the laſt to be put in execution. And as, when it is brought to perfection, it beareth the name of effect, ſo is it the cauſe that moueth all other to bring it to effect. And therefore to treate of that end, which is now the motion inducing vs to diſcourſe hereupon, we muſt come to the firſt principles which may be the cauſes to bring a man to this end. In which reſpect it were needfull for me firſt to ſpeake of the generation of man, ſince as all ſeeds bring forth their fruit like to themſelues; ſo falleth it out for the moſt part in men: for ſuch as are the father and the mother, ſuch are moſt commonly the children. I ſhould likewiſe declare, how he that wil be a commendable father, ought to haue a ſpeciall care, not of himſelfe onely (for him we wil ſuppoſe to be a man endewed with all the ornaments required for a wel compoſed body and mind) but of the mother alſo. For albeit ſhe receiue the ſeed of generation from the man; yet howſoeuer it be, the children when they be once conceiued, take their nouriſhment from the mother, and in her wombe, vntill the time of their birth: whereby we ſee the children very often to retaine the vices of the mother. Alſo that in regard hereof, euery man that intendeth to take a wife, ought to be very carefull in the choice of her; ſo that ſhe may not be baſe of parentage, vitious, wanton, deformed, lame, or otherwiſe imperfect or defectiue: but well borne, vertuous, chaſte, of tall and comely perſonage, and well ſpoken; to the end that of father and mother, by kind gentle, vertuous, modeſt,

deſt, and comely of ſhape and proportion, like children may betweene them be brought forth. For frō wiſe men hath proceeded that warning to men, that ſuch wiues they ſhould chuſe as they wiſhed to haue their children. And *Archidamus* King of *Sparta*, was condemned by his citizens to pay a fine, for hauing taken to wife a woman of very low ſtature; becauſe (ſaid they) ſhe is like to bring vs forth no kings, but dandiprats. Thereby declaring how they accounted no ſmall part of the maieſtie of a king, to conſiſt in the comely preſence and ſtature of his body; and not without cauſe. For it is written, that the goodly ſhew and apparance of a man, is the firſt thing worthy ſoueraigntie. But becauſe in the requeſt made to me, I am required to begin onely at his birth, I thinke it ſhall ſuffice, if I declare vnto you in what maner he ought to be nouriſhed, and brought vp, and inſtructed, till he come to ſuch ripe yeares and iudgement as he may rule himſelfe, and be his owne guide to direct all his actions to that ſame end, which in all humane things is the laſt and beſt. Neuertheles before I begin therewith, I would haue you to vnderſtand, that the firſt gift which the father beſtoweth on the ſon after he is borne, is his name, by which he is all his life time to be called. Which name, is to be wiſhed, may be decent and fit, ſo as it may ſeeme the life of the child is marked with a ſigne or pronoſtication of good hap, and of being framed to the courſe of vertue: for ſome are of opinion, that the name oftentimes preſageth the qualities and conditions of the child. And therefore they are not to be commended that name their children by the names of brute beaſts, as in ſome countries is vſed; where the names of *Leo*, of *Orſo*, of *Aſtore*, of *Pardo*, of *Cane*, and ſuch like are in vſe: as if their deſire were that their children ſhould reſemble thoſe

wild and bruite beaſts in their conditions. Let men therfore in Gods name be intitled with names meet for men, and ſuch as may ſignifie or carry with them dignitie, or rather holineſſe and religion, and leaue to bruite beaſts their owne poſſeſſion.

Then, ſaid ſir *Robert Dillon*, before you proceed any further, I pray you let vs vnderſtand whether that point be cleare or no, of the nouriſhing all manner of children. For among *Lycurgus* his lawes, there was one, whereby it was ordained, that ſuch children as were borne vnperfect in any part of their bodies, crooked, miſ-ſhapen, of ill aſpect, ſhould not onely, not be foſtered vp, but alſo be throwne downe from the top of a high rocke, as creatures condemned by God and nature in their conception; and ſo marked by them, to the end that men might know, that ſuch (if they were through ignorance bred & nouriſhed) were likely to bring harme and ruine to the houſes and common-wealths wherin they ſhould liue. Let vs therfore heare your authors opinion concerning that law.

There is no doubt (ſaid I) but that ſuch was the opinion of *Lycurgus*, and ſuch his law, though cruell and vniuſt. Neuertheles though the felicitie of man be a perfection of all the good gifts of body and mind, and he that is ſo borne, cannot indeed be properly termed happie in the higheſt degree of worldly happines: yet much more prudently haue thoſe wiſe men determined, who ſay, that the imperfections of mens bodies which are borne with them, are not to be imputed to them as hurtful or ſhamefull, becauſe it is not in their power to auoid them. And who is he that can be ſo hard hearted as to ſlay an infant ſo cruelly, onely becauſe nature hath ſhaped him vnperfect in any of his lims? The mind of any good man ab-

abhorreth to thinke ſuch a thing, much more to put it in execution.

Indeed (replied ſir *Robert Dillon*) pittie ought alwaies to be before the eyes of al men, as a thing natural to them, and without which they are vnworthy the name of humanitie: yet muſt not this pittie extend ſo farre for any particular compaſſion, as thereby to confound the vniuerſall order of things. The pittie which *Hecuba* had of *Paris* (as Poets haue taught vs) was the cauſe that *Troy* was burnt, and *Priamus* with all his worthy family deſtroyed: which things (ſay they) had neuer happened, if contrary to the directiō of the Gods (who by her dreame forewarned her of thoſe euils) ſhe had not ſaued him. If then it were true, as *Lycurgus* affirmed, that the markes or tokens, ſo brought into the world by children from their mothers wombe, ſhould foretell ſuch to be likely to bring ruine or calamitie to their cities or countries; were it not better that he that is ſo borne, ſhould rather die in his cradle, then be nouriſhed to become the ouerthrow and deſolation of a whole people? We know that by the opinion of the wiſeſt, it is expedient rather one ſhould die to ſaue a multitude, then by ſparing his life a number ſhould periſh.

That opinion (ſayd I) is not vnworthy wiſe men, but it is deepely to be conſidered, and their meaning to be looked into, for ſo ſhall we find no ſuch ſenſe therein, as you inferre: for thoſe men ſpake not of children newly borne, who are not able, either by ſpeech or deed, to giue any ſigne or token, whereby it may be gathered, that they will proue either good or euill; but of ſuch, as being commonly heads and ring-leaders of factious and ſeditious people, do make themſelues authors of the deſtruction of noble families and whole cities: ſuch as were

both the *Gracchi* in *Rome*, and ſundry others in *Greece*. And ſo it is to be applied, to wit, that ſuch a man ſhall rather die, then for the ſauing of his life, a whole citie or people ſhould go to wracke. Or otherwiſe, when in time of warre, by the ioyning of two armies in battell, a great multitude were likly to be ſlaine, it were farre better that one, or two, or moe, in certaine number on each ſide ſhould fight and hazard their liues in ſtead of the reſt, then their whole powers to meet, and venter the ſlaughter of the moſt part of them. As in the beginning of the State of *Rome*, the *Horatij* and the *Curiatij* did to keepe from hazard of battell both people, which were ready armed and prepared to fight together. In like manner may that ſaying be applied, in caſe a whole citie be in danger of deſolation, & that the death of one man may redeeme the ſame. As by *Curtius* the ſame citie of *Rome* was preſerued: who with ſo great courage threw himſelfe armed on horſebacke into that peſtilent pit which infected the whole citie, to the end that by his death he might ſaue the people from that mortalitie and infection. And the ſame effect (but farre more excellently) did our Sauiour likewiſe work, who to redeeme mankind from the bands of hell, tooke vpon him all our ſinnes, through which we were become thrals to Satan; and for our ſaluation yeelded himſelfe willingly to a moſt bitter death. But as in ſuch caſes it is to be allowed, that one ſhould die for the people: ſo is it much more to be diſcommended then I can declare, that an infant newly borne ſhould be killed, though by defect of nature, want of ſeed, or any ſtraine or miſchance of the mother, or through abundance of ill humors, or any other ſtrange accident, it be borne imperfect, or marked as is ſaid.

Well, ſaid ſir *Robert Dillon*, it is true indeed that the law

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of *Lycurgus* was too cruell and vniuſt. But *Plato* in his books *de Repub.* deuiſed a more mild and reaſonable way: for he allowed not that ſuch children ſhould be killed, as holding it inhumane, yet he ordained that they ſhould be brought vp in ſome place appointed out of the citie, and that they ſhould be debarred all poſſibilitie of bearing any rule or magiſtracie in the Common-wealth. For it ſeemed, he thought that through the intemperance and diſordinate liuing of the parents, children came to be ingendred no leſſe deformed and corrupt in mind then in body: and therein the exceſſe of drinking wine to be a principall cauſe. In which reſpect he forbad as wel to the man as to the woman the vſe of wine at ſuch times as they were diſpoſed to attend the generation of children.

Plato (ſaid I) muſt not be left vnanſwered, neither wil I ſpare to ſay (by his leaue) that his law, though it be milder then the other, was neuerthemore allowable for the cauſes aboue ſpecified. For it is not alwayes true, that the imperfections of the body are likewiſe in the mind: or that a faire body hath euermore a faire mind coupled vnto it. Haue we not ſeene men of miſ-ſhapen bodies that haue had diuine minds, and others of goodly perſonages that haue bin very furies of hell? as *Plato* himſelfe conſtrained by the force of truth and dayly experience could not but confeſſe. The good or bad ſhape of the body therefore, muſt be no rule for vs to bring vp, or not to bring vp our children, though it be to be eſteemed a great grace to be borne with ſeemely and wel proportioned members: and that it is a ſpeciall point of happineſſe to haue a faire mind harbored in a comely body, becauſe both together beare with them a naturall grace, pleaſing and gratefull to the eyes of men, conſtraining in a ſort

the loue of all that behold them: which thing *Virgil* wel vnderſtanding, when he ſpake of *Eurialus*, ſaid,

Gratior & pulchro veniens in corpore virtus,
Adiuuat, &c.

For although vertue of it ſelfe be louely and to be highly eſteemed, yet when ſhe is accompanied with the beauty of the bodie, ſhe is more amiable (whatſoeuer *Seneca* the Stoicke, more ſeuere then need, pleaſe to ſay) and with more affection embraced of all them that ſee her. Which thing appeared in *Scipio Africanus*, when he met with *Aſdrubal* his enemy in the preſence of king *Siphax:* for as ſoone as the ſubtill African had beheld the comely preſence and gratefull countenance of *Scipio*, he forthwith conceiued that, which afterward fell out, to wit, that *Scipio* would draw *Siphax* to ioyne with the Romanes, againſt the Carthaginians. But for all this we are not in any wiſe to eſteeme a perſon in body miſ-ſhapen or deformed, leſſe worthy to be nouriſhed, or to be admitted to magiſtracie, if he be vertuous, then the other that is of gratefull preſence. For though *Ariſtotle* thinke the deformitie of the body to be an impediment to the perfect felicitie of man, in reſpect of exteriour things; yet he determineth, that it is no hindrance to the courſe of vertue. To conclude therfore this point, though children be borne weake, crooked, miſ-ſhapen, or deformed of body, they are not therefore to be expoſed, but as wel to be brought vp and inſtructed as the other, that they may grow and increaſe in vertue, and become worthy of thoſe dignities which are diſpenſed in their commonweales. And, me thinketh, *Socrates* that wiſe man ſpake very well to his ſcholers, and to this purpoſe, when he aduiſed them, that they ſhould often behold themſelues in looking-glaſſes: to the end (ſaid he) that if you ſee your faces

faces and bodies comely and beautifull, ye may endeuor to ſet forth and grace the gifts of nature the better, by adioyning vertues thereunto: and if ye perceiue your ſelues to be deformed and il-fauoured, you may ſeeke to ſupply the defects of nature, with the ornaments of vertue, thereby making your ſelues no leſſe grateful and amiable then they that haue beautiful bodies. For it is rather good to ſee a man of body imperfect and diſproportioned endued with vertues, then a goodly body to be nought elſe but a gay veſſell filled with vice and wickednes. Children are to be bred, ſuch as nature giueth them vnto vs, and we are to haue patience to abide their proof, and to ſee what their actions will be: and if theirs that be of deformed body, do proue good and vertuous, they are ſo much the more to be commended, as they ſeemed leſſe apt thereunto by their birth. And on the contrary ſide, they that being beautifull of body, are lewd and vitious, deſerue to be driuen from the conuerſation of ciuil men; yea chaſed out of the world, as vnthankful acknowledgers of ſo great a gift beſtowed vpon them, and as vnworthy to liue among men. Theſe how faire ſoeuer (be they children or men) that cary one thing in their tongue, and another in their heart, be they that deſerue to be hunted out of all ciuill ſocietie, that are ingrate for benefites receiued; who hurt, or ſeeke to hurt them that haue done them good, and hate them, onely becauſe they cannot but know themſelues to be bound vnto them. Theſe be they that in very truth are crooked, miſ-ſhapen and monſtrous, and might well be condemned to be buried quicke: not ſimple innocent babes, who, hauing no election, can yeeld no tokens either of good or euill; againſt whom to pronounce ſentence of death before they haue offended, is great iniuſtice and exceeding crueltie. And this

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(loe) is the ſentence of this author touching the doubt propoſed, wherein (if you reſt ſatisfied) I will proceede.

All the companie aſſented to the ſame: and then Maſter *Dormer* ſaid; Now then (I pray you) let vs heare you declare what this end is, whereof you were diſcourſing when this doubt was propoſed, and withall we muſt expect that you ſhall ſhew vs and ſet vs in the way wherein we are to trauel for the attaining thereof, and giue vs precepts whereby that perfection may be purchaſed, vnto which all men deſirous to become happie in this life, direct their actions and their endeuours.

Of this expectation (quoth I) you need not feare to be fruſtrated, for here ſhall you haue enough (I aſſure my ſelfe) to fulfill your deſire: and therewith, peruſing my papers, I thus followed. The end of man in this life, is happineſſe or felicitie: and an end it is called (as before was ſaid) becauſe all vertuous actions are directed thereunto, and becauſe for it chiefly man laboureth and trauelleth in this world. But for that this felicitie is found to be of two kinds, wherof one is called ciuill, and the other contemplatiue: you ſhall vnderſtand that the ciuill felicitie is nothing elſe then a perfect operation of the mind, proceeding of excellent vertue in a perfect life; and is atchieued by the temper of reaſon, ruling the diſordinate affects ſtirred vp in vs by the vnreaſonable parts of the mind, (as when the time ſhall ſerue will be declared) and guiding vs by the meane of vertue to happy life. The other which is called contemplation, or contemplatiue felicitie, is likewiſe an operation of the mind, but of that part thereof which is called intellectiue, ſo that thoſe parts which are void of reaſō, haue no intermedling with the ſame: for he which giueth himſelfe to follow this felicitie,

licitie, ſuppreſſeth all his paſſions, and abandoning all earthly cares, bendeth his ſtudies and his thoughts wholy vnto heauenly things; and kindled and inflamed with diuine loue, laboureth to enioy that vnſpeakable beauty, which hath bin the cauſe ſo to inflame him, and to raiſe his thoughts to ſo high a pitch. But foraſmuch as our purpoſe is now to intreate onely of the humane precepts and inſtructions, and of that higheſt good, which in this vale of miſery, may be obtained: ye ſhall vnderſtand that the end whereunto man ought to direct all his actions, is properly that ciuill felicitie before mentioned; which is, an inward reward for morall vertues, and wherein fortune can chalenge no part or intereſt at all. And this end is ſo peculiar to reaſon, that not onely vnreaſonable creatures can be no partakers thereof, but yong children alſo are excluded from the ſame. For albeit they be naturally capable of reaſon, yet haue they no vſe of her, through the imperfection of their yong age, becauſe this end being to be attained by perfect operations in a perfect life, neither of which, the child, nor the yong man is able to performe, it followeth that neither of them can be accounted happie. And by the ſame reaſon it commeth to paſſe, that though man be the ſubiect of felicitie, yet neither the child nor the yong man may be ſaid properly to be the ſubiect therof, but in power and poſſibilitie only: yet the yong man approcheth nearer thereunto then the child. And thus much may ſuffice for a beginning, to ſatisfie the firſt part of your demaund.

Then ſaid Captaine *Carleil*, ſeeing you haue propoſed to vs this end, which is the marke (as it were) whereat all ciuill actions do leuel, as at their higheſt or chiefeſt good, we will now be attentiue to heare the reſt, and how you will preſcribe a man to order his life, ſo as from his child-

hood, and ſo forward from age to age, he may direct his thoughts and ſtudies to the compaſſing of this good, or *ſummum bonum*, as Philoſophers do terme it.

That ſhal you alſo vnderſtand, quoth I, but then muſt the diſcourſe thereof be drawne from a deeper conſideration. Thoſe men that haue eſtabliſhed lawes for people to be ruled by, ought to haue framed ſome among the reſt for the foundation of mans life, by which a true and certaine forme of life might be conceiued, and ſuch, as beginning to leade him from his childhood, might haue ſerued him for a guide, vntill he had attained to thoſe riper yeares, wherein he might rather haue bin able to inſtruct others, then need to be himſelfe inſtructed. For the foundation of honeſt and vertuous liuing, beginneth euen in childhood: neither ſhal he euer be good yong mā, that in his childhood is naught; nor a wicked yong man lightly proue good when he is old. For, ſuch as are the principles and beginnings of things, ſuch are the proceedings. Whereupon the wiſeſt men of the world, haue euer thought, that the way to haue cities and commonwealths furniſhed with vertuous and ciuil men, conſiſted in the bringing vp of childrē commendably. But among all the lawes of our time, there is no one that treateth of any ſuch matter. There are orders and lawes both vniuerſall and particular, how to determine cauſes of controuerſie, to end ſtrifes and debates, and how to puniſh malefactors: but there is no part in the whole body of the law, that ſetteth downe any order in a thing of ſo great importance. Yet *Plato* held it of ſuch moment, as knowing that the well bringing vp of children, was the ſpring or wel-head of honeſt life: he thought it not ſufficient, that the fathers onely ſhould take care of nurturing their children, but appointed beſides publike magiſtrates

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in the common-wealth, who ſhould attend that matter, as a thing moſt neceſſary. For though man be framed by nature mild and gentle, yet if he be not from the beginning diligently inſtructed and taught, he becometh of humane and benigne that he was, more fierce and cruell then the moſt wild and ſauage beaſt of the field. Wheras if he be conueniently brought vp, and directed to a commendable courſe of life: of benigne and humane that he is, he becometh through vertue in a ſort diuine. And to the end the cauſe may be the better knowne, why ſo great diligence is needful and requiſite, you muſt vnderſtand, that although our ſoule be but one in ſubſtance, and properly our true forme, yet hath it not one onely part, power, or facultie, or vertue (as we may call it) but diuers, appointed for diuers and ſundry offices. For we being participant of the nature of all things liuing, and thoſe being deuided into three kinds; it is neceſſary that man ſhold haue ſome part of euery of thoſe three. There is then one baſe and inferiour kind of life of leſſe eſtimation then the reſt, and that is the life of trees and plants, and of all ſuch things as haue roote in the earth, which ſpring, grow, bloome, and bring forth fruite: which fruit *Ariſtotle* ſayth, cometh from them in ſtead of excrement, together with their ſeed. And theſe trees and plants, and ſuch like growing things, haue onely life, deuoid of feeling (though *Pythagoras* thought otherwiſe) or of any knowledge: but by the benefite of nature onely, they ſpring, they grow, and bring forth fruite and ſeed for the vſe of man, and for the maintaining of their kind. There is another kind of life, leſſe imperfect then that, which is the ſame that perfect liuing creatures haue (for of that life, which is in maner a meane between the life of plants and this of ſenſible creatures, we need not now to ſpeake;

or if it were, we ſhould reſemble it to that which Phyſitions call *Embrio*, and is the creature vnperfect in the wombe, whiles it is betweene the forme of ſeed, and of the kind whence it cometh) which life of perfect liuing creatures, hath in it by nature power to feele, and to moue from place to place. For we ſee they ſtir and feele, and haue power to deſire thoſe things that are meete for the maintaining of their life and of their nature. And by natural inclination, and for the increaſe and continuance of their kinds, they couet the ioyning of their bodies, to yeeld vnto nature that, which of nature they haue receiued, that is, to ingender the like vnto themſelues. But this power of the ſoule, cannot vſe that force and vertue which naturally it hath, if it haue not withall that former part which is proper (as is ſaid) to plants, & is called *vegetatiue* (you muſt giue me leaue to vſe new words of Art, ſuch as are proper to expreſſe new conceits, though they be yet ſtrange, and not denizened in our language) becauſe it giueth life and increaſe to growing things, and without it the power of feeling doth vtterly faile. Next after this, cometh that excellent and diuine part of the ſoule, which bringeth with it the light of reaſon, containing in it the powers, faculties, or vertues of the other two. For it hath that life which proceedeth from plants; it hath ſenſe or feeling, & motion frō place to place, proper to the ſecond kind; and it hath beſides that other part, wherby it knoweth, vnderſtādeth, diſcourſeth, cōſulteth, chuſeth, and giueth it ſelfe to operation, and to contemplate things naturall and diuine: and this part is proper only to man. And as by the two other faculties before mentioned, we are like to plants and to bruite beaſts: ſo by this laſt, we do participate of the diuine nature of God himſelfe. Wherefore *Ariſtotle* ſaid, that man was created

ted vpright, for no other cauſe, then for that his ſubſtance was diuine, whoſe nature and office is to know and vnderſtand. And truly this gift is giuen vnto vs by the maker and gouernour of all things, becauſe we might know our ſelues to be of a nature moſt perfect among earthly things, and not farre inferiour to the diuine. And that we haue receiued ſo ſingular a gift from Almightie God for no other cauſe, but onely to the end we might perceiue how all other things that grow and liue on earth, are corruptible, and do reſolue into their firſt principles or beginnings, and ceaſe any more to be, as ſoone as the ſoule of life departeth from them: but that our minds are immortal and incorruptible, whereby we may reſt aſſured of an eternall life. Since then theſe three faculties of the ſoule are in vs, it is cleare, that as the plants, among things that beare life, are the moſt imperfect; ſo that part of the ſoule is moſt vnperfect which is proper to their kind: but it is ſo neceſſary to all other kinds, as without it there is no life, and with it the reſt of the faculties that are ioyned therewith, though they be worthier, decay and fall. And this neceſſitie of nature, that without it ſhe giueth no life, maketh the ſame to be moſt baſe and ignoble. For among natural things, thoſe, which are ſo neceſſary, as without them nothing can be done, are alwaies held and reputed the moſt vnworthy. Which thing we may ſee in that we call *Materia prima*: which though it be in nature before the *forme*, yet becauſe of the neceſſitie thereof, it is eſteemed of no nobilitie in compariſon of the *forme*. And euen ſo likewiſe among the ſenſes, that of feeling is held the baſeſt, becauſe no perfect liuing creature can be without it, nor yet the reſt of the ſenſes, vnleſſe that be preſent. And therefore *Ariſtotle* ſaid, that the other ſenſes were giuen to man, that

thereby he might liue the better; but the ſenſe of feeling was giuen him, becauſe without it he could neither be, nor liue. Now for ſo much as life may be without ſenſe, becauſe the *ſenſitiue* ſoule is not of ſuch neceſſitie as is the *vegetatiue*, therefore is that of more nobilitie then this ſomewhat, yet inferiour to the *intellectiue*, which can no more be without the *ſenſitiue*, then the *ſenſitiue* without the *vegetatiue*. And becauſe the *intellectiue* ſoule is not of neceſſitie ſeruing to any other facultie or power, therfore is ſhe as Lady, Miſtris, and Queene ouer all other the powers, faculties, or vertues of the ſoul; ſo as there is none proper vnto man, but that whereby he may be either good or bad, happie or vnhappie: and the ſame is it, whereby we vnderſtand and make choice rather of one courſe of life then of another. This great gift hath God beſtowed vpon vs, to ſhew his great grace and goodnes, and for this purpoſe, that, as he hath inuited vs through vertue of our vnderſtanding to the knowledge of truth, and by this knowledge to become like vnto himſelfe; ſo we ſhould bend all our ſtudy and endeuours thereunto, as the end and ſcope of our life in this world. Of which, the occaſion of this our preſent ſpeech did firſt ariſe.

Here I pawſing a while, as to take breath, and withall to order ſome of the papers, the Lord Primate ſpake, ſaying: Hauing treated thus farre of the powers, faculties, vertues, or parts of the ſoule, I thinke it not impertinent to moue a queſtion, whether they be in man ſeparate, and in ſeuerall places; or whether they be vnited all together, and ſeated in one place?

This queſtion (quoth I) is very pertinent to this place, and by the author here reſolued as a doubt, not lightly or eaſie to be anſwered. Firſt, for that there haue not wanted ſome, who would needs haue that theſe three powers

of

of the ſoule, were three diſtinct ſoules, and not ioyned in one ſoule, appointed for ſeuerall offices. But becauſe that opiniõ hath bin eſteemed but vaine, it needeth not to be inſiſted vpon; but briefly that I declare, what *Ariſtotle* and *Plato*, with their followers, haue held. The firſt, with his ſcholers, affirme the reaſonable ſoule to be in ſubſtance indiuiſible: and albeit they aſſigne vnto her diuers vertues, yet will they not haue them to be indeed ſeueral and diuers, but that the diuerſitie ſhould proceed & conſiſt only in the maner of vnderſtanding them: ſuppoſing them to be in the ſoule after ſuch a ſort, as in the line of a circle, the inner part which is hollow or embowed, and the outward which is bended. Which two parts, though we vnderſtand them diuerſly, yet are they but one line, and not ſeuerall. Neither do they aſſigne vnto her diuers places: but ſay that ſhe is all and whole in all our body, and in euery part of the ſame, and apt there to exerciſe all her functions, if the parts were apt to receiue them. But becauſe euery part is not diſpoſed to receiue them, therefore ſhe maketh ſhew of them onely in ſuch as are made fit inſtruments to execute her powers and faculties. So giueth ſhe vertue to the eye to ſee, to the eare to heare, and to the reſt of the members that are the inſtruments of our ſenſes. But *Plato* and his ſect, haue giuẽ to euery power or facultie of the ſoule, a peculiar ſeate in mans body: for though they held the ſoul to be but one, endued with ſeueral vertues or powers; yet they affirmed that euery one of thoſe had a ſeuerall ſeate appointed in mans body. To the *vegetatiue* (from which, as from a fountaine, they ſaid, the *concupiſcible* appetite doth flow) they appointed the Liuer for her place. To the *ſenſitiue*, whence cometh (ſay they) the feruent paſſion of anger, they gaue the Heart. But the reaſonable ſoule (as being the

the moſt diuine thing vnder heauen, they aſſigned to hold her ſeate, like a Queene in a royal chaire, euen in the head: vnto which opinion, all the Greek authors of Phyſicke haue leaned, and ſpecially *Galen* the excellent interpreter of *Hippocrates*, who hath not onely attributed three ſeuerall ſeates to the three ſeuerall faculties of the ſoule, in reſpect of their operations; but hath alſo ſhewed with what order thoſe members are framed, that muſt be the receptacles of thoſe faculties. For he ſheweth how the firſt member, that taketh forme after the conception, is the liuer, from whence ſpring all the veines, that like ſmall brookes, carry bloud ouer all the body. And in this member doth he place the liuing or nouriſhing ſoule, which we haue termed *vegetatiue*, affirming it to be moſt approching to nature. Next vnto this, he placeth the heart, wherein all the vitall ſpirits are forged, and receiue their ſtrength: for the generation whereof, the liuer ſendeth bloud thither, where it is refined, and made more pure and ſubtill; and from thence by the arteries (which all ſpring from the heart) the ſame ſpirits are ſpread thoroughout the whole body. And theſe two principall members, are the ſeates of the two principall appetites, the *iraſcible* and the *concupiſcible*; of that the heart, of this the liuer. And becauſe all this while the creature hath yet no need (as being vnperfect) of ſenſe or motion, it is buſied about nothing but receiuing of nouriſhment. Somewhat further off from the heart, beginneth the braine to grow, and from it do all the ſenſes flow; and then (loe) beginneth the child to take forme and ſhape of a perfect creature, the face, the hands, and the feet being then faſhioned, with the other parts of the body, apt for feeling and voluntary mouing: and from thence be deriued the ſinewes, the bands or ligaments,

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and muſcles are framed, by which the motions of the members are diſpoſed. This part is the ſeate of the reaſonable ſoule, by vertue and power of which, we vnderſtand, we will, we diſcourſe, we know, we chuſe, we contemplate and do all thoſe operations which appertaine vnto reaſon. And as nature hath placed the braine a good diſtance off from the other two principall members; ſo hath ſhe framed a cartilage, or thin rynd, or skin to ſeuer the heart from the liuer and other inward bowels, as with a fence or hedge betweene them and the other baſer parts that are leſſe pure. For the heart is purer, and ſo is that bloud which conueyeth the ſpirits from it throughout the body, then the liuer; or the bloud which is ingendred in the ſame. And in this reſpect was *Ariſtotle* iuſtly reprehended by *Galen*, in that he gaue to the heart alone, that which appertained to all three the principall members aforeſaid. For though he aſſigned diuers vertues or powers to the ſoule, yet he placed them all in the heart alone; from which he ſaid (contrary to that which common ſenſe and experience teacheth) that all the veines, arteries and ſinewes of the body were deriued. But becauſe we ſhould go too farre aſtray from our purpoſe, if I ſhould diſcourſe particularly all that which may be ſaid in this matter, I will returne (if you ſo thinke good) to our former purpoſe, which I left to ſatisfie your demaund.

Thus much (ſaid the Lord Primate) hath not a little opened the vnderſtanding of this matter, and therefore you may proceed, vnleſſe any other of the company haue any other doubt to propoſe. But they all being ſilent, and ſeeming attentiue to heare further, I ſaid; Now that you haue vnderſtood what the powers and faculties of the ſoule are, it followeth to be declared, how the ages

of mãs life haue ſimilitude with the ſame. As the ſoule of life therfore, called *vegetatiue*, is the foundatiõ of the reſt, and conſequently of the baſeſt: ſo is the age of childhood the foundatiõ of the other ages, and therfore the leaſt noble, for the neceſſity which it carieth with it. And becauſe vpõ it, the other ages are built, there ought the greater diligence to be vſed about the ſame, to make it paſſe on towards the other more noble then it ſelf: ſo as we may reaſonably cõceiue a hope, that frõ a wel-guided childhood the child may enter into a cõmendable youth, and thence paſſe to a more riper age, by the directiõ of vertue. But firſt ye muſt vnderſtãd, that *Ariſtotle* wil in no wiſe yeeld, that this inferior ſoule ſhould be capable of reaſon; and therfore placeth in the ſenſible ſoule, both the *concupiſcible* and the *iraſcible* appetites. And contrariwiſe, *Plato* (as before is ſaid) diſtinguiſheth theſe two affects, into both theſe faculties of the ſoule, giuing to the firſt the *concupiſcible*, and the *iraſcible* to the other. And becauſe *Plato* his opinion hath generally bin better allowed then *Ariſtotles*, I will ſpeake thereof according as *Plato* hath determined. This baſer ſoule then, being that, whereby we be nouriſhed, we grow, we ſuſtaine life, and receiue our body and being; about whoſe maintaining and increaſe, ſhe vſeth continually, whether we wake or ſleep, without any endeuour of our owne, her vertue and operation (if food and nouriſhment faile not) is in her ful force, chiefly in childhood: and as ſoone as the child is borne, ſtirreth vp the deſire of food, to the end that by little and little it might gather ſtrength of body, to become apt for the vſe of the ſoule, whoſe organ or inſtrument it is, for the accompliſhing of the more noble operations meet for man. And becauſe the milk of the mother, or of the nurſe, is the firſt fit food for the infant; it were to be wiſhed,

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that it ſhould receiue the ſame rather from the mother, then from any ſtrange woman: for, in reaſon, the ſame ſhould be more kindly and natural for the babe then any other. In conſideration whereof, the inſtructors of ciuill life, haue determined and taught, that it is the fathers office to teach and inſtruct the child, but the mothers to nouriſh it. For wiſe men ſay, that Nature hath giuen to women their breſts, not ſo much for defence of the hart, as becauſe they ſhould nouriſh their children: and that ſhe hath giuē them two paps, to the end that they might nouriſh two, if by chance they ſhold be deliuered of two at once. And truly it cannot be, but that would much increaſe both the loue of the mother to the child, and likewiſe that of the child to the mother. Neuertheles, if it fal out (as oftentimes it doth) that the mother cannot giue ſucke to her child, or for other conſiderations ſhe giue it forth to be nurſed to another woman; yet is there ſpecial regard to be had, in getting ſuch a nurſe as may be of good complexion, and of a louing nature, and honeſt conditions, that with milke it may alſo ſuck a diſpoſition to a vertuous and commendable life.

By your licence (ſaid M. *Dormer*) let me aske you a queſtion, whether you thinke that the mind taketh any qualitie from the nutriment of the body: for if the mind be diuine, me ſeemeth it is againſt reaſon, that it ſhould not be of greater power, then to receiue corruption from the nutriment of the body.

You ſay very well, quoth I, and here ſhall you be reſolued of that doubt. That the mind is a diuine thing, cannot be denied. And if the vertue of the mind (which is reaſon) could be freed from the company of thoſe other two faculties of the ſoule, void of reaſon, in reſpect of themſelues, it would doubtleſſe remaine ſtill in perfe-

ction of one nature, and not receiue any vice from that nutriment, which yeeldeth matter to the baſeſt facultie of the ſoule to maintaine and increaſe the body, but euermore practiſe her proper operations and vertue: but becauſe it hapneth too often, partly by the ill qualitie of the nutriment, and partly for want of care in the education, that the part wherein the *vegetatiue* power lieth, getteth ouermuch ſtrength, and allured by the delights of the ſenſible part, giueth it ſelfe wholy to follow the pleaſures of the ſenſes, the mind being oppreſſed, cannot performe the offices and functions pertaining thereunto. And for this cauſe *Plato* affirmed, that vnhealthfull bodies make the minds weake. And the body can neuer be ſound or healthfull, when it is giuen to follow that baſer part of the ſoule, and the luſts and ſenſualities of the ſame, whereby it forceth the mind preuailing againſt reaſon. Not but that the mind is neuertheles diuine, but becauſe the body being the neceſſary inſtrument of the mind, when it is wreſted and drawne to an ill habit, the mind cannot vſe it as it would, and the light of reaſon is darkned & hindred, not through any defect of the mind, but onely in reſpect of the inſtrument that is become rebellious. Euen as if a candle ſhould be put into a cloſe veſſell, that the light thereof could not appeare: for the not yeelding of light, ſhould not proceed from the defect of the candle, but of the veſſell that incloſed the ſame. To the end therefore that the child receiue not any vicious habit by the qualitie of his firſt food and nouriſhment; wiſe men haue aduiſed, that the nurſe to be choſen for a child, ſhould not be baſe or of vile condition, that the child might be the apter to be brought vp to vertue: that ſhe be not of ſtrange nation, leſt ſhe ſhould giue it ſtrange or vnſeemely manners, vnfit or diſagreeable

to the cuſtomes and conditions of the houſe or citie wherein it is borne, and wherein it is to liue: and laſtly, that ſhe be of good and commendable behauiour, to the end that with the milk it may ſuck good conditions, and an honeſt diſpoſition to vertuous life. And becauſe the nurſe may be kept in houſe, or ſuffered to carry the child to her owne dwelling place; of the two, it is to be wiſhed that the parents ſhould rather keepe her in their owne houſe, to the end that euen from his infancy it might learne to know the father and mother, and the reſt of the family, and take by little and little the faſhions and manners of the houſe. For the minds of children, whiles they be yong, are like to the yong tender ſlips of trees, which a man may bend and ſtraighten as he liſt; and are faſhioned to ſuch cuſtomes and conditions as may beſt beſeeme them. For looke what behauiour they firſt learne, the ſame they retaine and keepe a long while after. Wherefore *Phocilides* ſaid right well:

Whiles yet in tender yeares the child doth grow,
Teach him betimes conditions generous.

Great is the care then that fathers ought to vſe in framing the manners and diſpoſition of their children, when they be yong and tender in their owne houſes, and are yet in their nurſes laps. Hauing regard not to vſe them either ouer-curſtly, or ouer-fondly: for as the firſt ouer-aweth them, maketh them dull and baſe, and vile minded, by taking away the generoſitie of their minds; the other bringeth them to be wantons and waiward, ſo as they will neuer be ſtill, but euer crying and wrawling for they wote not what. For being yet but new in the world, and not acquainted with thoſe things, the images whereof are preſented to them by the ſenſes of hearing and ſeeing; they eaſily giue themſelues to way-

wardnes and crying, when they ſee any ſtrange ſight or images, or heare a fearfull ſound or noiſe, the rather by reaſon of the melancholy humor, which they bring with them from the mothers womb, (reaſon hauing yet little or no force in them, and their iudgments being too weak to diſtinguiſh good from euill, or what is hurtfull, from what may do them good:) not that naturally they be ſo, for that tender age is rather ſanguine and aëriall; but thorough the remnant of that bloud, from which they receiued their nutriment in their mothers belly: vnto which their crying, the vſuall remedy is the mouing them from place to place, the rocking of them in their cradles, & the dandling of them; for ſuch motions do diuert them from thoſe fearfull impreſſions, and make them the leſſe wayward and comberſome, quieting the inward paſſions of the mind. Beſides that, ſuch ſtirring of them, wakeneth and kindleth in them that naturall heate which helpeth the digeſtion of humors in them, and maketh them apt to be well nouriſhed and ſtrengthened againſt thoſe outward feares, which cauſe their waywardnes and crying. Hereunto may be added the ſinging of their nurſes, whereby they commonly ſtill them, vſing it, as taught by nature onely: which ſome men thinke cometh to paſſe, by reaſon that the ſoule is (as they ſay) compoſed of harmony, and therefore is delighted with that which is proper and naturall to it ſelfe. Others (haply of better iudgement) ſay, that children are ſtilled by the ſinging of their nurſes, becauſe one contrary expelleth and driueth away another, when it is the ſtronger: ſo as the nurſes ſinging being lowder then the childs crying, therefore it preuaileth. But the moſt effectuall reaſon is, that the *vegetatiue* power or facultie being of moſt force in that age, and it taking pleaſure in things delightfull, and abhorring thoſe

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that are diſpleaſant and noiſome; when with crying it findeth it ſelfe annoyed, it doth more willingly admit the nurſes ſinging, and becometh calme and ſtill by hearing the numbers and ſweetnes of the voice delighting them. Thus then are children drawne from waywardnes to be ſtil, from crying to mirth, and become thereby the more liuely and fuller of ſpirit, and ſtirred vp to a better kind of life; growing by little and little apt to vnderſtand, and to ſpeake as nature may permit thē. In which time ſpecially, great diligence is to be vſed, that they neither heare any diſhoneſt or vnſeemely ſpeeches, vnfit for a generous mind to conceiue, nor ſee any ſights that be ſhamefull or vndecent to behold. For theſe two ſenſes, of all the reſt, are of moſt importance in this life; for that the images of things are repreſented to the mind by the eies, and by the eares do the conceits and words enter into the ſame. And of theſe two ſenſes, do the eares ſo much the more helpe vs towards the learning of a ciuill life, as the ſentences of wiſe men paſſe thereby into our vnderſtanding. And whereas the things which we learne by the eyes, are but dumbe words: ſo do the eares heare the liuely voices, by which we learne good diſciplines, & the true maner of well liuing. And therefore *Xerxes* ſaid, that the mind had his dwelling in the eares, which were delighted with the hearing of good words, and grieued at the hearing of vnſeemely. And the auncient wiſe men conſidering the great profit which the eares yeelded towards the attaining of knowledge, accounted them as conſecrated to Prudence and to Wiſedome. In which reſpect alſo, when they met their children, they kiſſed them on the eare, as if they meant to make much of that part chiefly, by which they hoped their children were to learne wiſedome. And for this cauſe ought they that

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haue the care of bringing vp children to be very circumſpect, neuer to pronounce any word before them, but ſuch as are modeſt, and may tend to the inſtruction of a good life. For though it ſeeme not, that yong children marke ſuch things; yet what they heare and ſee, doth ſecretly enter into their tender minds, and there take inſenſible rootes: which, when men think leaſt of any ſuch matter, bringeth foorth fruite agreeable to the ſeed was ſowne. And of ill ſeed, the fruite cannot but alſo be euill. Let fathers then take great heed to the modeſty of ſpeech and honeſt behauiour of all his family, and ſpecially of the nurſes, in whoſe boſoms their children are euer held, and in whoſe faces their eyes are alwayes fixed; becauſe they note and obſerue moſt what they do or ſay, hauing leſſe regard to others. And thus, vnderſtanding, increaſing in the child with yeares, as ſoone as he is come to be capable of any precept, before all other things it is expedient that care be had to make him conceiue a knowledge of that ſimple, pure and omnipotent nature, the moſt high and euerliuing God, and that the ſame be ſo imprinted in his heart, as he may learne God to be the Creator of all things, the giuer of life, and maintainer therof, the diſpoſer of all gifts & graces, and the only diſpenſer of al goodnes: ſo as he may be made to vnderſtād, that he receiues al goodnes frō his diuine Maieſty. Therfore they that giue vnto him any thing, how ſmal ſoeuer a trifle it be, or a toy, ſhall do well to offer it vnto him, as a thing ſent vnto him, or made for him by God, by little and little to acquaint his mind, and to faſhion it to the knowledge of God, and of his diuine power and goodnes. For by this meanes ſhall there be a ſure and firme foundation layd, whereupon a ſtrong and neuer-failing frame of good manners and godly inſtructions may be built:

built: and without this foundation, all other care will be ſpent but in vaine. For he that is void of religion, and of that feare of God, which is in effect but a due reuerence vnto his Maieſty, can neuer in all the whole courſe of his life, do any thing worthy prayſe or commendation. Whereas on the other ſide, he that hath this holy feare fixed in his mind, will alwayes abſtaine from doing any thing vnfitting or diſhoneſt, or that may offend God, and bring him to his wrath and indignation. And if perhaps through the frailtie of our nature apt to offend, by reaſon of the ſpot of ſinne, wherein we are conceiued, throgh the diſobedience of our firſt father *Adam*, he happen to fall ſomtime into any ſin, he is forthwith ſtrucken with that ſame religious feare and reuerence, and being aſhamed of himſelf, ſeeketh to make reconciliation therfore; to the end he may not dwell in the wrath and diſpleaſure of Almighty God, from whom he acknowledgeth as well his life and being, as whatſoeuer good beſides he hath in this mortall life. To the attaining of this religion, will the example of the father greatly further the child, if to him he ſhew himſelfe ſuch, as he wiſheth he ſhould become. For though the children of *Socrates* (as it is written) proued not capable of good diſcipline, though the father were a patterne or fountaine of honeſt and vertuous life, yet are we to aſſure our ſelues, that the example of the fathers life is the true and perfect mirror for the child to faſhion himſelfe by, that he may attaine a commendable courſe of life. For if the dumbe and ſenſleſſe images of excellent men, which the auncient Romanes held in their houſes, were ſufficient to ſtirre vp in young men, when they beheld them, a deſire to follow their ſteps, and to reſemble thoſe noble perſonages of their aunceſtors, whoſe reſemblances they beheld; ende-

uouring themſelues not to degenerate from the vertues and the nobilitie of their parents: how much more, may we thinke, that it wil moue the child to ſee in his fathers liuely face, and in his actions vertue imprinted, and daily repreſented. I know right well, that ſometimes the contrary is ſeene, through the inconſtancy of humane things: but if we conſider what happeneth for the moſt part, we ſhall find that good examples commonly are cauſes of good, and bad examples cauſes of euill. Since the child therfore is chiefly to learne of the father his forme of life, it is the fathers part to be to him in his tender yeares a liuely patterne of vertue, as we haue ſaid, wherby he may (as it were) ingraft into his childs mind that good and commendable kind of life, which may bring him by vertuous actions to honour and eſtimation. But becauſe it cometh oftener to paſſe then were requiſite, that the father being buſied about other matters concerning the order of his houſe and family, or elſe in the managing of the affaires of the common-wealth, he cannot attend the bringing vp of his child with that care that he ought, therfore muſt he prouide for his education, ſo as the ſame be not neglected. For as the true images of vertue are eaſily imprinted in the minds of childrē whiles they be tender: ſo do they quickly weare out and vaniſh, if they be not refreſhed and reuiued by the diſcretion and induſtry of ſome meet perſon appointed for that purpoſe, and their contraries as ſoone ingraued in their places. The father therefore ought in any wiſe to make choiſe of ſome ſuch man, to whom he may commit the charge and inſtruction of his child, when he is paſt the age of three yeares, as may be meet to giue him good example of life, and ſeaſon him with ſuch doctrine, as he may not degenerate or decline from that vertuous courſe of life which he

hath

hath endeuored to put into the babes mind, euen whiles he was yet in his nurſes armes, and vnder the charge of women. For if in thoſe firſt dayes of infancy, when yet he had almoſt no vnderſtanding, ſo great care was to be taken (as we haue ſaid) to lay a good foundation, how much more diligence is there now to be vſed, when he beginneth to haue ſome knowledge and iudgement, that the building may riſe anſwerable to the ſame. Wiſe men haue wiſely ſaid, that nature is the beſt miſtris we can haue: and the cuſtome of vertuous behauiour and wholſome doctrine being taken in tender yeares, is conuerted not onely into an habite, but euen into nature. Wherefore let the father at thoſe yeares giue his child in charge to ſome vertuous and godly man to be trained and inſtructed, who muſt be neither too mild nor too ſeuere; but ſuch, as may in ſome things agree with the manner of the nurſes bringing vp, to the end he may gently turne to other manners and behauiour then he had learned when he was moſt among women. For to take a child from the breſt, and from his nurſes boſome, and to put him ſuddenly vnder the hard gouernment of a curſt maſter, would be too violent a change, and force that tẽder nature ouermuch. But if he that ſhal then haue the ruling of him, ſhall diſcreetly win him with mildnes from being fond after the nurſe, and by little and little draw him to a more firme kind of behauiour, in ſuch ſort as he ſcarſe perceiue that he hath forſaken his nurſes lap: the child wil quickly delight to be with him as much as with his nurſe, yea or with his father or mother: and pratling or childiſhly crauing, now one thing, then another of him, there wil ſoone ſpring in his mind a deſire of knowledge: which deſire, though indeed it be naturall & borne with vs, yet hath it need to be holpẽ and ſtirred vp

to come forth and put it ſelfe in action; for elſe will it lie hidden and couered with the vnworthieſt part of the ſoule, like to the fire which is couered with aſhes: which though it haue naturally vertue to giue light and heate, yet vnleſſe that impediment be taken away, it wil do neither of both, nor be apt to worke his naturall effect. And therefore (as before is ſaid) he which ſhall take the charge of the child after the nurſe, muſt be very diſcreet to win him to his diſcipline without bitternes or ſtripes, which do rather dull and harden the childs mind, then worke any good effect. And the ſeruile feare which the ouerſharpe and vnaduiſed vſage or beating of the child bringeth him vnto, (not fit for a generous mind) maketh him to hate the thing he ſhould learne, before he can come to know it, much leſſe to loue it. It is alſo a thing very profitable for his better inſtructing, that there be others of like yeares in his company to learne with him; for ſo will there ariſe a certaine emulation among them, through which, euery of them will ſtriue to ſtep before his fellow: beſides that the conuerſation of ſuch as are like in age and qualitie, wel bred and brought vp, is a very fit occaſion to make them all wel mannered and of good behauiour, thoſe yong yeares being (as before is ſayd) apt for the ſimplicitie thereof, to take whatſoeuer forme is giuen vnto them. And for this cauſe was *Merides* King of the Ægyptians greatly commended among the auncient wiſe men, for that as ſoone as his ſonne *Siſoſtres* was borne, he cauſed all the children that were borne in the citie that ſame day, to be gathered together, and brought vp with his ſaid ſon, where they were inſtructed in all thoſe diſciplines and noble arts, that in thoſe dayes were in eſtimation, and meet to direct to a commendable life. And that the manner of good education is to pro-

proceed by degrees, it appeared by the order which the Kings of Perſia held in the bringing vp of thoſe who were to ſucceed them in their Empire. But becauſe our diſcourſe tendeth not to the inſtructing of Princes children, but onely of ſuch gentlemen of meaner qualitie as may be fit inſtruments for the ſeruice of their commonwealth or country: it will be beſt to paſſe that ouer in ſilence.

Whiles in this place I was pawſing a while, as to take ſome breath, Captaine *Carleil* ſayd in this ſort: I hope your author giueth not ouer ſo this matter. For howſoeuer his purpoſe was to diſcourſe of the ciuill life of priuate men, yet the declaring of the order which was held in the inſtructing and training vp of the children of thoſe Princes, cannot but be as well profitable as delightfull. Therefore let vs (I pray you) heare what is ſayd by him touching the ſame.

That ſhal I willingly do, ſaid I, for that the like requeſt was made to him by one of that company; and thus he proceedeth, ſaying, that though it might ſuffice to refer them to what *Xenophon* in his *Ciropædia* hath left written of that ſubiect, hauing learnedly and diligently vnder the perſon of *Cirus*, framed an *idæa* or perfect patterne of an excellent Prince: yet he meaning to follow *Plato* and *Ariſtotle* in his treatiſe, will therefore report what he hath gathered out of *Plato* to that purpoſe, and adde therunto briefly as much out of *Ariſtotle* as may ſerue for the better vnderſtanding of the reſt. You ſhall vnderſtand then that the cuſtome among theſe kings, was to giue the child who was to ſucceed in the kingdome, ſoone after he was borne, into the hands of thoſe Eunuchs that were eſteemed of beſt life in the court: whoſe care was chiefly to faſhion his body with all diligence, that it might be ſtraight

and moſt comely of ſhape and proportion; becauſe the firſt thing that is offred to the ſight in a King, is the grace and comelineſſe of his perſon, which maketh him to be reuerenced of his people, and beloued of his Peeres. His infancy being paſt, he was giuen in charge to others, that exerciſed him in handling his weapons, horſe-manſhip, and feates of armes; and likewiſe in hunting, as a meet exerciſe to frame him fit for military diſcipline. And this the father did, becauſe he was perſwaded that the knowledge of warre was one of the ſureſt foundations for the vpholding of a State or kingdome. When he was come to the age of 14. yeares, then was he deliuered ouer to foure other excellent perſonages, who were called the royall ſchoole-maſters, the one moſt wiſe and prudent, the other moſt iuſt, another moſt temperate, and the laſt moſt valiant. The firſt inſtructed him to know and honour God, and taught him the knowledge of things diuine and eternall, and withall, ſuch as appertaine to the life of a good Prince: by which he became learned, as wel in things contemplatiue, as in things concerning the actions neceſſary and conuenient for a King. For they exerciſed him dayly in the vnderſtanding of ſciences, and in the knowledge of good and vertuous behauiour, as two moſt neceſſary things to humane life, and which ſhould leade him the ready way to his felicitie and happines in this world; making him to know, that nothing was more miſerable in man then ignorance, and how by the generall conſent of the moſt wiſe men, he that is ignorant is eſteemed an ill man. To which purpoſe it is ſaid by *Cicero*, that there is no greater euill can befall a man then to be ignorant. And *Plato* (from whom the other drew his ſentence) ſayth, that all ignorant perſons were in that reſpect alſo miſerable. For Temperance being the rule

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and meaſure of Vertue, vpon which dependeth mans felicitie; the opinion of this diuine Philoſopher was, that he that was ignorant could not know temperance, and conſequently muſt be to ſeeke in the way of vertue: the defect whereof eſtrangeth a man from God, euen as the hauing of this ſingular vertue of temperance (wherof we ſhall ſpeake hereafter more at large) doth draw him neare vnto his Maieſty, to his great comfort and ſatisfaction. Ignorance therfore being a mortall infirmitie vnto mans mind, and ſuch a one as ſuffereth him not to enioy his felicitie, to which (as to the marke propoſed) he leuelleth all his actions: it is written that they of *Mitilene* intending ſeuerely to puniſh certaine of their confederates, who being armed with them in the field, had forſaken them, made a decree againſt them, that from thenceforth they ſhould not ſet their children to ſchoole to learne arts or ſciences. This firſt ſchoole-maſter teaching him thus, Religion and the feare of God; and training him in the mãners and behauiour appertaining to a King, did ſo long hold him vnder his gouernance, till it appeared he had taken well and perfectly that diſcipline. Then the ſecond maſter taking him in charge, taught him that which in conſequence next followeth to religion, that is, that there is nothing more fitting for a King then truth and veritie; that ſpeciall care was to be taken ſo to embrace the ſame, as he ſhould neuer haue one thing in his mouth, and another in his heart, as wicked and deceitful men haue, who are borne for the deſtruction of vertue, and of honeſt and wel-diſpoſed perſons: and that thoſe, who were to be taxed therewith, were not only deceiuers, but worthy the name of traitors. In regard wherof (as *Philoſtratus* writes) among the Indians, if any man bearing magiſtracy, were detected of a lie, he was preſently depriued of his magiſtracy,

ſtracy, and diſabled for euer after to beare any. And this did they, becauſe they conceiued (and that rightly) that he which reſpected not truth in matters of moment, deſtroyed as much, as in him lay, the ſocietie and ciuill conuerſation of men, ſince no man can truſt or beware of a lyer. Therfore (as *Plutarch* reporteth) *Epenetus* affirmed, that all iniuries and wickednes proceeded from a lyer. This ſchoole-maſter gaue him to vnderſtand, that as the nature of God is pure and ſimple, neuer deceiuing vs, whether we ſleepe or wake: ſo, ſeeing there was no dignitie vnder God ſo great as the Kings, he ought firſt, and aboue all things, to conforme himſelfe and his actions vnto that high and eternall truth, the feare & knowledge of whom, had bin formerly taught him. And as it ſeemed to them, that by truth he attained a reſemblance of God himſelfe: ſo did they think that by lying, a man was worthy to looſe the title of a man. Which thing haply he meant, who deuiſed *Pan* to be the ſon of *Mercury*, the inuenter of ſpeech, as Poets haue fained; ſignifying by the ſhape of *Pan*, vnder which is comprehended as well the falſe ſpeaker as the true; that the vpper part of his body bearing humane ſhape, betokeneth truth (then the which nothing is more proper to a man of vertue) but by the lower parts being crooked, and of ſhape like a goate, falſe and vntrue ſpeaking was ſignified: inferring that man by ſpeaking vntruth, becometh monſtrous, and of a reaſonable creature falleth to be a bruite beaſt: whence alſo proceeded that among the Perſians, a lie was reputed a moſt hainous offence. And we ſee that euen now among vs, it is reputed ſo great a ſhame to be accounted a lyer, that any other iniury is cancelled by giuing the lie; and he that receiueth it, ſtandeth ſo charged in his honor and reputation, that he cannot disburden himſelfe of that imputation,

putation, but by ſtriking of him that hath ſo giuen it, or by chalenging him the combat.

Captaine *Norreis* hearing thus much ſpoken of truth, and of the lie, interrupting me, ſaid; God grant your author follow this theame a while, that we ſoldiers may alſo haue ſome inſtruction from him. For this matter of the lie giuing and taking, is growne of late among vs to be confuſed and dangerous, ſo as a man can hardly tell, how to carry himſelfe in ſo many occaſions, and ſundry caſes, as dayly happen in companies, wherein perhaps the authoritie and reaſons of ſuch a man may yeeld vs no ſmall light.

Your wiſh therin (quoth I) ſhal not be fruſtrate, for the matter is by him handled at large: but let vs heare what be the points that you would ſpecially be reſolued in; for it is not vnlikely but that they will iump with the queſtion propoſed by one of thoſe perſons ſuppoſed in his dialogue.

Marry ſir (ſaid he) I would gladly know, ſince he hath ſpoken of truth and vntruth, and declared how the iniury receiued by taking the lie, cannot be cancelled, but by ſtriking or chalenging the partie who gaue it; whether this kind of chalenging and fighting man to man, vnder the name of *Duellum*, which is vſed now a dayes among ſouldiers and men of honour, and by long cuſtome authorized, to diſcharge a man of an iniury receiued, or for want of proofes in ſundry cauſes, be ancient or no? whether it concerne honor or no? and whether it appertaine to ciuill life, and that felicitie which we are diſcourſing vpon or no?

You haue (ſaid I) moued your queſtion very right, and to the purpoſe; which to anſwer at full, would require a long ſpeech: ſo deepe rootes like an ill weed, haue the

opinions of men taken concerning the ſame in this our age; which to cut downe or roote vp, many ſithes and howes would ſcarce ſuffice. But as briefly as may be, you ſhall be ſatisfied in part; and he will make it appeare vnto you, that the reaſons which are ſet downe in defence of this fooliſh cuſtome and wicked act, are falſe and abſurd. And firſt of all you ſhall heare him ſay, that this maner of combatting, which through the corruption of the world hath taken ſtrength, and is permitted of ſome Princes, is nothing auncient at all. For in hiſtories it is not to be found, that for reuenge of iniury, for want of proofes, for points of honour, or for any ſuch like cauſes, this wicked and vnlawfull kinde of fight, was euer graunted or allowed in auncient time. For when any difference or controuerſie fell out among men of honor, which might concerne their credit and reputation for matter of valor, they neuer tried the quarrell by combat betweene themſelues, but ſtroue to ſhew which of them was moſt worthy honor, by making their valour well knowne in fight againſt their common enemies, as in *Cæſars* Commentaries we haue a notable example. And the ſingular fights or combats, that are mentioned in the Greeke or Latine hiſtories, or fained by the Poets, happened euermore betweene enemies of contrary nations, or otherwiſe in time of publike warre, though perhaps the quarrell might be priuat betweene ſome of the chiefe men of both camps, as betweene *Turnus* and *Æneas*, *Paris* and *Menelaus*. *Turnus* labouring that *Æneas* might not haue *Lauinia* to his wife: and *Menelaus* ſeeking to recouer his wife whom *Paris* had taken from him. Or elſe they fought for the publike quarrell, one to one, or more in number on each ſide, for preuenting of greater bloodſhed, as did the *Horatij* and the *Curiatij* before Rome. Or by the ordinance

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of ſome publike games, as thoſe called *Pithij* and *Olimpici* among the Greeks, and thoſe called *Circenſes* among the Romanes, whether they were celebrated in honour of their Gods, or at the funerals of their dead, or for other cauſes. In which games or ſpectacles were produced certaine men, named by the Romanes *Gladiatores*, and by the Greeks *Monomachi*, to fight together; the firſt inuention wherof, appeareth to haue come from the people of *Mantinea*. But other priuate combats for cauſes aboue mentioned, was neuer ſo much as heard of among them, much leſſe receiued or allowed in their common-weales, which were well ordered and maintained by honeſt and vertuous lawes. The name of *Duellum* was giuen by the Latins, not to ſingular fight betweene man and man, but to the generall warre betweene two nations or States, as may be ſeene by *Plautus*, *Horace*, *Liuie*, and other authors. And as for them that ſay, the name of *Duellum* was vnproperly applied to an vniuerſal warre, they are not to be heard or beleeued, becauſe they that ſo vſed it, were the fathers of the Latine tongue, who knew better the proprietie of the words of their owne language, then theſe fellowes now do. But rather they are to be blamed for wreſting that auncient name to ſo wicked a fight, which they rightly gaue to the generall warre allowed by the lawes, and by all ciuil and politike conſtitutions.

The Primate, who had bin attentiue to this ſpeech, ſaid, as concerning the Latins, it is true that hath bin alledged: but it ſeemeth, the Greeks knew very well this combat, as may be gathered by the word *Monomachia*, which ſignifieth the fight of one man againſt another. And I remember *Plato* in his dialogue intituled *Laches*, maketh mention of this ſame ſingular fight, which ſheweth, that

in his dayes the combat of body to body was knowne and vſed.

Two things (ſaid I) the author hath ſaid, the one, that this ſort of battell or fight which is now in vſe, and called *Duellum*, was not knowne to the ancient Greeks nor Romanes in their wel-ordered Common-weales, and that therefore they gaue no ſuch name vnto the ſame: the other, that the Romanes gaue that name of *Duellum* to the publike warre betweene two people or nations, being enemies. But that the Greeks gaue not the name of *Monomachia* to thoſe ſingular fights which were vſed among them, that hath he not ſaid. But though the name of *Monomachia* were vſed among them, yet was it not meant of this kind of combat which we ſpeake, but of that onely which was ſometimes vſed in their publike games and ſpectacles, or elſe might fall out ſometimes accidentally in their warres. And that ſame place of *Plato* which you haue alledged, doth ſufficiently declare it. For if my memory faile me not, he ſaith there, that when the generall battell ceaſeth, and that it is requiſite either to fight with them that reſiſt, or to repulſe thoſe that would aſſault, in ſuch a caſe the *Monomachia*, or fight of man to man was meet to end all ſtrife. Which word of *Monomachia*, neuertheles I remember not to be vſed by *Ariſtotle* in any place of all his works, from whom neuertheles theſe men that defend this folly, ſeeme to fetch their arguments, as hereafter I ſhall declare. But by this you may perceiue that the vſe of *Monomachia*, was a fight betweene two men in their publike games and ſhewes, not for priuate quarrell or hatred, nor for want of proofes, or for points of honour. And further I will ſay, that in well ordered martiall diſcipline, and warres lawfully enterpriſed, after the fury of the battell was ceaſed, it was not lawfull

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to kill or hurt the publike enemy. Which thing is cleerly ſet foorth by *Xenophon* in the perſon of *Chriſantas*, who although he had caſt downe his enemy, and faſtned hold in the haire of his head, ready to haue ſtricken it off; yet hearing the trumpet ſound the retreit, forbare to ſtrike him, but let him go: holding it not fit to offend his enemy after the time of fight was paſt, ſignified by the retreit ſounding. This ſort of fight was likewiſe ſuffered againſt publike enemies by the Romanes when their ſtate flouriſhed. For we reade in their hiſtories of ſundry that haue in the warres fought hand to hand with their enemies; but yet could not the Romane ſouldier, though he were prouoked by his enemy to ſingular battell, fight with him without the licence of his General or Captain. And this was ſo religiouſly obſerued among them in that Common-weale (which was the patterne of all others) that the father ſpared not to condemne and ſlay his owne ſonne, who had gotten a notable victory in his abſence, becauſe he had without his fathers licence attempted to fight with the enemy. True it is, that for contention of valor, we reade that *Alexander* granted a combat betweene *Dioſippus* and his aduerſary, both being his ſouldiers and in his campe, though the one were a Macedonian, and the other an Athenian; which *Dioſippus* vnarmed, hauing onely a clubbe for weapon, ouercame the Macedonian armed with ſpeare and ſword, and other armour on his body. But this was not for quarrell of iniury receiued, for reuenge or want of proofes. Neither from this one example, is any concluſion to be drawne, that for ſtrife of valour the combat ſhould be granted. For the not admitting it afterwards in wel-ordered commonweales, nor by any other generall that we can reade, aboue once, doth plainly ſhew that it was rather a toy of

Alexanders head, then grounded vpon any reaſon: who among ſo many vertues as he had, wanted not other diſordered motions, which ſtained his nobleſt and moſt glorious actions, as that of the death of *Caliſthenes* and ſome others. By this then you may vnderſtand that amõg the Greeks our maner of combat was vnknown, & that it was not that which they cal *Monomachia*. But this wicked and deteſtable cuſtom of the combat ſprong firſt among the Longobards, a barbarous people; & much more barbarous is the thing it ſelfe growne, by the abuſe therof in our daies. For though they in ſome caſes grãted the combat, yet ſuffered they not their champions to fight with weapons of ſteele or iron, but only with ſtaues & targets, vnles it were in caſes of treaſon. But now vpõ euery quarell they come to fight with ſwords & daggers, and other like ſharp weapons, and with minds cruelly bent to murder and miſchiefe like moſt wild and ſauage beaſts. And thus much concerning the firſt queſtion may ſerue, ſince time wil not permit to treate of euery one at large.

Yea but, I think, ſaid captain *Carleil*, that if the combat be lawfull in caſes of treaſon or iniury to the Prince, the ſame reaſon ſhould make it lawfull alſo for other cauſes.

Not ſo, ſaid I, for treaſons or offences againſt the Princes perſons, offend the publike State, which repoſeth vpon the perſon of the Prince, and therefore the iniuries of priuate men are not to be compared vnto them. And as touching the ſecond point, whether it concerne honor or no: my author ſaith, that he that taketh ſo vniuſt a courſe to reuenge his priuate wrong, is ſo farre from getting honor thereby, as he rather looſeth whatſoeuer honor or reputatiõ he had before; the combat being a thing odious and offenſiue vnto God. For it is ſaid, that he reſerueth reuenge vnto himſelfe; which, they that by combat

bat ſeeke to wreake themſelues, take vpon them to do by their owne power and ſtrength, againſt all lawes diuine, naturall and poſitiue, in contempt of magiſtrates, contrary to the orders and conſtitutions of all wel-founded Common-weales: and finally contrary to all equity, and all ciuill and honeſt conuerſation. Howbeit I know there want not ſome, who with their confuſed arguments go about to make men beleeue, that ſo great an iniuſtice ſhould be equitie: not knowing, or faining not to know, that equitie is the tempering or mitigating the rigor of the law, which otherwiſe (like a tyrant) condemneth without mercy; being farre from fauouring the rigor of ſo vnreaſonable and ſo ſharpe a conflict, then the which, none can be imagined more furious or contrary to the nature of man. Yet forſooth to equitie do theſe maintainers of the combat ſeeke to draw this crueltie; arguing that of two euils, it is the leſſer; and that the leſſer euill is to be reputed in liew of a good, if not truly, yet reſpectiuely. Which argument is no way to be admitted, ſince that (God be thanked) without this leſſer euill, ſo many good Common-weales haue euer bin ruled, and at this day are ruled with good and politike gouernement; and the ſame neuer permitted, but where men forſake to follow reaſon, and like mad and deſperate people are tranſported by rage and fury. For what common-wealth, either auncient or moderne, well framed vpon honeſt and godly lawes, hath euer admitted this leſſer euill? And yet, Iwis, in all places and in all ages haue iniurious words and deeds paſt betweene men. Nay, the ſame hath euermore bin forbidden vtterly, and the inquirie and puniſhment of the wrong-doers bin reſerued to the magiſtrates. Neither doth their allegation of being included within the kind of warre generall, ſerue to their

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purpoſe. For the combat is not contained vnder warre, as the particular vnder the vniuerſall: for thoſe things that are contained vnder any vniuerſall, are of the ſame nature that the vniuerſal is: as we ſee man hath the nature of the liuing creature, vnder which he is contained, euen as is the bruite beaſt; but the combat is cleane contrary of nature to the vniuerſall warre, as ſhall be declared. Firſt great Lords and Princes who make warre, haue no magiſtrates ouer them to decide by iuſtice, and to end their controuerſies, as priuate men haue. Beſides that, when warre is moued againſt any Prince, the State and Common-weale is offended, publike orders are peruerted, honeſty put in danger, the way layd open to all iniury to the offence of Almightie God, and finally, whatſoeuer is good or honeſt in citie or country, brought into confuſion. And man being borne for the behoofe of his country, his Prince, his kinred and friends, and for the defence of religion, publike honeſty and of vertue; it is the dutie of euery man of vertue and honor, to oppoſe himſelfe againſt the fury of the enemy for the defence of all thoſe things aboue ſpecified. Furthermore, the vniuerſal warre is allowed by the lawes of all thoſe who haue bin founders of famous Common-weales, to take away ſeditions, and reduce ſuch as were rebellious to obedience, and to maintaine temperance and order among all ſubiects. And God himſelfe is called the God of hoaſts, but not the God of combats: for they are none of his works, but of the diuell himſelfe. Whereupon it is alſo ſayd in the Scripture, that the ſtrength of warre conſiſteth not in the multitude of ſouldiers, but that it commeth from heauen. And S. *Auguſtine* ſayth, that warre is not vniuſt, vnleſſe it be raiſed with purpoſe to vſurpe or to ſpoyle: and S. *Ambroſe* in like ſence affirmeth, that the valour of

thoſe

thoſe men that defend their countrey from barbarous people, is full of iuſtice. By all which may clearly be ſeene how farre they are aſtray, that would bring this kind of combat to be comprehended vnder the kind of warre vniuerſall. And if in all ages, ciuill warres haue bin odious and accounted cruell, what praiſe or commendation can be iuſtly giuen to two gentlemen of one citie or country that fight together with purpoſe to kill one another? whereas then the circumſtances aboue mentioned make the vniuerſall warre iuſt and lawfull: this wicked kind of priuate fight or combat, is voyde of them all, and cannot therefore be but moſt vniuſt and vnlawfull. With like wrong do they alſo labour to make it ſeeme commendable, affirming that men thereby ſhew their valour and fortitude. For valour or fortitude being a principall vertue, how can it haue place in ſo vniuſt and ſo vnnaturall an action, proceeding onely from anger, rage, fury, and raſhnes? Finally, theſe men that will needs haue *Ariſtotle* to be their warrant, might (if they liſt) ſee that he in his Ethikes, where he directeth man vnto vertue, and to ciuill felicitie, putteth not among thoſe whom he calleth *fortes*, or men of valour, ſuch men as are delighted in reuenge, but giueth them the title of warlike or *bellicoſi*. And in the ſame bookes he ſayth, that whoſoeuer doth any thing contrary to the lawes, is to be accounted vniuſt. And (I pray you) what can be more directly contrary to the lawes then this kind of combat or priuate fight? And if by taking iuſtice from the world, all vertue muſt needs decay, becauſe ſhe is the preſeruer and defender of vertue; how can this ſo excellent a vertue of fortitude be in them, that deſpiſing the lawes and the magiſtrates, and neglecting all religion, and good of their cuntrey and weale publike, do practiſe this wicked combat.

Moreouer, they perceiue not, that *Ariſtotle* in his Ethikes (from whence the rules of ciuill life are to be drawne, and not from his Rhetorikes, out of which theſe men fetch their doutie arguments, becauſe elſewhere they can find none for their purpoſe) ſaith, that to fight for cauſe of honour, is no act of fortitude. Whereupon enſueth, that ſuch as come to the combat vpon points of honour, as men do now a dayes for the moſt part, make not any ſhew of their fortitude, but onely of their ſtrength and abilitie of body, and of their courage: whereas true fortitude, is to vſe theſe gifts well and honeſtly, according to reaſon. And what honeſtie or reaſon can there be in this ſo miſchieuous and wicked a fight? which neuertheles theſe men ſo farre allow and commend, as they are not aſhamed to ſay (moued ſurely by ſome diuelliſh ſpirit) that a man for cauſe of honour may arme himſelfe againſt his country, the reſpect whereof is and euer was ſo holy; yea euē againſt his father, and with curſed hands violate his perſon, vnto whom (next after God) he muſt acknowledge his life and being, and what elſe ſoeuer he hath in this world. This cannot be but a moſt peſtiferous opinion, and a ſpeech hardly to be beleeued could come out of the diuels owne mouth of hell; who though he be the author of all euill, yet ſcarce thinke I that he durſt father ſo abhominable a conceit or ſentence. But it is a world to ſee how ſolemnly men wil become ſtarke mad, when they once vndertake to defend a mad cauſe. For to make their frantike fancie to ſeeme reaſonable, they vtter ſuch abſurdities as are not only deteſtable to mē, but euē bruite beaſts alſo abhorre. For among beaſts, many there are, that by naturall inſtinct, not onely feare and reſpect their begetters, but do alſo nouriſh them diligently when they are waxen old, and not able to purchaſe foode for them.

themſelues, repaying thankfully the nouriture which themſelues receiued whiles they were yong, as it is certainly knowne the Storke doth. But here to colour their aſſertions, they ſay, that ſo ought children to do to their parents, and citizens to their country, ſo long as the one ceaſeth not to be a father, and the country forgetteth not her citizens: a ſaying no leſſe fooliſh then the other. For when can that come to paſſe? what law of nature, or what ciuill conſtitution hath taught vs this leſſon? or out of what ſchoole of Philoſophie haue they learned it? what iniuries can a father or a mans country do vnto him that may make him not to acknowledge his countrey, which ought to be deerer vnto him then his life, or to caſt off the reuerence due to his father? Good God what els is this but to inuite men, and as it were to ſtir them vp to *parricide*, a thing odious euen to be mentioned. It is no maruel therfore, if ſuch as attribute ſo much to points of honor, & wil needs defend the combat in that reſpect, fall by Gods ſufferance (as men blinded of the light of naturall reaſon) into ſuch abſurd opinions, fit for ſenſleſſe men: which opinions, in very truth, are no leſſe to be condemned then wicked hereſies, and the authors of them worthy ſharpe puniſhment to be inflicted vpon them by ſuch as haue authoritie in that behalfe. And this do they the rather deſerue, becauſe they ſeeke to maske and diſguiſe the good and commendable opinions of the beſt Philoſophers, and to wreſt them in fauour of their damnable and wicked doctrine. But I ſhould digreſſe too far if I ſhould ſay all I could to confute this impietie, and theſe wicked writings and cruell opinions: and therefore returning to our purpoſe of honour, whereof we were ſpeaking, you may vnderſtand by that which I haue already ſayd, that honour there is none to be gotten by the

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combat; yet becauſe among other things they ſay the combat hath bin deuiſed for cauſe of honour, I muſt let you know that in true and ſound Philoſophie, they that reſpect honour as the end of their actions, are not onely vnworthy to be accounted vertuous men, but deſerue blame and reproch. But hereof I ſhall haue occaſion to ſpeake more amply in a fitter place. Onely this I wil now adde, that no actions are commendable but thoſe that are honeſt, and where honeſtie is not, there can be no honour. And honeſtie in truth there is none (as before hath bin ſaid) in ſuch a fight contrary to all vertue, odious to all lawes, to all good magiſtrates, and to God himſelfe; though the folly of the fauourers of this diuelliſh deuice ſeeke moſt wrongfully to draw the ſumme of all vertues to this iniuſtice. Furthermore, either the offences done to men, may be auouched before Princes and magiſtrates in iudgement, as no wrongs, but lawfull acts, or not. If they may be ſo auouched and proued, then a thouſand combats cannot take them away: neither is there any cauſe of combat if ſo wicked a cuſtome were allowable. If not, then he that hath done the iniury, is already diſhoneſt and diſhonored; and the victorie ouer ſuch a man, in faith what honour can it purchaſe? *Plato* the diuine Philoſopher, and *Ariſtotle* his diſciple after him, conſidering the nature of iniury, and finding that it caried with it alwayes vice and reproch, affirmed that it was better to receiue an iniury then to do it. And *Plato* concludeth, that he that doth iniury, cannot attaine to happineſſe: both which ſayings are moſt agreeable to Chriſtian religion. *Ariſtotle* affirmeth, that the magnanimous or great minded man, vtterly deſpiſeth all iniuries, for that an ill man cannot by any iniury he can do vnto him, blemiſh thoſe vertues wherewith he muſt be adorned to be truly

truly magnanimous. With these worthy men therefore I conclude, that iniuries are to be contemned and light set by, specially of magnanimous men. For, as *Seneca* saith, a magnanimous man will neuer thinke that a vicious man hath done him iniury, though his meaning were to do it; but referre the punishment of his ill intention to the magistrate, and the reuenge to God. And whosoeuer doth otherwise, entring into this reuengefull humour of the combat, he doth not onely not purchase any honor to himselfe thereby, but heapeth on his owne head Gods wrath and indignation, and shame of the world in the iudgement of wise men, who know what is honest, and what not, what things deserue praise, and what blame; and how, when, and wherefore a man of vertue ought to venture his life. For he that thinketh by the combat to right himselfe, taketh vpon him the office of God, and of the magistrate, as if himselfe were superiour to them both, and were able of himselfe (as soueraigne Lord) to do iustice: which thing how dangerous it is in a wel-ordered Common-weale, all lawes, and reason it selfe doth plainly teach vs.

But yet these goodly defenders of this abuse say, that a man, both by order of nature, and by the opinion of Philosophers, may well repulse an iniury by his owne vertue, and not by law. And I say (as before) that if the iniury be done vnto a man of magnanimitie; the way to shake it off, is to despise it, because the excellencie of his vertue is greater then any iniury that can be done vnto him: and if it be done to him that is not come to that degree of vertue as to be magnanimous, he may perchance at the instant repulse the same, or reuenge himself in hot bloud without any great reproch. But to reserue a malice or hatred any long time, and therupon to come

to the combat with a reuengefull mind, as bruite beaſts do; will alwayes be eſteemed of wiſe men, a vicious action, and contrary to all lawes and ciuill order. And they that are of ſuch reuengefull minds, are termed by *Ariſtotle* bitter and ſharpe men, as if he would ſay without reaſon. In which reſpect he iudgeth them to be (as hereafter ſhal be ſhewed) men vnworthy of ciuil conuerſatiō. And by him it is eſteemed the part or office of a vertuous ciuill man, and a point of magnanimitie to pardon and forgiue offences and iniuries. For *Plato* and his followers were euer of opinion, that magnanimitie was giuen to man, not becauſe he ſhould diſpoſe himſelfe to hatred, fury, reuenge and wrath, but to honeſtie and vertue. Wherefore *Seneca* alſo ſaid, that it was a kind of reuenge to forgiue. And the temple of the *Graces* (according to *Ariſtotles* opinion) was placed in the midſt of the citie of *Athens*, becauſe all men might thereby vnderſtand, that they were to render good for good, not ill for ill. For as by the firſt, cities are the better preſerued and maintained: ſo by the other, they are deſtroyed and brought to ruine. Yet if the magnanimous man would wiſh him chaſtiſed that hath offended him, he will not vouchſafe himſelfe to file his hands vpon ſo baſe and vicious a perſon as thoſe be (by *Plato* and *Ariſtotles* iudgement) who are iniurious to others; but ſuffereth the magiſtrates according to the order of law to reuenge his cauſe by the puniſhment of the offender, according to his deſert, to the end the vertue of the one, and the vice of the other may be manifeſted, and the one chaſtiſed, and the other honored thereby. And what more glorious reuenge can a man deſire, or what more notable teſtimonie of his vertue, then to haue him corrected, and reſt infamous by the puniſhment which law ſhall inflict

vpon

vpon him who hath done him iniury? Or what elſe do theſe furious minded men ſeeke in fine by their combat? But yet they alledge further (as wiling to maintaine their wrong opinions with ſome ſhew of reaſon) that combats are ſought only in caſes of iniuries, not determinable by law. Which anſwer is as inconſiderate as the reſt. For what kind of iniuries can grow betweene man and man, whereunto the authoritie of the Prince and of the Magiſtrates doth not extend? who indeed are not to regard the obſtinacie of the parties, but to puniſh them by impriſonment, and ſuch other meanes as law doth allow and permit; to bridle the inſolencie and diſobedience of ſuch as will not obey and be ameinable. For if in ciuill actions that courſe be held, wherefore ſhould not the ſame rigor be the rather vſed in this ſo vnlawfull and beaſtly a debate? Neither is there any reaſon in that they ſpeake of publike and priuate iniuries, ſince the caſes are farre vnlike. For publike iniuries come from lawfull enemies, ſuch as offend or offer wrong to States or Cities: but they that are priuatly iniuried in their perſon, cannot call them their lawfull enemies that ſo haue done them iniury: rather they themſelues are to be eſteemed lawfull enemies to their countrey, whiles in following their rage and furious appetite of reuenge, they oppoſe themſelues againſt the publike and ciuill gouernement, and deſerue in that reſpect to be ſeuerely puniſhed by the magiſtrate, as men that eſteeme more their priuate iniuſtice then publike iuſtice. And thus much for the ſecond part of your queſtion. Now touching the laſt point, whether it appertaine to ciuill felicitie or no: you may eaſily gather by that which is already ſaid, that there can be nothing more contrary to good diſcipline in a wel-ordered commonweale, then this wicked and vniuſt kind of fight,

which

which deſtroyeth, ſo farre foorth as it beareth ſway, all ciuill ſocietie. For it breedeth the contempt of God and his commandements, of Religion, of lawes, conſtitutions and ciuill gouernement, of Princes, of magiſtrates, and finally of countrey, parents, friends and kinred: to all which men are bound by reaſon naturall and ciuill, and for defence of them to ſpend their liues in maner aforeſaid: but not at their owne appetite, inſtigated by rage and furie to be prodigall thereof, or for reuenge of priuate quarrels or iniuries. Will you ſee how abſurd and ſenſleſſe a thing theſe men maintaine, that ſet vp and magnifie this glorious combat? then take but this one inſtance. They ſay, in good ſooth, that if two gentlemen, ſubiect to the ſelfe and ſame lawes, ſtirred by this furious conceit, haue chalenged the one the other to the combat, and that their ſoueraigne Lord or Prince forbid them to proceed therein, that they are not to obey him, but to ſeeke to accompliſh their chalenge elſewhere out of his iuriſdiction. And can any reaſonable man, or a good ſubiect endure to heare ſuch a propoſition maintained without ſtomacke or diſpleaſure? That which among the Painims and Gentiles was not lawful without ſpeciall licence of the ſuperiours to be attempted againſt a publike enemie, armed to the ruine of their State and Common-weale: will theſe iolly politicians haue now to be lawfull among Chriſtians in deſpite of their naturall and lawful Lords and Princes, vpon whom the foundation of well pollicied States is layd, and in the obedience towards whom, ciuill felicitie it ſelfe doth reſt? But we neede not to maruell, if ſuch men contemne humane lawes and ordinances, when they ſticke not to diſobey God himſelfe; vnto whom they knowing manifeſtly this kind of fight to be odious and diſpleaſing;

yet

yet are they not aſhamed by publike writings to maintaine it, and thereby to draw ſouldiers and men of valour into their errror of a wilfull madneſſe and miſchieuous mind. It is a more mockery, and a thing worthy to be laughed at, to ſee how buſily ſuch fellowes build vpon a falſe foundation, as if their building were like to ſtand. For leauing and forſaking the patterne and true rules of vertuous behauiour, of policie and ſtates, and of good lawes written by that excellent Philoſopher *Ariſtotle*, they take hold (forſooth) of ſome fragments or parcels of his Rhetorikes to worke vpon: as though from thence men were to take the precepts of ciuill conuerſation or politike gouernement, whence onely the rules and method of well ſpeaking are to be taken, and not of ciuill felicitie. Out of his Rhetorikes they haue culled out namely this place, where he ſaith, that God helpeth thoſe that are wronged, not vnderſtanding, or ſeeming not to vnderſtand, that *Ariſtotle* in that place ſpeaketh of ciuill iudgements or criminall; and not of battels or combats, ſuch as this that he neuer knew, ne yet euer heard ſpoken of: and if he had, would haue ſought to haue driuen it out of the frantike fancie of all men. It is not to be denied, but that in good and godly iudgements managed by men deſirous to maintaine iuſtice, God is alwayes at hand to help and vphold the right, and to tread downe and ouerthrow the wrong. For by him haue iudgements bin appointed and ordained, and magiſtrates to rule and ouerſee them, not only for the common benefit of men, but alſo for the defence of truth and righteouſneſſe, and for the puniſhment of vntruth and wickedneſſe. Moreouer it is to be vnderſtood, that onely ſuch places in *Ariſtotles* Rhetorikes are to be approoued and allowed in ciuil or politike life, as are by him confirmed in his Ethikes

and Rhetorikes: as that it is lawfull for a man to repulſe an iniury, and to defend himſelfe, and ſuch other like. For, as himſelfe affirmeth, the drift of his booke of Rhetorikes, is to inſtruct a man how to frame his ſpeech to perſwade, and how to moue the minds of Iudges to anger, hatred, reuenge, compaſſion, and ſuch like other affects, which oftentimes wreſt the truth, and make wrong to preuaile. So as if the Orator preuaile, and attaine the end he ſeeketh, which is to perſwade, or vſe the meanes to attaine it artificially, he hath done his dutie. By which it appeareth, that Rhetorike is ordained for iudgements and controuerſies, but not for inſtruction of ciuill life and manners. But let vs ſee what they get by this place taken out of the Rhetorikes. For my part, I ſee not wherfore any man ſhould looke or hope for any helpe or fauour at Gods hands in this ſo vniuſt, vnlawfull and wicked an action, moſt offenſiue to his diuine Maieſtie, as contrary to his expreſſe commandement, and a worke moſt pleaſing and acceptable to the diuell, by whoſe inſtigation the ſame is wholy ſet forward. Nay rather may the preuailing of them that haue the wrong cauſe to defend, as oftentimes we ſee it happen in the combat, ſerue for a moſt cleere argument, that it falleth out by Gods ſpeciall permiſſion to vnſeele the eyes (if it were poſſible) of ſuch as are ſo wilfully blinded, to the end they might ſee how vniuſt the conflict is, which, theſe men ſay, was firſt inuented (among other cauſes) that truth might be knowne, and right from the wrong. But how is truth or right found out, if he which hath right on his ſide be ouercome, as oftentimes it falleth out? Forſooth they anſwer, that it ſo hapneth by reaſon of ſome other offences of him that is ouercome, and that God will haue him ſo puniſhed for the ſame. By which reaſon it ſhould follow

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that God (who is truth it ſelfe) ſuffereth in this fight (which they ſay was deuiſed for trying out of the truth) that in reſpect of puniſhing him for other offences that maintaineth the truth, the other who hath the wrongfull cauſe in hand, ſhiould triumph in his vniuſt victory, and truth ſhould be borne downe and defaced. Then which reaſon, what can be imagined more contrary to the goodnes, iuſtice, and power of God? as if he could not otherwiſe puniſh ſinners, then by a meane that ſhould ſpot and ouerthrow truth, in which he is ſo well pleaſed. It is therfore a moſt euident ſigne & certaine teſtimonie, that this kind of proofe or trial of truth is moſt vncertain, and the fight to that end vniuſt and wicked. And that it is no other then the work of the very diuell, who being the author of all diſcord, hatred, debate, falſhood, ſeditions, vniuſt wars, of death, & mortal enemy to truth, reioiceth when he ſeeth right ouerwhelmed with wrong, reaſon oppreſſed by iniuſtice, truth defaced by falſhood, and by meanes thereof, men drawne to euerlaſting damnation. And when it doth come to paſſe, that he which maintaineth the right doth preuaile (if any right or reaſon may be ſuppoſed in ſo wicked and vnlawfull an action) euen that it ſelfe is to be imputed to the ſubtiltie of the diuell, to draw men on as with a baite, becauſe he is loth to loſe the great gaine of ſoules which he maketh by the humor of this deteſtable combat. By which, not onely the champions themſelues, but they that hauing power, permit them or grant them libertie to fight; all they that counſel them therunto, & all they that giue them the looking on in ſo damnable an action, become ſubiect vnto him, and enemies to God their Creator and Redeemer. And indeed there is no vice or ſinne in the world, whereby he winneth more to his kingdome, then by this; becauſe at

once he purchaſeth thouſands of ſoules: ſo fooliſhly do men flocke to be the beholders of a bloudie ſpectacle, with inhumane deſire to ſee the ſpilling of mans blood. But now to conclude this matter, it is a lamentable thing that any Chriſtian Prince, or other generall commander, ſhould permit ſo pernicious and ſo damnable a thing, and conſent, that vnder their authoritie it ſhould be lawfull for one man to kill another for priuate quarrell, and they to ſit themſelues *pro tribunali*, to behold ſo vniuſt and cruell a fight. For they ought rather to conſider, that they are Gods miniſters, and by his diuine prouidence called to ſo high and ſo eminent a place, not to fauour or giue reputation to the diuels works (among which there is none more wicked then this) but to execute his will, to which the combat is directly and expreſly contrary, though it haue bin accepted and allowed by ill vſe, or rather abuſe, and bene entituled by the name of a cuſtome by ſuch as defend the ſame: who conſider not that cuſtome is to be obſerued in good and cõmendable things, and not in wicked and vnlawfull, as this is. And if it happen that any abuſe do grow and ſhrowd it ſelfe vnder the name of a cuſtome, the ſame ought to be taken away and aboliſhed; and thereto do all Philoſophers agree. Of which kind, this combat being manifeſtly one, it ſhould be rooted out, and not ſuffered to continue vnder that name. For good cuſtomes are agreeable to Nature, in which reſpect it is ſaid, that cuſtome is another nature. But that which is contrary to nature (as this is) ought not to be named a cuſtome, but a vile abuſe, be it neuer ſo much cloked with the name of cuſtome: the rule whereof is preſcribed by *Ariſtotle* in his ſecond booke of Politikes, and ſhould therefore not only not be permitted or maintained, but being crept in, be remoued

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and baniſhed as a moſt peſtilent and dangerous thing. And wheras *Ariſtotle* in his Rhetorikes ſaith, that reuenge is better then pardon, that is to be ruled according to the ciuill orders and conſtitutions of good common-weales. For he ſayth not ſo vniuerſally, but onely in reſpect of an Orator, and (as is ſaid already) he in his Rhetorikes teacheth but what is requiſite for an Orator to conſider, to perſwade, and not what is meete in ciuill life, as he doth in his Ethikes.

And thus much this author hauing ſaid effectually to the purpoſe of your demaund, I may, if you pleaſe, proceed to the former matter, from which this queſtion hath occaſioned him and vs to digreſſe.

All the companie agreed thereunto, and hauing well allowed of the diſcourſe, framed themſelues attentiuely to heare the reſt.

Wherefore I ſaid, You remember well (I doubt not) that the next was to ſpeake of the third maſter of the Kings ſon; who after the good inſtructions giuen by the former two to their diſciple, taught him that his appetite was in all things to be ſubiect to reaſon, and that he ought neuer to ſuffer himſelfe to be drawne from that which was honeſt by any inticement: for that honeſtie was the end and ſcope of all vertue. He ſought to perſwade him, that the chiefeſt thing that maketh a King to be knowne for a King, was to know how to rule himſelfe before he ruled others, and to maſter his owne appetites rather then other mens. So the firſt hauing faſhioned him to Religion, and the ſecond to truth, this third framed him to be temperate and iuſt. Whereby it came to paſſe, that although he know himſelfe to be aboue the law, yet did he not onely not ſeeke to ouer-rule the law, but became a law to himſelfe:

ſo as he was neuer led, either by loue or hatred, in his iudgements (whether he puniſhed or rewarded, nor by anger, or deſire to benefite any man) from that which was iuſt and honeſt. Thus holding vnder reaſons awe the diſordinate appetites of his mind, with the direct rule of iuſtice, (vnder which, *Plato* ſaith, all vertues are contained, becauſe it is grounded vpon truth) he alwayes directed his actions to the marke of honeſtie, euer doing good, but neuer harming any. And knowing, that who ſo is ſubiect to his owne appetites, deſerueth not the title of a free man, much leſſe of a King: he framed himſelfe to be moſt continent, and ſhewed in himſelf an example of honeſt life and behauior to all his ſubiects. His benignitie he declared to them by his liberalitie, and by ſhewing more care of the publike good then of his owne; and that he would rather giue of his owne, then take from them their goods. With his mildneſſe and affabilitie he made himſelfe ſingularly beloued, and wan their hearts, and with gentleneſſe in word and deed, and with loue towards his people, & truth in al his actions, he made them vnderſtand that indeed he approched as neare to God in theſe excellent qualities, as a mortall man could do. By meanes whereof, no man fearing harme from him, he was beloued and reuerenced as a God among them. Now hauing learned of his three firſt maſters, Religion, Prudence and Wiſedome, Truth, Iuſtice and Temperance, with thoſe other vertues belonging vnto them; the fourth then taught him all that appertained to Fortitude, and made him vnderſtand, that onely he is to be eſteemed a man of fortitude and valour, who can hold a meane betweene furie and feare. And that when occaſion of perill and danger is offred vnto him, bearing with it honeſtie, and wherein he might make ſhew of his ver-

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tue and courage, did readily embrace and take hold of the ſame. And that albeit he were deare to himſelfe, in reſpect of thoſe vertues which he knew himſelfe to be poſſeſſed of; yet eſteeming more an honeſt and a glorious death then a naturall and reprochfull life, he would make no difficultie to hazard his life for the benefite of his countrey, knowing that an honorable end would be crowned with immortall fame. And foraſmuch as it is ſeldome ſeene, that men can vſe this princely vertue as it ought to be vſed, and when it ſhould be vſed, with ſuch other circumſtances as are requiſite thereto; therefore did his maſter inſtruct him and make him vnderſtand, that he which matcheth not his naturall courage with Prudence, and thoſe other vertues, which the former maſters had taught him, could not rightly be called a valiant man. And how that this vertue, being ſtirred vp by magnanimitie, ſtoutly purſued honeſt things without reſpect of difficulties: and that though things formidable and terrible be naturally ſhunned of men, yet the valiant man deſpiſeth them, and feeleth them not in reſpect of iuſtice and honeſtie, whereby ſuch men became equall to the Gods, as Poets fained. And that if Prudence and Temperance were not ioyned with this royall vertue of Fortitude, the ſame was turned into fooliſh hardineſſe. And becauſe his diſciple ſhould know how to auoid this vice, he declared to him how ſuch men as, to auoyde infamie, onely exerciſed their valour, and expoſed their liues to perill, or onely to purchaſe honour, were not to be called properly valorous men; but they onely who for honeſties ſake made triall of their valour, becauſe honeſtie is the onely end of vertue, by which humane felicitie is to be atchieued. And that he likewiſe was not to be accompted valiant, who for feare of paine or puniſhment, tooke

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in hand fearefull and dangerous enterpriſes, nor yet they that through long experience in warfare, or becauſe they haue bin often in the brunt and danger of battels, went cheerfully or couragiouſly into the warres to fight, as it were by cuſtome, for that they did it rather by art and practiſe then by free election, without the which can be no vertue. Neither he that by rage and furie ſuffered himſelfe to be tranſported to attempt any danger; ſince there can be no vertue, where reaſon guideth not the mind. And for this cauſe wilde beaſts (though they be terrible and fierce by nature) cannot be termed valiant, becauſe they being ſtirred onely by naturall fierceneſſe, wanting reaſon, do but follow their inſtinct, as do the Lions, Tygers, Beares, and ſuch other like. Neuertheles he denied not but that anger might accõpany fortitude; for that it is rather a help vnto it, then any let or impediment, ſo long as reaſon did temper them, and that it ſerued but for a ſpurre to pricke men forward in the defence of iuſt and honeſt cauſes. Moreouer he declared vnto his ſcholer, that there is a kind of fortitude that hath no need of any ſuch ſpurre of anger: which kind concerned the bearing of grieuous and diſpleaſing accidents, and the moderating of a mans ſelfe in happie and proſperous ſucceſſes. And this is that bleſſed vertue which neuer ſuffereth a man to fall from the height of his minde, being called by ſome men patience: who will not onely haue her to be a vertue ſeparate from the foure principall vertues, but alſo that ſhe ſhould be aboue them. But this opinion of theirs is not well grounded, ſince in truth ſhe is but a branch of fortitude: through which (as *Virgil* ſayth) men beare ſtoutly all iniuries, whether they proceed from wicked perſons, or from the inconſtancie and changeableneſſe of fortune; but remaineth alwayes inuincible

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and conſtant againſt all the croſſes, thwarts and deſpites of fortune. This vertue is fitly deſcribed by *Cicero*, where he ſaith, that it is a voluntary and conſtant bearing of things grieuous and difficult, for honeſties ſake. And in the Scriptures it is ſaid, that it is better for a man to beare with inuincible courage ſuch things, then to be otherwiſe valiant, or to hazard himſelf, how, where, & when it is fit. For who ſo beareth ſtoutly aduerſities, deſerueth greater commendation and praiſe then they which ouercome their enemies, or by force win cities or countries, or otherwiſe defend their owne, becauſe he ouercometh him ſelfe, and maſtereth his owne affects and paſſions. Hauing reſpect to theſe things, this wiſe ſchoole-maſter ſhewed his diſciple, that the valiant man was like a ſquare ſolid body, as is the die, whereunto *Ariſtotle* alſo agreeth, which in what ſort ſoeuer it be throwne, euer ſtandeth vpright: ſo he being ſtill the ſame man, which way ſoeuer the world frame with him, or the malice and enuie of wicked men, or the freakes of fortune toſſe him; which fortune, ſome call the Queene of worldly accidents, though, as a blind cauſe, ſhe alwayes accompanieth her ſelfe with ignorance. Moreouer he added that hope of gaine or profit ought not to moue a man to put his life in apparant danger: for if it chanced (as often it doth) that the hope began to quaile, forthwith courage failed withall, and the enterpriſe was abandoned, becauſe vaine conceiued hope, and not free choice of vertue had guided him. A thing which neuer happeneth to them that in honeſt cauſes hazard their liues. For though any vnexpected terror chance vnto them, ſo as on the ſudden they cannot deliberate what were beſt to do: yet euen by habite which they haue made in the vertue of fortitude, they looſe not their courage: but the more difficult

and fearefull the accident appeareth, the more ſtoutly will they reſiſt and oppoſe themſelues againſt the ſame. Likewiſe he declared to him, that it was not true fortitude, when men (not knowing what the danger was which they entred into) did vndertake any perillous enterpriſe: for it muſt be iudgement, and not ignorance, that ſhall ſtirre men to valorous attempts. Neither yet that they were to be eſteemed properly valiant, who like wilde ſauage beaſts, moued by rage and fury, ſought reuenge, and to hurt them that had prouoked them to wrath: for ſuch were tranſported by paſſion, and not guided by reaſon. Laſt of all he concluded that he was iuſtly to be accounted a man of valour, who feared not euerie thing that was perillous, yet of ſome things would be afraid. So as true fortitude ſhould be a conuenient mean betweene raſhneſſe and fearefulneſſe: the effect whereof was to be ready and hardie to vndertake dangerous actions, in ſuch time, place, and maner as befitted a man of vertue; and for ſuch cauſes as reaſon commanded him ſo to do: and becauſe the doing thereof was honeſt and commendable, and the contrary was diſhoneſt and ſhamefull. All theſe points did this worthy ſchoolmaſter ſeeke to imprint in the yong Princes mind, that he might become ſtout and haughtie of courage, to the end that he (who was borne to rule and commaund) might not through any ſudden or vnlooked for accidents be daunted with feare, or become baſe and cowardly minded: nor yet by ouermuch raſhneſſe or furie waxe fierce and cruell; but with mild, yet awfull behauiour, gouerne and commaund the people ſubiect vnto him. Theſe were the ſeeds of vertue, which theſe wiſe and worthy maſters did caſt into the tender mindes of thoſe yong Princes, from whence (as out of a fertile ſoile) they hoped to reape

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in their riper yeares fruite anſwerable to their labour and trauell. And this is all (ſaid I) that this author hath diſcourſed vpon this matter, and as much (I ſuppoſe) as is needfull for the education of children, till they come to yeares of more perfection, wherein they may begin to guide themſelues.

And then ſir *Robert Dillon* (who as well as the reſt had giuen a very attentine eare to the whole diſcourſe) ſayd: Truly theſe were right good and worthy documents, and meete to traine a Prince vp vertuouſly; neither could any other then a glorious iſſue be expected of ſo vertuous principles and education. And though this diligence and care were fitting for ſo high an eſtate as the ſon of a mightie monarke, yet hath the declaration therof bin both pleaſing and profitable to this companie, and may well ſerue for a patterne to be followed by priuate gentlemen, though not with like circumſtances; ſince the ſame vertues ſerue as well for the one as for the other to guide them the way to that ciuill felicitie, whereof our firſt occaſion of this dayes diſcourſe began. But euening now haſting on, and the time ſummoning vs to draw homeward, we will for this preſent take our leaues of you; hauing firſt giuen you harty thanks for our friendly entertainment, eſpecially for this part thereof, whereby with your commendable trauell in tranſlating ſo good and ſo neceſſary a worke, you haue yeelded vs no ſmall delight, but much more profite; which I am bold to ſay as well for all the companie as for my ſelfe: whereunto they all accorded.

But, ſaid the Lord Primate, we muſt not forget one point of your ſpeech, which was, that you tied vs to a condition of three dayes aſſembly; that as the author had deuided his work into three dialogues, ſo we ſhould

giue you three dayes time to runne ouer euery day one of his dialogues. Suppoſing therefore that you haue finiſhed his firſt, we will to morrow (if this company pleaſe to giue their conſent thereunto) be here to vnderſtand whether he haue as ſufficiently ſet downe rules for the faſhioning a yong man to the courſe of vertue, as he hath done for the education of his childhood. Therefore you may looke for vs, & prepare your tongue, as we will bring attentiueneſſe to heare his doctrine by your ſtudy made ready for our vnderſtanding. And ſo they departed all together towards the citie.

The ſecond dayes meeting, and diſcourſe of Ciuill life.

WHen the next morning was come, which appeared faire and cleare, the companie (which the day before had bin with me) came walking to my houſe, all, ſaue onely M. *Smith* the Apothecary, whoſe buſineſſe being of another ſort, was not ſo deſirous to ſpend his time in hearing diſcourſes of that nature, which brought no profit to his ſhop. And being entred into the houſe, they found me ready to go walke abroade to take the ſweete and pleaſant ayre: wherefore though they had already had a good walke from the citie thither, being ſomewhat more then a mile; yet were they not vnwilling to beare me companie, and would needs go with me. So I led them vp the hill to the little mount, which ſtandeth aboue my houſe, along a pleaſant greene way, which I had planted on both ſides with yong aſhes: from whence hauing the proſpect not onely of the citie, but alſo of the ſea and hauen, we there ſate vs downe, and ſome commending the ayre, ſome the delightfulneſſe

lightfulneſſe of the view, we ſpent the time in ſundry ſpeeches, vntil one of the ſeruants came to ſummon vs to walk home to dinner. Whereupon returning home, and finding the meate on the table, we ſate vs downe; I telling them that they found a Philoſophers dinner, for ſo I would now begin to take vpon me to entitle my ſelfe, ſince they had made me (at the leſt) the trucheman or interpreter of one that was worthy that name. And that I had the rather prepared no greater ſtore of meate for them, becauſe I would imitate the temperance of a Philoſopher, as we were in number a conuenient companie for a Philoſophicall dinner.

Why, ſaid the Lord Primate, what meane you by that? is there any determinate companie appointed for ſuch meales as are fit for Philoſophers?

Yea ſir, quoth I, if my memory faile me not, I haue read that to ſuch refections as might as wel feed the mind as the body, there would not be any ſuch great company of gueſts inuited, as by the confuſion of their talke and communication, the ſerious and yet delightful diſcourſes that might be propoſed, ſhould not be imparted to all, nor yet ſo few, as for want of matter the ſame were to be omitted. Therfore it was determined that the number ſhould be betweene the Graces and the Muſes, that is to ſay, not vnder three, nor aboue nine. We are therefore a fit companie for a Philoſophicall dinner., and your entertainment ſhall be according for your cheere.

Wel, ſaid ſir *Robert Dillō*, you ſhal need no ſhifts with vs, for as we wil not cōmend your cheere (which is the thing is cōmonly begged by the excuſing of want of meate) ſo ſhal you not need to take any care, either for the ſatisfying of our appetites with dainty fare, or to entertaine vs with Philoſophicall diſcourſes at dinner: for we expect ſuch a

at your hands after dinner in that kind, as we ſhall the better paſſe ouer our dinner without them, which we deſire in that reſpect may be the ſhorter, to the end that our bodies being fed temperatly, our mindes may be the ſharper ſet to fall to thoſe other dainties which you haue prepared for vs.

Yea but let not our dinner I pray you (ſaid Captaine *Dawtrey*) be ſo temperate for ſir *Robert Dillons* words, but that we may haue a cup of wine: for the Scripture telleth vs that wine gladdeth the heart of man. And if my memory faile me not, I haue read, that the great banket of the Sages of Greece, deſcribed by *Plutarke*, was not without wine; & then I hope a Philoſophical dinner may be furniſhed with wine: otherwiſe, I will tell you plainly, I had rather be at a camping dinner then at yours, howſoeuer your rerebanket will haply be as pleaſing to me as to the reſt of the company.

Whereat the reſt laughing pleaſantly, I called for ſome wine for Captaine *Dawtrey*; who taking the glaſſe in his hand, held it vp a while betwixt him and the window, as to conſider the colour: and then putting it to his noſe, he ſeemed to take comfort in the odour of the ſame.

Then ſaid the Lord Primate, I thinke (Captain *Dawtrey*) that you meane to make a ſpeculation vpon that cup of wine, you go ſo orderly to worke, as if you were to examine him vpon his qualities; whereof two principall you haue already reſolued your ſelfe of, by the teſtimony of your two principall ſenſes. The colour, we all determine with you is good, the ſmell ſeemeth not to miſlike you: it is conſequent therefore that when you haue drunke it vp, you will alſo reſolue vs whether all three the qualities concurring together, it may deſerue the title of *vinum Cos* or no: for ſuch was the wine wont to be entituled

tuled among the ancient Romanes, that caried the reputation to be the beſt.

And what (I pray you, ſaid I) might be the cauſe that their beſt wine was ſo called? for I haue heard that queſtion ſundry times demaunded, but I could neuer heare it yet anſwered ſufficiently to my ſatisfaction.

It is no maruell (ſayd the Lord Primate) for although the matter haue bin long in controuerſie, and debated by many ful learned men, and among them ſome that loued wine ſo well, as their experience might make them beleeue that their verdit ſhold be very ſound; yet for ought I find, we may ſay *adhuc ſub iudice lis eſt*. Some ſay it ſhould be taken for *vinum Coſſentinum*, as coming from a territory ſo named, which commonly bare the beſt wines neare about Rome. Others interprete it by letters, ſaying that *Cos* is to be taken for *corpori omnino ſaluberrimum*. But they that preſume moſt to haue hit the marke, ſay that it is ſo to be vnderſtood, that *Cos* ſhould ſignifie the wine to be beſt by theſe three qualities, which Captaine *Dawtrey* ſeemeth to inſiſt vpon, that is to ſay, *coloris, odoris*, and *ſaporis*; which three recõmending a wine, it cannot but be called very good. And this is as much as I haue read or heard, and will be content to be of the Iurie with Captaine *Dawtrey* to giue my verdit whether this of yours be ſuch or no.

In good faith (ſaid Captaine *Dawtrey*) if I be the foreman of the Iurie, as I haue bin the firſt to taſte the wine, I will pronounce it to be indeed ſingular good, and well deſeruing the title of *Cos*: for all three thoſe qualities which you haue ſayd wine is to be commended for.

If the wine be good (ſaid I) you may be ſure I am right glad, as well becauſe I haue it to content ſuch my good friends, as becauſe I haue made my prouiſion for my ſelf

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ſo well; whereby I hope you will all thinke me worthy to be a taſter for the Queenes aduantage, and my office to be well beſtowed vpon me, ſince I can taſte a cuppe of wine ſo well; for it is indeed of mine owne choice.

Marry ſir (ſaid M. *Dormer*, who had euen then finiſhed his draught) me thinkes it fareth not with you according to the common prouerbe, which ſaith, that none goeth worſe ſhod then the ſhoomakers wife: for in good ſooth this is a cup of wine fit to recommend your taſte, and conſequently your ſelfe to be employed in your office. But ſince you asked my Lord Primate the meaning of *vinum Cos*: and withall ſaid that you neuer heard that queſtion anſwered to your contentment; let vs (I pray you) heare what is your conceit therein, and whether you can giue any more probable ſence thereof then thoſe which he hath told vs.

Nay in good faith, ſaid I, that wil I not preſume to do; for I am not ſo affected to mine owne conceits, as to preferre them before other mens. A better interpretation I will not therefore offer vnto you: but if you will needs haue me tell you how I, among others, conceiue of that *vinum Cos:* which is read of, I thinke that it was ſo called for that the cuſtome being in thoſe dayes, that whereſoeuer the Romane Conſul came, when he went in his iorney towards his gouernment, or els within his prouince, they of the good townes or cities preſented him with ſuch dainties as the place affoorded, and ſpecially with the choiſeſt wines that were there to be had, thereupon the beſt and moſt excellent wine was termed *vinum Conſulare*, to wit, ſuch as of choiſe was taken for the Conſul himſelfe. And the common abbreuiation of Conſul being written in all auncient authors with theſe three letters *Cos*: ſo commeth *vinum Cos:* to be vnderſtood (as

I haue ſaid) for *vinum Conſulare*, which was the beſt. And this is my opinion, which if it be worthy to be admitted to go in companie with the reſt, I will not deſire it ſhould go before them: and if you will be pleaſed to accept of this my interpretation of *vinum Cos*: together with the wine which you ſay is ſo good, and let the ſame ſupply the badneſſe of your fare, (wherein my wife hath the greateſt fault) I ſhal go the more cheerfully to the reſt of my taske, which I am comforted by your ſpeeches, you are ſo well diſpoſed vnto, as it maketh you haſten to make an end of your bad dinner. Fruite therefore being brought, and the table taken vp, ſir *Robert Dillon* ſaid; It is an approoued opinion of all antiquitie, that after dinner a man ſhould ſit a while, and after ſupper walk a mile: we muſt not therefore ſo ſuddenly riſe from dinner to go to our rerebanket; yet may we gather vp ſome of the crums of yeſterdayes feaſt, how full ſoeuer our bellies be with the good meate we haue eaten here. I remember then that the ſubſtance of a childs education, that was to be ſet in the right way to his ciuill felicitie, was yeſterday declared by the example of the order held by the Kings of Perſia, in the training of their ſons, which were to ſucceed them in their kingdome. Which order, though it were both pleaſing and profitable to be vnderſtood, and that with change of circumſtances it might well ſerue for the direction of a priuate gentleman how to bring vp his child: yet I for my part thinke that it would haue bin very good that there had bin ſet downe a courſe more particularly, in what learning or ſtudy of the liberal arts the child ſhould haue bin exerciſed. For I haue found by experience, that the care and diligence of parents may aduance very much the forwardneſſe of their children, ſo as ſome being well plied, ſhall not onely reade perfectly, but be

alſo well forward in his Grammer, when the other of like wit and capacitie ſhall for lacke of plying drag and come very farre behind.

That is (ſaid I) moſt true, and I can verifie it in my ſelf; for ſuch was my fathers care (who not onely in the education of his children, but alſo in the ordering of his houſhold, was ſecond to no man of his degree that euer I knew) as before I was full fiue yeares of age, I had gone through mine Accidence, & was ſent to ſchoole to Tunbridge, 20 miles frō London, and if either the aire of the place, or ſome other diſpoſition of my body had not hindred my health by a quartaine ague that tooke me there, I might haue bin a forward ſcholer in my grāmer at 6 yeres old, and haue bin ready to haue accompanied my learning with thoſe corporall exerciſes which by ſome are ſet downe as fit to be vſed by children betweenè the yeares of fiue and ten, as well to harden their bodies and to make them apt for the wars (if their diſpoſition be thereunto) as for health. But by that vnhappie accident, not onely the health and ſtrength of my body, but my learning alſo met with a ſhrewd checke, which I could neuer ſithens recouer ſufficiently. Neuertheleſſe as much as my father could performe, he omitted not to haue me trained both to my booke and to other exerciſes agreeable to his calling & abilitie, following (as I ſuppoſe) ſuch precepts as he had found ſet downe by ſome worthy authors treating of that matter. The exact forme of which education perhaps is hard to be obſerued, but by ſuch as haue together with a fatherly and vigilant care, wealth and meanes anſwerable to finde in their owne houſes ſchoole-maſters to inſtruct and faſhion their children according to thoſe rules and precepts. For by them, before the child attaine the age of 14. yeares, he ſhould not only

haue

haue learned his Grammer, but alſo Logike, Rhetorike, Muſike, Poetrie, drawing and perſpectiue, and be skilfull at his weapons, nimble to runne, to leapē and to wreſtle, as exerciſes neceſſary vpon all occaſions where fortitude is to be employed for the defence of his countrey and Prince, his friends, and of his faith and religion. And this is that which I conceiue your meaning was, when you ſaid, that you thought it had bin needfull there had bin ſome more particular courſe ſet downe for the diſpenſing of the childs time in his learning. All which *Piccolomini* hath ſo exactly ſet downe in his learned booke of Morall inſtitution, written firſt in the Italian tongue, as it may ſeeme he rather propoſed or ſet foorth a perfect child, as *Cicero* hath a perfect Orator, and *Caſtiglione* a perfect Courtier, then that it were eaſie to bring vp or traine any in that ſort or according to that patterne. And therefore ſince that which our author hath ſayd of the education of the Kings children of Perſia, ſeemeth enough if it be fitly applied for the inſtruction of any children during their childhood, we may (if you pleaſe) now proceede to his ſecond dialogue, treating of the inſtruction of a yong man from his childhood forward: for I haue made ready my papers, ſo as I hope without much interruptiō I may in Engliſh deliuer vnto you his mind, ſet downe in his owne language, though not with like ſmoothneſſe of ſtyle. But ſince yeſterday I heard you find no fault, I may the better be encouraged to go on this day with my plaine manner of penning, though it be vnpoliſhed.

Yea marry, anſwered ſir *Robert Dillon*, very willingly: and all the company aſſenting thereunto, I aroſe, intreating them not to ſtirre, for that I would preſently returne vnto them with my bookes.

Which being done, and euery man lending an attentiue eare, thus I began: As yeſterday the infancy or childhood of man was reſembled vnto that part of the ſoule which giueth life, and is called *vegetatiue*, being the foundation of the other parts: ſo muſt youth now be likened to that part which giueth ſenſe and feeling, and is named *ſenſitiue*. And as it is harder to rule two horſes to guide a coach or charret then one: ſo is there farre greater difficultie in guiding a yong man then a child: for he is ſtirred much more with paſſions then the ſimple age of a child, and is more violently caried away with things that delight him; becauſe he hath now the ſecond power of the ſoule in force to draw him, which for the moſt part is much more contrary to reaſon then the firſt. For wheras that firſt coueted only that which was profitable, and which might nouriſh the bodie without any great regard of that which was honeſt, as whereof it had no knowledge at all; this other being wholy bent to delight, reſpecteth little any other thing: which delight hauing greateſt force in yong mindes, draweth them ſundry wayes, and by allurements maketh them ſo much the more greedy to attaine the things they take pleaſure in, as the ſpurres wherewith they be pricked are more ſharpe and poignant. This appeareth by their actions moſt manifeſtly. For hunting egerly after pleaſure, they are neuer quiet vntill they compaſſe their deſires: and albeit that their deſires be vehement in euery thing they fancie, yet do they moſt of all diſcouer themſelues in the luſts of the fleſh, which in them are firie, by reaſon of the abundance of blood and naturall heate that is in them, increaſing thoſe their diſordinate deſires beyond meaſure, yea they grow infinite in them, and variable, as themſelues are inconſtant, miſliking this day that, which yeſterday they liked;

ked; which proceedeth onely becauſe their ſaid deſires are not forged in that part of the mind where reaſon hath her firme ſeate, and proper dwelling. To this imperfectiō of luſt, is alſo added the violent motion of anger, to which they are ſubiect, and thereby ſoone drawne from the courſe of reaſon and iuſtice. By this paſſion are they prouoked to enter in to debate and quarrels vpon euery light occaſion, and as people deſirous of honour and reputation, as ſoone as they thinke they receiue any iniury, they feare no perill nor danger of their liues, but boldly and raſhly vndertake to fight, led by a deſire of reuenge, and hope to haue the victorie ouer their enemies. Of money or goods they make ſmal reckoning, through lacke of experience, becauſe of their youth, and want of prudence, which groweth from experience: and therefore little know they, how neceſſary the goods of fortune are to humane life, and into what inconueniences they fall that are without them. So as they ſpend and conſume without diſcretion, not regarding the time to come, but ſuppoſing the world will alwayes be at one ſtay. They be eaſily deceiued, not knowing the ſaying of *Epicarmus*, that not to beleeue raſhly was the ſinewes of wiſedome. And becauſe they conſider not how variable are the reſolutions of this world and humane affaires, they are euer full of good hope, ſeldome fearing that any thing may befall them other then wel: which hope layeth open the way to ſuch as lie in waite to intrap them and deceiue them. They ſeeme likewiſe to haue a touch of magnanimity, by reaſon of the heate of their youth, which ſtirreth them vp to vndertake great matters, but yet inconſideratly, as folke moued rather by nature then by election: and ſo are they inclined rather to attempt things ſeeming honorable, then things profitable. They loue their friēds

much more feruently then any other age, becauſe they delight more in company, and meaſure not friendſhip by profit or by honeſtie, but onely by their delight, as they find them conformable to their appetites. They flie eaſily into that which is in all things vicious, that is, too much; which too much, is harmeful euen in iuſtice it ſelf: whereupon is growne (I thinke) our Engliſh prouerbe, that too much of a mans mothers bleſſing is not good: not conſidering the precept of *Chilo*, who with three words taught the ſumme and effect of all vertue, *Ne quid nimis*. Whereby we may vnderſtand, that vertue conſiſteth in the meane betweene two extremes, which on either ſide are too much or too little, wherein yong men do moſt incline to that extreme of too much: for they loue too much, they hate too much, they hope too much, they feare too much, they truſt too much, they ſpend too much, they beleeue too much, they preſume too much: and by preſuming too much, they build more then they ought to do vpon the vncertaine and variable chances of fortune, without ſetting before their eyes thoſe good courſes by which men through vertuous and commendable acts do attaine a happie life. And this is the cauſe why they giue ſo deafe an eare to friendly admonitions, and to wiſe & graue aduice & counſel. For they, not knowing their owne ignorance, thinke they know all things, ſuch is the quickneſſe and vehemencie of ſpirit which raigneth in them, and giueth them a certaine ſhadow of nobilitie of courage, by which they preſume they are able to do all things of themſelues well and commendably; but they find themſelues farre deceiued when they come to the triall. They do oftentimes iniury to others, rather vnaduiſedly then malicioufly of purpoſe to harme or offend. And hauing generally a good opinion of all men,

men, ſimply meaſuring others words by their owne hart: they are ſoone moued to compaſſion and pittie. They delight exceedingly (as voide of care) to laugh, to ſport, and to be merrie: and with quips and biting ſpeeches to taunt their fellowes, and ſuch as conuerſe with them: and heare more willingly pleaſant conceits and merrie tales, then graue ſayings or auncient admonitions of wiſe and learned men.

In faith (ſaid Captaine *Norreis*) you haue painted or deſcribed a yong man in ſo ſtrange a figure, as to me it ſeemeth, I ſee a monſter before mine eyes, with moe heads then the auncient Poets ſaid that *Hydra* had, the ſame that gaue *Hercules* ſo much to do to ouercome her: and it is to be maruelled, that all yong men are not ſoone weary of that age, which bringeth with it ſuch varietie of imperfections, and all contrary to reaſon and vertue. You make vs almoſt to conceiue an opinion, that there can be no Art nor prudence ſufficient to deliuer vs from ſuch a multitude of errors that enuiron vs on euery ſide.

If there were cauſe of complaint that youth ſhould be thus deſcribed, ſaid I, yet am not I the man you ſhould complaine of, but rather of mine author, or of *Ariſtotle*, who long before deſcribed the ſame euẽ as he hath done: and of *Horace* in like ſort, who taking the matter out of *Ariſtotle*, concluded it in ſubſtance much like, though in fewer words, ſaying:

The yong man on whoſe face no beard yet ſhewes,
When firſt he creepeth out of others charge,
Delights to haue both horſe and hound at will,
With them to hunt, and beate the woods and fields,
Like waxe to vice is eaſie to be wrought,
And ſowre to them that tell him of his fault:
Too late he learnes his profit for to know,

And

And in expence, aye too too lauiſh ſtill,
His heart is high, and full of hote deſires,
And ſoone he loathes that earſt he loued deare.

And truly the nature of a young man is very perillous, and vnapt of it ſelfe to be ruled and directed to any good courſe; partly becauſe of the ignorance accompanying that age, and partly for that following the vanities and delights which the worſer part of the ſoule or mind doth ſet before him, he reſpecteth not that which is honeſt and vertuous, as a thing he neuer knew or taſted. And therefore being intent onely to pleaſures and delights, he conſidereth not any thing but what is preſent before him. For wanting (as is ſaid) experience, meete to foreſee accidents to come, he beleeueth much more them that intice him & flatter him, by praiſing all he doth, then thoſe men that reproue or check him for doing ill, or ſhew him the way to vertue, by telling him the truth. Neither is there any thing that more ſetteth a yong man aſtray from the courſe of vertue, then flattery: and ſpecially are yong Princes to take heede thereof, about whom are continually flatterers to winne their fauor, and by harming them with that ſubtil engin, to purchaſe to themſelues as much gaine & profit as they can. Theſe, who (as *Ariſtotle* ſaith) bend all their wits to euill, with continuall lying and ſoothing, make yong men beleeue that they are excellent in all things aboue courſe of nature; whereunto they (ſimple) giuing a readier eare then they ſhould, become ſo blind and fooliſh, that they diſcerne not their owne good: but pricked forward with thoſe falſe praiſes, apply themſelues to that onely which is pleaſant and delightfull, and become a prey vnto their flatterers, who like Paraſites affirme all that they heare their maſter ſay, and denie whatſoeuer he denieth. In which reſpect *Diogenes* did

did right well ſay, that flatterers were worſe then crowes, who feed but on the carcaſſes of the dead, but theſe iolly companions deuoure the mindes of men aliue, making them become (as *Seneca* ſaith) fooliſh or mad. Frō whoſe conceit *Epicarmus* varied not much, who ſaid, that crows pick out the eyes but of dead carcaſſes, but flatterers pick out the eyes of the mind, whiles men are yet aliue. And to ſay truly, this curſed generation, with their leaſings and ſoothing, induce ſuch as harken to them and beleeue them, to be their own foes, and to barre themſelues from the attaining of true glory, whiles they make them glory in the falſe praiſes of wicked flatterers. Who to the end they may be the better beleeued when they flatter, vſe all art poſſible to ſhew themſelues affectioned (though counterfetly) to them, in whoſe harts they ſeeke to poure their poiſon. For they kill in them all ſeeds of vertue, and they take from them the knowledge of themſelues, and of all truth: to which, flattery is a moſt peſtilent and mortall enemie. And happy might indeed Princes thinke themſelues, if they had about them men that would frankly and reſolutely reſiſt the attempts of flatterers, ſuch as was *Anaxarcus Eudemonicus* about *Alexander* the Great. This *Anaxarcus* miſliking that *Alexāder* throgh the flattery & falſe praiſes of ſuch as magnified his acts, grew ſo prowd, as he wold needs be eſteemed a God, & ſeeing on a time his Phyſition to bring him a potion to eaſe the griefe of his diſeaſe when he was ſicke, ſaid, *Is it not a wofull caſe, that the health of our God ſhould conſiſt in a draught of licour and drugs compoſed by a man?* Words full wel beſeeming the ſincere mind of a free harted man. As on the other ſide it was vile adulation which *Demades* the Athenian vſed, who being at an aſſembly of Councell, propoſed a decree, by which he would haue had *Alexander* to be reputed for the thirteenth of the great Gods. But the

people perceiuing his flattering purpoſe and ſmall reuerence to diuine things, condemned him in a fine of an hundred talents. If Princes, and ſuch as manage States, would follow this example, and haue an eye to ſuch fellowes, there would not be ſuch ſtore of Sycophants as now a dayes there are; and the vertues and merites of honeſt men, worthy honour and fauour, would be better knowne and regarded then they are; and rewards and recompences would be giuen to ſuch men, and not to flatterers, who ſeeke to put them beſides themſelues. This I ſay of ſuch as ſuffer themſelues to be ſeduced by theſe charmers, but not of wiſe Princes, who giue no more eare to their inchantments, then doth the ſerpent to the charmer; becauſe they know that their praiſes and ſoothings are but ſträgling morſels ſmeared ouer with hony. *Philip* of Macedon, the father of *Alexander*, had a flatterer in his Court, called *Ciſofus* (or as ſome ſay *Cleophus*) who did not onely affirme and deny all that *Philip* ſayd or denied, but alſo on a time when *Philip* had a ſore eye, and ware ſome band or ſcarfe before it, he in like manner came before the King with the like: and another time when *Philip* hauing hurt one of his legs, limped vpon it, and had clothes wrapped about it, the flatterer came likewiſe with his leg ſo wrapped and halting into the Court; ſeeking thus not only by his words as other Parafites do, but alſo with his geſtures and whole body to transforme the King, and put him beſide himſelfe. But although *Philip* tooke delight in this skim of men, yet could they neuer draw him by their charming to incurre thoſe vices which his ſonne ranne into: who albeit he was of a moſt noble nature and mind, yet did he ſo much attribute to theſe bad companions, and was ſo caried away with their flattering praiſes, that he could not endure the truth that

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Caliſthenes told him, but miſerably ſlue him, ſpotting with ſo cruell and barbarous a fact, all that euer he did before or after, were it neuer ſo noble and worthy of glorie. But contrariwiſe, *Ageſilaus* did ſo deſpiſe and hate all flatterers, that he wold neuer giue any man leaue to commend his vertues, but onely ſuch as had authoritie to reprehend his vices. Whereas *Alexander* was ſo diſtraught & rauiſhed with the delight of ſuch flatterers, that he not onely ſuffered himſelfe to be perſwaded by them that he was the ſonne of *Iupiter*, but became alſo ſo fooliſh as to endure ſacrifices to be made vnto him, and to be worſhipped like a God. From which folly he could neuer be brought, vntill ſuch time as he was grieuouſly wounded in an incounter with an arrow. Out of which his wound *Depoſippus* the Athenian wraſtler ſeeing the blood to run aboundantly, ſaid, to taxe *Alexanders* vaine glory; Why then, do the Gods immortal bleed as we mortal men do? which his words *Alexander* hearing, and feeling the pain and ſmart of his wound, he perceiued himſelf to be mortall and no God; opening thereby in ſuch ſort the eyes of his mind, as whē *Anaxander* the Philoſopher (though vnworthy that name becauſe he was a flatterer) ſtanding once by *Alexander* when it thundred, asked him, whether it were he that had cauſed that thunder-cracke, as the ſon of *Iupiter?* No, ſaid he, mildly reiecting his flattery, I will cauſe no ſuch terror vnto men. And another time when a medicine which he had taken troubled him grieuouſly in the working, and *Niceſias* had ſaid vnto him, What ſhall we mortall men do, if ye Gods endure ſuch paine and agonie? he looking angrily vpon him, anſwered, What Gods? I feare me rather that the Gods do hate vs. This noble King likewiſe, after ſickneſſe and hurts had made him know himſelfe, did a worthy and noble act

towards *Ariſtobulus* the Hiſtoriographer. For this *Ariſtobulus* hauing written a booke of the deeds of *Alexander*, and being with him in boate vpon the riuer *Hidaſpes* in *India*, he beſought leaue that he might reade his booke vnto him: which when he had obtained, and that *Alexander* perceiued, by the vntrue reports made in his praiſe beyond all meaſure, that he was a flatterer, and no Hiſtoriographer: deſpiſing his ſhameleſſe flattery, he tooke the booke out of his hands, in a rage throwing it into the riuer, and fiercely turning to him, ſaid, Thou wretch, thou haſt thy ſelfe deſerued to be throwne after thy booke, ſince thou haſt not bin aſhamed to ſet downe to the memory of poſteritie the reports of my acts in ſuch a falſe and flattering manner. By this, which we haue ſayd, may eaſily be gathered, that they, who once giue eare to flattery, cannot diſcerne the harme and deceit of flatterers towards them, vntill ſome bitter ſtorme or croſſe of froward fortune befall them, to open their eyes, and to giue them to vnderſtand how they haue bin deceiued by ſuch lying companions, and harmed more then by their mortall enemies. Which thing this wicked generation well conſidering, leſt Princes ſhould perceiue their flatterie, they neuer ceaſe, as ſoone as they haue gotten truſt and credit by their lies, to vſe all meanes and deuices poſſible, to put into their diſgrace and hatred all ſuch as they think may be like to diſcouer their ſubtilties, and to make knowne the harme which they procure. To which purpoſe of inuenting falſe and colourable cauſes, they labor to remoue them from being about the Prince, that they may the better turne topſie-turuie all at their pleaſure. By this meanes they ſo blind the eyes of thoſe poore Princes whom they poſſeſſe, that whiles they are in proſperitie they not onely loue them and hold them deare, but alſo

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beſtow vpon them offices, lands, and great Lordſhips. As by *Philip* before named it appeared, who made *Thraſideus* the flatterer, Lord of his countrey, though otherwiſe he were a man of little worth and wiſedome. And that *Philip* who was the laſt King of Macedon ouercome by the Romanes, had a flatterer in his Court, whoſe name was *Proclides*: who albeit he were a ſtranger (to wit, a Tarentine) and a very vaine fellow, yet crept he ſo farre into the ſaid Kings fauour, that he was able to breede great broyles and troubles in the kingdome. Theſe and ſuch like inconueniences would not happen, if the ignorance of yong men (not diſcerning themſelues) did not open the way to flattery, and leade her as it were by the hand into the preſence of Princes, inducing them to delight in her. Hereof I haue ſpoken the more, becauſe, the number of flatterers being infinite, and very many thoſe that by them are blinded and ſeduced to eſteeme them and raiſe them into reputation, all yong gentlemen, and Princes ſpecially might be forewarned of the harme they may do vnto them, if before they offer their poiſon of lies and ſoothing praiſes, they be not armed to repulſe their practiſes, and aduertiſed of their ſnares. Which thing the Theſſalians conſidering, when they had take a citie called Melia, they razed it, only becauſe it bare the name of flattery in the Greeke language, ſo much did they hate and abhorre euen the name of ſo abhominable a vice. And where ſome Princes haply think themſelues wiſe inough to take heed of ſuch caterpillers, and therefore care not to rid their Courts of them: let them aſſure themſelues that therein they do like men that will feede on hurtfull meates, and preſume they ſhal not offend their ſtomacks. For theſe gallants can ſo cunningly watch and eſpie their times to worke their feate, that in the end they caſt out

their poiſon, and infect their minds with ſome fawning deuice or other before they be aware: ſo as there is no other meanes to auoid this miſchiefe, but onely to keepe it farre off, and not to ſuffer it to approch. True it is neuertheleſſe, that if Princes (hauing flatterers about them) would looke well into themſelues, and learne the precept of *Noſce teipſum* (which onely precept is of ſuch importance, as without it no mã cã be happie) they might reape profit by their flattery: not by delighting in it, but by vſing it as a rule or a ſquare to examine their mindes and their actions by. For when they ſhall find themſelues praiſed and magnified by any flatterer, they wil endeuor themſelues to garniſh their minds with thoſe vertues, for which they were by him commended and extolled, and were not before in thẽ; to the end they might afterwards be truly and deſeruingly praiſed for the ſame by men of vertue and honeſtie, whoſe propertie is to exalt and celebrate the actions of worthy and famous men, and not to lie and flatter, to purchaſe fauour to themſelues, and to draw ruine vpon the heads of thoſe that they ſhal haue put beſides their wit, as flatterers do. *Diogenes* was ſo great an enemy to flattery, that he choſe rather to liue in his tub, then in the courts of mightie Princes, who offered him fauour and entertainment, diſdaining to haue abundance of things gotten by ſo vile a vice. Contrariwiſe *Ariſtippus*, though he were one of the diſciples of *Socrates*, did ſo degenerate from the doctrine and behauior of his maſter, that he became a paraſite to *Dionyſius* tyrant of Sicile, eſteeming more the profit he got that way, thẽ the reputation he might haue won by the profeſſion of Philoſophie: and grew in the end to be of ſo baſe a mind, that although the Tyrant did ſpit in his face, yet would he not be angry; but being rebuked for enduring ſo vile

a diſgrace, he laughing at them that rebuked him, ſayd: If fiſher-men to take a ſmall fiſh can be content to go to ſea, and to be waſhed all ouer with the waues; ſhall not I endure that the King with a little ſpittle wet me, to the end I may catch a Whale? This ſame *Ariſtippus* ſeeing *Diogenes* on a day to waſh a few herbes which he had gathered for his ſupper, he ſaid to him: Go to ſirra, if you would frame your ſelfe to follow the humor of Princes, you ſhould not need to feed vpon herbes. Neither thou (ſaid *Diogenes*) if thou kneweſt thy ſelfe to be (I will not ſay) a Philoſopher, but a man, thou wouldſt not be (as thou art) the dog of *Dionyſius*. For dogs for their meate fawne vpon their maſters; and ſo did this Philoſopher ſhew how baſe and vile a thing it is to be a flatterer. Which, by this digreſſion, my author hath in like ſort laboured to make apparant by reaſons and examples. But now returning to his former matter, becauſe he hath rather ſhewed the harme that comes by flattery, and how it increaſeth vice in yong mens minds, then inſtructed them which way to roote it out, you ſhall heare how he goeth about to pull vp the ill weeds that choke the naturall good ſeeds in their minds, that by the increaſe of the good, they may haue ſufficient ſtore to furniſh them in the way of their felicitie. It is already declared what bad qualities and conditions the two worſer powers of the ſoule ſtirre vp in yong mens minds, for that they be mightie and vehement, and apt to oppoſe themſelues againſt reaſon, and to reſiſt her. And how reaſon in yong folkes is ſcarce felt or perceiued, ſuch is the force of the two foreſaid faculties, which draw them to luſtfull appetites and diſordinate paſſions. The cauſe whereof, *Heraclitus* aſcribeth to the humiditie, wherwith theſe two ages abound: for it ſeemed to him that drineſſe was the cauſe of wiſe-

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dome, and therefore ſayd, that the wiſeſt mind was nothing elſe but a drie light. To which opinion *Galen* leaning, thought the ſtarres to be moſt wiſe becauſe they be moſt drie. But leauing them with their opinions, and imputing the cauſe onely to the worſer powers or faculties of the ſoule, let vs follow our two firſt choſē guides, *Ariſtotle* & *Plato*. They ſay then, that the ſoule which giueth ſenſe or feeling, and containeth in it the other that giueth life, is not yet ſo rebellious againſt reaſon, but that ſhe maybe ſubdued, and brought to be obedient. So as you muſt not think, but that youth, though it be incombred with thoſe paſſions and deſires before mentioned, may neuertheleſſe be directed to that good courſe which leadeth man to his moſt perfect end in this life, and for which all vertues are put in action. For aboue or ouer theſe two powers or faculties, is placed a third, like a Ladie or Queene to commaund if ſhe be not hindred in the execution of her charge. And if theſe two vnruly and wild powers, which are the ſpring and fountaine head of all diſordinate affections, be once wel tamed and broken, they do no leſſe obey her cōmaundements, then the wel taught horſes obey the coach-man. For we are all drawne as it were by two vnbridled colts in this life, by theſe two baſer powers of the ſoule. Wherof the one ſheweth it ſelf in moſt vigour and ſtrength in childhood, and the other in youth. Concerning the firſt of which, *Ariſtotle* and his maſter do diſagree. But when they both are ioyned together, and ſtrong, they become the more vnruly, vnleſſe the former (as was ſaid yeſterday) be well tamed and made meeke by good inſtruction and diligent care of education. For if childhood be faſhioned according to the good precepts of the learned; that firſt power commeth humble & obedient to be coupled with the other,

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and thereby is there the leſſe labor requiſite for him that ſhall haue the guiding of them both in youth. But in youth deſcribed euen now, as you haue heard, in whom both theſe faculties are rude and vndiſciplined, the paſſions are altogether incited and ruled by the naturall powers. For though nature (if ſhe be not hindred) bring forth her effects perfectly in reſpect of their ſubſtances; yet are they often vnperfect in regard of the accidents. And for this cauſe is Art and induſtry needful to induce vertuous habits, to ſupply that wherin nature accidentally may be defectiue. Whereby it cometh to paſſe, that although the vertues and faculties of the ſoule haue all that which nature can giue vnto them; yet haue they need of mans wit and diſcipline to bring forth laudable and perfect operations. And this is done by that part of Philoſophie which is called Morall, becauſe from it we do draw the forme of good manners, which being actually brought into the mind of a yong man, as well as by the doctrine and wiſe inſtruction of others: and ſo by long cuſtome, conuerted into an habite, do breake and make ſupple thoſe parts which by nature are rebellious to reaſon. And of ſo great importance is the well training vp of childhood, euen from the firſt, that it may be aſſuredly beleeued, that the youth ſucceeding ſuch a childhood as was yeſterday preſcribed, muſt needs be ciuill and well diſpoſed: and on the contrary ſide, that the life of ſuch youths will be wicked and diſordered, as hauing bin ill brought vp in their childhood, do enter into ſo hopeleſſe a courſe, as may be likely to be the foundation of all vice and wickedneſſe during the whole life to come. And hopeleſſe may they be thought indeed, who by ill doing beginne euen from their tender yeares to induce an ill habit into their minds: for from age to age after it increaſeth and taketh roote

in ſuch ſort, as it is almoſt impoſſible to be rooted out or taken away. Neither can there be any greater euil wiſhed to any man, then that he be ill-habituated, which thing by *Ælianus* report, the Cretans were wont to wiſh to their enemies whom they hated moſt extremely, and not without cauſe. For he that is fallen into an ill habite, is no leſſe blind to vertuous actions, then he that wanteth his ſight to things viſible. And as the one is euer plunged in perpetual darknes: ſo doth the other liue in euerlaſting night of vice, after he hath once hardned himſelfe to euil. And this is the worſt kind of youth that may be, which *Ariſtotle* aduiſed ſhould be driuen out of the citie, when neither for honeſties reſpect, nor for admonitions, nor ſhame, nor for loue of vertue or feare of lawes, they could poſſibly be reclaimed to vertuous life.

I pray you (ſaid Captain *Norreis*) let me interrupt you a little, ſo ſhall you the better take breath in the meane while. I noted not long ſithens a ſaying of your author, which me ſeemed ſomewhat ſtrange, and that is, that the ſubſtance of the ſoule ſhould be made perfect by the accidents.

You ſay right, quoth I, but let not that ſeeme ſtrange vnto you: for it ought rather to ſeeme ſtrange vnto you if it were otherwiſe; becauſe the ſubſtance of euery thing is ſo called, by reaſon that it is ſubiect vnto accidents; neither can there be any accident (to which it is proper to be in ſome ſubiect) but it muſt fall into ſome ſubſtance: and hardly would the ſubſtance perhaps be diſcerned by ſenſe, but that the accidents do make it to be knowne. Yet hath nature giuen to the ſubſtance all that ſhe could giue to enable the ſame, to wit, that it might by nature be of it ſelfe alone, hauing no need of any other thing in reſpect of being; and that it ſhould be ſo neceſſary to

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all things elſe that is not a ſubſtance, as without it they ſhould be nothing. Therefore the nature of the ſoule is ſuch, as the parts thereof haue their vertues and faculties perfect: but in that concerneth the directing of them to ciuill life, man cannot by nature onely compaſſe it, nor attaine to that end of which we treate.

Then ſaid Captaine *Norreis*, If it be ſo, as by nature we cannot haue that wherewith we ſhould compaſſe our felicitie, it muſt belike be in vs contrary to nature. And, all things contrary to nature, being violent, and of no continuance; I cannot perceiue how this felicitie of ours may ſtand.

Sir (ſaid I) it followeth not, that whatſoeuer is not by nature, muſt needs be contrary to nature. But moſt true it is that the meanes to guide vs to this felicitie; or our felicity it ſelfe, is in vs not by nature: for if it were ſo, all men ſhould naturally be happy, and by nature haue the means to purchaſe the ſame, becauſe all men ſhould of neceſſitie worke after one ſort. For things naturall, vnleſſe they be forced or hindered, do alwayes bring foorth the ſame effects, whereſoeuer they be; and the powers which nature beſtoweth, are indifferently diſpenſed to all alike. Which thing is to be vnderſtood by the *vegetatiue* part of the ſoule, which in plants and in creatures ſenſible attendeth onely by nature, without counſell or election, to nouriſh, to increaſe, to procreate, and to preſerue: ne ceaſeth at any time frō thoſe offices, but alwaies produceth like effects in al things that haue life. And the ſēſible ſoule euermore giueth the power and vertue of feeling to creatures ſenſible, and neuer altereth her operation, nor ceaſeth to yeeld the ſame whiles life endureth, except by ſome ſtrange accident ſhe be forced. Seeing therefore the diuerſitie of mans will, the varietie of his operations, and

how differently they vſe the faculties of the ſoule, we muſt needes conclude, that in reſpect of ciuill life, they work not according to nature. But we muſt not therfore ſay, that their working to purchaſe their felicitie, and the end wé ſpeake of, is contrary to nature. For ſuch things are properly ſaid to be contrary to nature, as are violently forced to that which is not naturall, and whereunto they haue no aptneſſe or diſpoſition at all. As for example, if a ſtone (which is naturally heauy, and therfore coueteth to moue to the center of the earth) be caſt vpward into the aire by force, it is to be ſaid, that the motion of that ſtone ſo forced vpward is contrary to nature; becauſe it hath no inſtinct or mouing from nature to go vpward: and though it were throwne vp ten thouſand times, ſo often wold it fal downe again, if it were not retained otherwiſe frō falling. And if fire, which is light, & couets to aſcend, ſhould be forced downeward, that force would be contrary to nature, and the force ceaſing, it would by nature aſcend again, becauſe it hath not any vertue, or principle, or motion to deſcend, but onely to aſcend, by which it ſtriueth to come to the place which is proper to it by nature, as it is fire, and by which it is fire naturally. For the elements haue alwayes their eſſence moſt perfect, when they are neareſt to the place aſſigned them by nature. But man being a creature capable of reaſon, and thereby apt to receiue thoſe vertues, the ſeeds whereof nature hath ſowne in his mind, it cannot be ſaid, that the meanes (by which he is to be led to ſo noble an end as his felicitie) ſhould be in him contrary to nature. For neuer any thing worketh contrary to nature, in which is the beginning of that operation that it is to do.

Why, ſaid Captaine *Norreis* againe, ſince you ſay that the ſeeds of vertues are in our minds naturally, it ſeemeth ſtrange

ſtrange to me that they ſhould not bring forth generally in all men their fruite; as the ſeed which is caſt into the earth, ſpringeth, buddeth, flowreth, and laſtly in due ſeaſō yeeldeth fruite according to kind.

Marry (ſaid I) and ſo they do. For if mans care and induſtry be not applied to manure the earth diligently, and to weed out the il weeds that ſpring among the good ſeed which is ſowne, they would ſo choke the ſame as it would be quite loſt. And euen ſo, if the ſeeds of vertue be not holpen with continuall culture, and care taken to pul vp the vices which ſpring therewith, and whereof the ſeeds are naturally as well in our mind, as thoſe of vertue, they wil ouer-grow and choke them, as the weeds of the garden ouer-grow and choke the good herbes planted or ſowne therein. For ſo grow vp the diſordinate appetites, vnreaſonable anger, ambitions, greedie deſires of wealth, of honour, wanton luſts of the fleſh, and ſuch other affections ſpoken of before, which haue their naturall rootes in thoſe two baſer parts of the ſoule deuoyde of reaſon. And as we ſee the earth, without manuring to bring forth wyld herbs and weeds more plentifully then other good ſeed, which by induſtry and labor is caſt into the ſame: ſo do thoſe paſſions, affects, and appetites of thoſe baſer parts of the ſoule, ſpring and grow vp thicker and faſter then the vertues; whereby (for the more part) the fruit of thoſe good ſeeds of vertue is loſt, if the mind be not diligently cleaned frō them by the care of others. And theſe ill qualities are in yong men the worſe, when they ſuffer themſelues to be tranſported without regard of reaſon or honeſtie, and their right iudgement to be corrupted, and their crooked to preuaile. Which crooked iudgement is in effect the cauſe of all vices and ill affections, & turnes the braine, making them like drunken men,

much like as coccle doth to them that feed thereupon. But this hapneth not vnto that youth which ſucceedeth a well faſhioned childhood, ſuch as yeſterday was ſpoken of; though it be not ſufficient to haue a childe either well brought vp or well inſtructed. For a new care muſt be taken, and new diligence be vſed to cheriſh the growth of the good ſeeds beſtowed & manured in the mind of the child: which made *Ariſtotle* ſay, that education onely was not enough to make a man vertuous. For though the child be ſo well bred as hath bin preſcribed, yet vnleſſe ſome care be had to bridle it (ſo vnpleaſing a thing it is for youth to liue within the compaſſe of modeſtie and temperance) it is eaſily turned to that part, to which pleaſure and delight doth draw it. Neuertheles that firſt culture beſtowed vpon childhood, doth ſo much auaile, as the yong man that is diſpoſed to hearken, to good admonitions, ſhall haue the leſſe to do to liue vertuouſly, and to tame that ſenſitiue part which he hath onely to ſtriue withall, and to make obedient to the rule of reaſon.

Captaine *Carleil* then ſaid, I pray you (before you go any further) let me aske this one queſtion, why vntil now your author hauing ſpoken of this moral ſcience, hath all this while made no mention of the ſpeculatiue ſciences, wherein me thinketh a yong man hath ſpecial need to be inſtructed? for they alſo (I ſuppoſe) are neceſſary to happineſſe of life.

That doubt the author anſwereth thus, ſaid I: Vertues are generally deuided into Speculatiue and Practike; or we may ſay, into Intellectiue and Actiue. The ſpeculatiue habites are fiue in number, viz: Vnderſtanding, called by the Latines *Intellectus*, Science, Wiſedome, Art, and Prudence. And becauſe hitherto he hath ſpoken onely how men in ciuill life may attaine to be good, or decline from being

being euill; and that the ſpeculatiue ſciences declare, but how wiſe, how learned, or how prudent they be, and not how good or vertuous they be: and that theſe two firſt ages are not of capacitie ſufficient to embrace them, therefore he reſerueth the treating thereof vntill a fitter time, which the courſe of our ſpeech will leade vs vnto.

Yea but *Ariſtotle* ſaith (quoth the Lord Primate) that yong men may be Arithmeticians and Mathematicians, and finally therin wiſe, but yet he affirmeth that they can not be prudent.

That place of *Ariſtotle* (ſaid I) is to be vnderſtood, not of this firſt degree of youth, whereof the author hath ſpoken hitherto, but of the perfection and ripeneſſe that in time it may attaine, as after ſhall be declared when time doth ſerue.

That time (ſaid Captaine *Carleil*) we will attend. But becauſe we ſee both vertues and ſciences are to be learned, and that I haue heard queſtion and doubt made of the manner of learning them, I pray let vs heare whether your author ſay ought thereof, and ſpecially whether our learning be but a rememorating of things which we knew formerly, or elſe a learning a new.

This is indeed (ſaid I) no light queſtion which mine author handleth alſo euen in this place: and there are on either ſide great and learned authors, as *Plato* and *Ariſtotle* firſt, whereof the one was accounted the God of Philoſophers, and the other the maſter of all learned men: and ech hath his followers, who with forcible arguments ſeeke to defend and maintaine the part of their maſter and captaine. But before we enter into that matter, you muſt vnderſtand that *Plato* and *Ariſtotle* haue held a ſeuerall way each of them in their teaching. For *Plato* from things

things eternall, deſcended to mortall things, and thence returned (as it were by the ſame way) from the earth to heauen againe; rather affirming then prooving what he taught. But *Ariſtotle* from earthly things (as moſt manifeſt to our ſenſes) raiſed himſelfe, climing to heauenly things, vſing the meane of that knowledge which the ſenſes giue, frō which his opiniō was, that al humane knowledge doth come. And where ſenſible reaſons failed him, there failed his proofes alſo. Which thing, as it hapned to him in diuine matters, ſo did it likewiſe in the knowledge of the ſoule intellectiue (as ſome of his interpreters ſay): which being created by God to his owne likeneſſe, he hath written ſo obſcurely thereof, that his reſolute opinion in that matter cannot be picked out of his writings; but that reaſons may be gathered out of them, in fauour of the one part and of the other: as though the treatie of a matter ſo important and neceſſary to our knowledge, were (as ſchoole-men ſay) a matter contingent, about which arguments probable may be gathered on both ſides: yet had he before him his diuine maſter, who (as far as mans wit could ſtretch without grace) had taught him cleerly that which was true, that mans ſoule is by nature immortall, and partaker of diuinitie; howſoeuer ſome of the *Peripatetikes* ſeeme out of *Ariſtotle* to affirme that *Plato* was contrary to himſelf, as making the ſoule ſomewhiles immortall, and otherwhiles not: which in truth is not in *Plato* to be found, if he be rightly vnderſtood. But to the purpoſe. The opinion of *Ariſtotle* was, that our ſoule did not only not record any thing, but that it ſhold be ſo wholy voyd of knowledge or ſcience, as it might be reſembled to a pure white paper: and therefore affirmed he, that our knowledge was altogether newly gotten; and that our ſoule had to that end need of ſenſe; and that

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ſenſe failing her, all ſcience or knowledge ſhould faile withall. Becauſe the ſenſes are as miniſters to the mind, to receiue the images or formes particular of things: which being apprehended by the common ſenſe, called *ſenſus communis*, bring foorth afterwards the vniuerſals. Which common ſenſe, is a power or facultie of the ſenſitiue ſoule, that diſtinguiſheth betweene thoſe things that the outward ſenſes offer vnto it; and is therefore called common, becauſe it receiueth commonly the formes or images with the exteriour ſenſes preſent vnto it, and hath power to diſtinguiſh the one from the other. But as thoſe ſenſes know not the nature of things; ſo is the ſame vnknowne alſo vnto the common ſenſe, to whom they offer things ſenſible. Wherefore this common ſenſe being (as we haue ſaid) a facultie of the *ſenſitiue* ſoule, offereth them to the facultie *imaginatiue*, which hath the ſame proportiõ to the vertue *intellectiue*, as things ſenſible haue to the ſenſe aforeſaid. For it moueth the vnderſtanding after it hath receiued the formes or images of things frõ the outward ſenſes, & layeth them vp materiall in the memory where they be kept. This done, *Ariſtotle* and his followers ſay, that then the part of the ſoule capable of reaſon, beginneth to vſe her powers; and they are (as they affirme) two: the one *intellectus poſsibilis*, and the other *intellectus agens*: theſe latin words I muſt vſe at this time, becauſe they be eaſie enough to be vnderſtood, and in Engliſh would ſeeme more harſh; whereof the firſt is as the matter to the ſecond, and the ſecond as forme to the firſt. Into that poſſible facultie of the vnderſtanding, do the kinds or *ſpecies* of things paſſe, which the fantaſie hath apprehended, yet free of any materiall condition: and this part is to the vnderſtanding, as the hand is to the bodie. For as the hand is apt to take hold of all inſtruments;

ſo is this power or facultie apt to apprehend the formes of all things, from whence grow the vniuerſals: which though they haue their being in the materiall particulars which the Latins cal *indiuidua*; yet are they not material, becauſe they are not (according to *Ariſtotle*) yet in act. In which reſpect it is ſayd, that ſenſe is buſied about things particular, and that onely things vniuerſall are knowne, becauſe they be comprehended by the vnderſtanding, without matter. It is neuertheleſſe to be vnderſtood, that the kindes of things are in this poſſible part thus ſeparated from matter, but blind and obſcure: euen as colours are ſtil in ſubſtances, though the light be taken away; which light appearing and making the ayre tranſparent which before was darkened, it giueth to things that illumination, by which they are comprehended and knowne to the eye, whoſe obiect properly colours are. And the Sunne being the fountaine of light, wiſe men haue ſaid, that the ſame Sunne giueth colours to things; for that by meanes of his light they are ſeene with thoſe viſible colours which naturally they haue neuertheleſſe in themſelues, though without light they could not be diſcerned, and remaine there as if they were not at all. This part of the ſoule then, wherein reaſon is, worketh the ſame effect towards things intelligible that the Sun doth towards things viſible; for it illumineth thoſe kinds or formes which lie hidden in that part poſſible, dark and confuſed, deuoyde of place, time, and matter, becauſe they are not particular. And hence it cometh that ſome haue ſaid this poſſible vnderſtanding (as we may terme it) to be ſuch a thing, as out of it all things ſhould be made, as if it were in ſtead of matter; and the other agent vnderſtanding to be the worker of all things, and as it were the forme, becauſe this part which before was but in

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power to things intelligible, becometh through the operation of the agent vnderſtanding to be now in act. And for this cauſe alſo is it ſaid, that the vnderſtanding, and things vnderſtood, become more properly and truly one ſelfe ſame thing, then of matter and forme it may be ſaid. For it is credible, that both the formes of things and the vnderſtanding being immateriall, they do the more perfectly vnite themſelues, and that the vnderſtanding doth ſo make it ſelfe equall with the thing vnderſtood, that they both become one. To which purpoſe *Ariſtotle* ſaid very well, that the reaſonable ſoule, whiles it vnderſtandeth things intelligible, becometh one ſelfe ſame thing with them. And this is that very act of truth, to wit, the certain ſcience or knowledge of any thing: which knowledge or ſcience is in effect nought elſe then the thing ſo knowne. And this knowledge is not principally in man, but in the ſoule, wherin it remaineth as the forme therof. This is briefly the ſumme of the order or maner of knowledge, which thoſe that follow *Ariſtotle* do ſet downe: who therefore affirme that his ſentence was, that who ſo would vnderſtand any thing, had need of thoſe formes and images which the ſenſes offer to the fantaſie. From which ſentence ſome (not well aduiſed in my opinion) haue gone about to argue, that the ſoule of man ſhould be mortal, becauſe *Ariſtotle* aſſigned no proper operation vnto her, as if ſuch had bin his opinion. But they conſider not that *Ariſtotle* in his bookes *de Anima*, ſpake of the ſoule as ſhe was naturall, and the forme to the body, performing her operations together with the body, and as ſhe was the mouer of the body, and the body moued by her, but not as ſhe was diſtinct or ſeparate from the bodie. And right true it is, that whiles ſhe is tied to the bodie, ſhe cannot vnderſtand but by the meanes of the ſen-

ſes: but that being free and looſed from the body, ſhe hath not her proper operations, that is moſt falſe. For then hath ſhe no need at all of the ſenſes, when being pure and ſimple, ſhe may exerciſe her owne power and vertue proper to her, (which is the contemplation of God Almightie, the higheſt and onely true good) nor yet of any other inſtrument but her ſelfe. And in this reſpect, perchance the better ſort of *Peripatetikes* following their maſters opinion, haue ſaid, that the ſoule ſeparated from the body, is not the ſame ſhe was whiles ſhe was linked thereunto, as well becauſe then ſhe was a part of the whole, and was troubled with anger, deſire, hatred, loue, & ſuch like paſſions cõmon to her with the body; as becauſe being impriſoned in the body, ſhe had neede of the ſenſes; but now that ſhe was freed frõ that impriſonment, nor any way bound to the body, ſhe might vſe her ſelfe and her vertue much more nobly and worthily then before. And therefore *Ariſtotle* ſaid, that the ſoule ſeparated frõ the body, could no more be called a ſoule, but equiuocally. But here is to be noted, that it is one thing to ſpeake of the intellectiue ſoule which is diuine and vncorruptible, and another thing to ſpeake of the ſoule ſimply. For doubtleſſe, the *vegetatiue* and *ſenſitiue* ſoules, which cannot vſe their vertues and operations but by meane of the body, die with the body. But the intellectiue ſoule, which is our onely true forme, not drawne from the materiall power, but created and ſent into vs by the diuine maieſtie, dieth not with the body, but remaineth immortal and euerlaſting. And thus much touching the maner of our learning, according to *Ariſtotles* opinion may ſuffice. But *Plato* doubtleſſe was of opinion that our ſoule, before it deſcended into vs, had the knowledge of all things: and that by comming into this

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mortall priſon (which his followers haue termed the ſepulchre of the ſoule) ſhe was plunged as it were into profound darkneſſe from a moſt cleere light, whereby ſhe forgat all that erſt ſhe knew. And that afterwards by occaſion of thoſe things, which by meanes of the ſenſes come before her, the memory of that ſhe knew before being ſtirred vp and wakened, ſhe came to reſume her former knowledge, and in this ſort by way of rememorating, and not of learning a new, ſhe attained the knowledge of ſciences; ſo as we learned nothing, whereof before we had not the knowledge. In conformitie of which their maſters ſentence, the *Platonikes* ſay, that ſince the body bringeth with it the ſeeds that appertaine vnto it by nature, it is to be beleeued, that the ſoule likewiſe, being much more perfect, ſhould bring with it thoſe ſeeds that appertaine to the mind. And to this reaſon they adde, that men euen from their firſt yeares deſiring things that are good, true, honeſt and profitable: and ſince no man can deſire a thing which he knoweth not after ſome ſort, it may be cõcluded, that we haue the knowledge of thoſe things before. But becauſe it would be too long a matter to rehearſe all the arguments which *Plato* his followers bring to proue this, by our deſiring of things, by ſeeking them, by finding them, and by the diſcerning of them; it may ſuffice to referre you to what *Plato* hath left of this matter written vnder the perſon of *Socrates*, in his dialogs intitled *Menon* and *Phædon*, and diuers other places. And likewiſe to that which his expoſitors haue written, among whõ *Plotinus*, though he be ſomewhat obſcure, deſerueth the chiefe place, as beſt expreſſing *Plato* his ſence and meaning. But let our knowledge come how it will, either by learning anew, or by recording what the ſoule knew before; ſhe hauing need (howſoeuer it be) of

the miniſtery of the ſenſes, and ſeeing it is almoſt neceſſary to paſſe through the ſame meanes from not knowing to knowledge: we ſhall euer find the like difficulties, whether we rememorate or learne anew. For without much ſtudy, great diligence, and long trauel, are ſciences no way to be attained. Which thing *Socrates* (who haply was the author of *Plato* his opinion) ſhewed vs plainely. For when the curtizan *Theodota* ſcoffing at him ſaid, ſhe was of greater skill then he: for ſhe had drawne diuers of *Socrates* ſcholers from him to her loue, where *Socrates* could draw none of her louers to follow him: he anſwered, that he thereat maruelled nothing at all: for (ſaid he) thou leadeſt them by a plaine ſmooth way to luſt and wantonneſſe; and I leade them to vertue by a rough and an vneaſie path.

Here Captaine *Norreis* ſaid, Though this controuerſie betweene two ſo great Philoſophers be not (for ought I ſee) yet decided, and that if we ſhould take vpon vs to diſcerne whoſe opinion were the better, it might be imputed to preſumption: yet would I for my part be very glad to know what was the reaſon that induced *Plato* to ſay that our ſoule had the knowledge of all things before it came into the body; and I pray you, if your author ſpeake any thing thereof, that you will therein ſatisfie my deſire.

Yes marry doth he ſir, ſaid I, and your deſire herein ſheweth very well the excellencie of your wit, and your attention to that which hath bin ſaid: and both may ſerue for a ſufficient argument, what hope is to be conceiued of a gentleman ſo inclined and deſirous to learne. Thus therefore he ſaith to your queſtion. That whereas we according to truth beleeue, that our ſoules are by the diuine power of God, incontinently created and infuſed into

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our bodies, when we beginne to receiue life and ſenſe in our mothers womb. *Plato* contrarily held, that they were long before the bodies created, and produced in a number certaine by God, and that they were as particles deſcended from the Gods aboue into our bodies: and therfore he thought it nothing abſurd, that they ſhould haue the knowledge of al things that may be knowne. For that they being in heauen buſied in the contemplation of the diuine nature, free from any impediment of the body: and that diuine nature containing in it (as he ſaid) the eſſentiall *Ideas* of all things, which *Ideas* (according to his opinion) were ſeparate and eternall natures remaining in the diuine minde of God, to the patterne of which, all things created were made, they might (ſaid he) in an inſtant haue the knowledge of all that could be knowne.

If this opinion were true, ſaid Captaine *Norreis*, happie had it bin for vs, that our ſoules had continued ſtil, after they were ſent into our bodies, to be of that ſort that they had bin in heauen, for then ſhould we not haue needed ſo much labour and paine in ſeeking that knowledge which before they had ſo perfectly. And being ſo perfect to what end did he ſay, they were ſent into our bodies to become vnperfect?

His opinion (ſaid I) was, that the ſoules were created in a certaine number, to the end they might informe ſo many bodies: and therfore if they ſhould not haue come into thoſe bodies, they ſhould haue failed of the end for which they were created. In which bodies, the *Platonikes* ſay further, that they were to exerciſe themſelues, and were giuen to the bodies, not onely becauſe they ſhould giue them power to moue, to ſee, to feele, and to do thoſe other operations which are naturall; but to the end that they ſhould in that which appertaineth to the mind, not

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ſuffer vs to be drowſie, and lie (as it were) aſleepe, but rather to waken and ſtirre vs vp to the knowledge of thoſe things that are fit for vs to vnderſtand: and this was the moſt accompliſhed operation (ſayd they) that the ſoule could giue vnto the bodie whiles it was linked thereunto.

I cannot ſee (ſaid the Lord Primate) how this hangeth together. For I haue read that theſe kind of Philoſophers held an opinion, that our ſoules all the while they were tied to our bodies, did but ſleepe: and that all, which they do or ſuffer in this life, was but as a dreame.

It is true (ſaid I) that the *Platonikes* ſaid ſo indeed; and that was, becauſe they knew that whatſoeuer we do in this life is but a dreame, in compariſon of that our ſoules ſhal do in the other world, when they ſhal be looſed from thoſe bands which tie them to our bodies here: through which bands they are hindred from the knowledge of thoſe things perfectly which here they learne. In regard whereof *Carneades*, *Arceſilas*, and others the authors of the new Accademie ſaid conſtantly, that in this world there was no certaine knowledge of any thing. And *Nauſifanes* affirmed, that of all thoſe things which here ſeeme to vs to be, we know nothing ſo certainly as that they were not. Vnto which opinion *Protagoras* alſo agreed, ſaying, that men might diſpute of any thing *pro & contra*; as if he ſhould ſay, that nothing could be aſſuredly knowen to vs whiles we are here, as our ſoules ſhall know them whenſoeuer they ſhall be freed from our bodies, and lie no more inwrapped in theſe mortall ſhadowes, becauſe then they ſhall be wholy buſied in the contemplation of truth: neither ſhal they be deceiued by the ſenſes, as in this life they are oftentimes, who offer vnto them the images of things vncertainly, not through default

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of the ſenſes, but by reaſon of the meanes whereby they apprehend the formes of things. For the ſenſe by his owne nature (if he be not deceiued or hindred in receiuing of things ſenſible) comprehendeth them perfectly, nay becometh one ſelfe ſame thing with them. And this is the cauſe why it is ſaid, that our ſoules ſleepe whiles they remaine in this life, and that our knowledge here is but as a dreame. According to which conceit, the inamoured Poet, ſpeaking of his Ladie *Laura*, ſaid very properly vpon her death in this ſort:

Thou haſt (faire Damſell) ſlept but a ſhort ſleepe,
Now wak'd thou art among the heau'nly ſpirits,
Where bleſſed ſoules interne within their maker.

Shewing that our life here is but a ſlumber; and ſeeming to infer that ſhe was now interned or become inward in the contemplation of her maker, being wakened frō her ſleepe among thoſe bleſſed ſpirits, as ſhe had bin, before ſhe was incloſed in this earthly priſon. And likewiſe he ſeemed to leane to *Plato* his opinion in another place, when ſpeaking of her alſo, he ſaid ſhe was returned to her fellow ſtar. For *Plato* thought the number of ſoules created, was according to the number of the ſtarres in heauen: and that euery ſoule had a proper ſtarre to which it returned after this life. But as for our knowledge, in truth it is but a ſhadow in reſpect of the knowledge our ſoules ſhall haue by the contemplation of the diuine eſſence. Whereupon *Socrates*, one of the wiſeſt and moſt learned mē that euer were, yet euermore affirmed reſolutely, that the only thing he knew, was, that he knew nothing. And to ſay truly, this his knowing of nothing, might well be termed a learned ignorance.

Well (ſaid the Lord Primate) captain *Carleil* and captaine *Norreis* haue by their demaunds miniſtred a very

fit occaſion vnto you, to diſcourſe out of your author the conſiderations of the maner of our knowledge, and conſequently of the ſoule of man, and to declare withall the opinions of two ſo excellent Philoſophers and of their followers. But though both agree in this, that whether the ſoule learne of new, or by rememorating, ſhe hath alwayes need of the ſenſes as her miniſters to attain knowledge: yet is it to be beleeued, and that aſſuredly, that the ſoule of man being created by God Almightie to his owne image and likeneſſe, ſhe hath alſo ſome proper operation or action reſembling his; to the accompliſhment whereof, ſhe hath no need of the ſenſes. And that being diſſolued from the body, or after, when he ſhall be re-united to the ſame in the reſurrection, ſhe hauing then the ſame image and likeneſſe of God ſtill in her, ſhe ſhall euerlaſtingly be wholy and onely intent to the contemplation of his diuine maieſtie, who is the onely true and perfect good and happineſſe. The perfection of which diuine maieſtie, is the knowledge of himſelfe; and knowing himſelfe to know all things by him created and produced. But it is time now for you to returne to the matter you had in hand, when you were drawne by their demaunds to make this digreſſion.

And euen ſo will I, ſince you be ſo pleaſed, quoth I, and ſo proceeded in this maner. In the beginning of youth, the yong man is fitly to be reſembled to a traueller that is arriued in his iourney to a place where the way is deuided into two parts, and ſtandeth in doubt which of them he ſhall take: for in either of them he ſeeth a guide ſtanding ready to leade him; whereof, the one inuiteth him to pleaſure, and the other to vertue. The firſt propoſing to him his delights and eaſe, and the other labour and trauell. And foraſmuch as that age is inclined naturally

rally to pleaſures, and enemy to paine-taking and labour, it is greatly to be doubted that the yong man leauing the way that leades to vertue, wil betake himſelfe to the other guide to follow the way that leadeth to delight. Wherefore if at any time it be needfull for the father to haue a watchfull eye vpon his ſonne, it is then moſt important when his child is to make his paſſage from his childhood into his youth: and at that time to ſet before his eyes continually inſtructions, wherby he may conceiue how honeſtie and good behauiour, with ciuill conuerſation, are the foundation of good and happie life: and this chiefly is he to do by his owne example. For though it be very good, that his ſon in thoſe yeares, and at all other times, ſhould ſee the whole family ſo ordered, as he may learne nothing therein but vertue and honeſty; yet muſt he not thinke but that his ſonne will better beleeue and follow what he ſhal ſee himſelfe do or ſay, then all the family beſides. And if *Ariſtotle* aduiſe maſters to endeuour themſelues to giue good example to their ſeruants and ſlaues; how much more ought the father to be carefull to do the like to his owne children, who are dearer to him then his ſeruants, being his owne liuely images. For as it is the mothers care and office to breed and nouriſh her childe; ſo is it the fathers dutie to ſee him well inſtructed and taught in vertues and good behauiour: and the ſpeeches and demeanour of the father in his houſhold or family, are to his children as lawes in a citie to the citizens, and do aſſuredly enter into the mindes of children with farre greater force then men would think. Which made *Xenocrates* to ſay, that the ſtopping of young mens eares was more needful then the arming of their bodies againſt the ſtrokes of their enemies; becauſe the danger was greater which they incurred by hearing an vnſeemely ſpeech,

ſpecially from their parents mouth, then that which they might feare by fighting with their enemies. The father therefore muſt be very circumſpect that his ſonne heare him not ſpeake any word vndecent or diſhoneſt: for nature with a certain hidden vertue perſwadeth youth, ſucceeding a weltaught childhood, to beare great reuerence and reſpect to the graue and ripe yeares of their parents, and of all aged perſons; who euen in the firſt view repreſent vnto them vertue, prudence, and all good and graue behauiour. And ſuch is he to ſhew himſelfe to his ſonne, as euen in his countenance, geſtures and words he may as in a table behold therein the lawes of honeſt life. And that his actions may be in all points to his ſon a patterne and example of ciuill conuerſation and vertuous liuing.

It is a very neceſſary and important inſtruction and aduertiſement (ſaid M. *Dormer*) that you haue laſt mentioned for fathers to obſerue. But I would faine that you ſhold tel me, whether you haue not ſeen (as I oftentimes haue done) wicked children begotten of very good and honeſt parents.

Yes (quoth I) oftener then I would. Neither can it be denied, but that as there are ſome young men by nature and through their happie conſtellation wholy bent to vertuous and honeſt conditions; ſo are there others naturally diſpoſed to vice and lewd behauiour: yet ſince it ſeemeth not credible, that of good parents ill children ſhould come; and that diligent care in bringing them vp ſhould not plucke vp (if not wholy, yet in part) thoſe euil weeds which choke the good ſeeds, ſo as the fruit might in due ſeaſon be expected: ſeeking to finde the reaſon hereof, I haue called to mind the precept of *Hippocrates* giuen to the Phyſitions, to wit, that it is not ſufficient for recouery of the ſicke patient, that the Phyſition be well

diſpoſed

diſpoſed to cure him, and employ his diligence to that effect: but that other things muſt likewiſe concurre for the recouery of his health, as the care and ſollicitude of ſuch as watch and tend him, with other exteriour things. For euen ſo me thinketh, that to the good proofe of a young man, beſides the example of the father, and of the reſt of the family, be it neuer ſo vertuous, there muſt alſo concurre the goodneſſe of his conuerſation abroade, to make his domeſticall familiaritie worke due effect: ſince many times I haue ſeene it fall out, that the haunting of ill company from home, hath done a young man much more hurt, then all the good inſtructions or vertuous examples domeſticall could do him good. So ſoft and tender are the minds of yong men, and apt (as was formerly ſaid) to be wrought like waxe to vice. And this cometh to paſſe, by reaſō that the ſenſitiue part calling youth to delight, and diuerting it from the trauell and paine which learning and vertue require, is hardly ſubdued and brought vnder the rule of reaſon, by which it eſteemeth it ſelfe forced, when it is barred from that it deſireth. And if by any exteriour occaſion it be pricked forward, it fareth as we ſee it oftentimes do with young hard-headed colts, who take the bit in the mouth, and run away with the rider, carrying him, will he, nill he, whether they liſt. It ought therefore to be none of the leaſt cares of the father to prouide, that the forraine conuerſation of his ſon may be ſuch as ſhall rather help then hinder his care and home-example. To which effect, it would be very good, if it might be poſſible, that the young man were neuer from his fathers ſide. But foraſmuch as many occaſions draw men to attend other waightier affaires, as well publike as priuat, wherby they are driuen to haue their minds buſied about exterior things, and to neglect their childrē

who are their owne bowels. Therefore is it their parts in ſuch caſes to appoint for their children, when they are paſt their childiſh yeares, ſome learned and honeſt man of vertuous behauiour to gouerne them and take care of them, whoſe precepts they may ſo obey, as they ſhall feare to do any thing that may breede reproch or blame vnto them. For ſuch things are mortall poiſon to yong mens minds, and not only put them aſtray from the path that ſhould leade them to vertue, but imprint in them alſo a vitious habit that maketh them vnruly and diſobedient to all wholeſome admonitions and vertuous actions. This man ſo choſen to haue the charge of youth, muſt be carefull among other things to foreſee, that his diſciples may haue ſuch companions, as the Perſian Princes had, prouided for them, to wit, equall of age and like of conditions, with whom they may be conuerſant & familiar. For ſuch ſimilitude of age and conditions doth cauſe them to loue and like one another, if ſome barre or impediment fall not betweene them. The auncient wiſe men aſſigned to youth the Plannet of *Mercury*, for no other cauſe (as I ſuppoſe) but for that *Mercury* being (as Aſtronomers ſay) either good or bad, according as he is accompanied with another plannet good or euil: euen ſo youth becommeth good or bad, as the companies to which it draweth or giueth it ſelfe. And therefore ought not yong men to haue libertie to haunt what companie they liſt, but to be kept vnder the diſcipline of wiſe men, and trained vp in the companie of others of their age well bred, vntill it may be thought, or rather found by experience, that they be paſt danger, and become fit to guide themſelues: hauing brought their mind obedient to reaſon ſo farre, as it cannot any more draw him to any delights, but ſuch as are honeſt and vertuous. This delight in vertue

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and honeſtie, is beſt induced into a yong mans mind by that true companiō of vertue that breedeth feare to do or ſay any thing vnſeemely or diſhoneſt: which companion *Socrates* ſought to make familiar to his ſcholers, when he would tell them how they ſhould endeuour themſelues to purchaſe in their minds prudence, into their tongues truth with ſilence, and in their faces baſhfulneſſe, called by the Latins *verecundia*, deriuing it from the reuerence which yong men vſe to beare to their elders. This we call ſhamefaſtneſſe, and is that honeſt red colour or bluſhing which dieth a yong mans cheekes when he ſuppoſeth he hath done or ſaid any thing vnſeemely or vnfit for a vertuous mind, or that may offend his parents or betters: a certaine token of a generous mind, and well diſciplined, of which great hope may be conceiued that it will proue godly and vertuous. For as a ſure and firme friend to honeſtie and vertue, like a watch or guard ſet for their ſecuritie, it is euer wakefull and carefull to keepe all diſordinate concupiſcences from the mind, whereby (though of it ſelfe it be rather an affect then a habit) neuertheleſſe ſhe induceth ſuch a habite into a yong mans mind, that not onely in preſence of others he bluſheth, if he chance to do any thing not commendable, but euen of himſelfe he is aſhamed, if being alone he fall into any errour. For though ſome ſay, that two things chiefly keepe youth from euill, correction, and ſhame, and that chaſtiſement rather then inſtruction draweth youth to do well; yet I for my part neuer think that yong man well bred or trained vp, who for feare of puniſhment abſtaineth from doing things ſhamefull or diſhoneſt: puniſhment being appointed but for them that are euill: which made the Poet ſay:

For vertues ſake good men ill deeds refraine:

Ill

Ill men refraine them but for feare of paine.

For the wickedneſſe of men hath cauſed lawes to be deuiſed and eſtabliſhed for the conſeruation of honeſt and vertuous ſocietie, and ciuil life, whereunto man is borne: which lawes haue appointed penalties for the offenders, to the end that for feare thereof, as *Xenocrates* was wont to ſay, men might flie from ill doing, as dogs flie harme doing for feare of the whip. And becauſe *Plato* formed his Common-weale of perfect and vertuous men, therfore ſet he downe no lawes in his bookes *de Repub.* becauſe he ſuppoſed the goodneſſe of the men to be ſufficient for the gouernement thereof without a law, either to commaund good order, or to puniſh offenders. Neuertheles the ſame diuine Philoſopher conſidering how the imperfection of mans nature will not ſuffer any ſuch Common-wealth to be found: he wrote alſo his bookes of lawes to ſerue for the imperfection of other Common-weales, which were compoſed of men of all ſorts, good and bad, meane or indifferent, in which both inſtruction and puniſhment were needfull, as well to make the euill abſtaine from vice, as to confirme the good, and to reduce thoſe that were indifferent to greater perfection. Lawes therefore haue appointed puniſhments, that vertue might be defended and maintained, ciuill ſocietie and humane right preſerued. But young men bred as our author would haue them, are by all meanes to be framed ſuch, as for vertues ſake, for feare of reproch, for loue and reuerence to honeſtie, and not for feare of puniſhment to be inflicted on them by the magiſtrates or their ſuperiours for doing of euill, they may accuſtome themſelues neuer to do any thing, for which they ſhould neede to bluſh, no not to themſelues alone. Which thing they ſhal the better performe, if they vſe to forbeare the doing

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of any thing by themſelues, which they would be aſhamed of if they were in company. It is written, that among the auncient Romanes one *Iulius Druſus Publicola* hauing his houſe ſeated ſo as his neighbours might looke into it, a certaine Architect offered him for the expence of fiue talents to make it ſo cloſe as none of his neighbors ſhould looke thereinto, or ſee what he was doing. But he made him anſwer againe, that he would rather giue him ten talents to make it ſo, as all the citie might ſee what he did in his houſe; becauſe he was ſure he did nothing within doores whereof he neede be aſhamed abroade, though euery man ſhould ſee him. For which anſwer he was highly cõmended. True it is that *Xenophon* eſteemeth this bluſhng to a mans ſelf, to be rather temperance then baſhfulnes: but let it be named how it wil, it is ſurely the propertie of a gentle heart ſo to do. And therefore *Petrarke* ſaid well:

Alone whereas I walkt mongs woods and hils,
I ſhamed at my ſelfe: for gentle heart
Thinkes that enough, no other ſpurre it wils.

Yet would I not neither, that our young man ſhould be more baſhfull then were fit, as one ouer-awed or doltiſh, not able to conſider perils or dangers when they preſent themſelues, not yet to looſe his boldneſſe of ſpirit. For *Antipater* the ſonne of *Caſſander* through the like qualitie caſt himſelfe away, who hauing inuited *Demetrius* to ſupper with him at ſuch a time, as their friendſhip was not ſure but ſtood vpon doubtful termes, and he being come accordingly: when *Demetrius* afterwards as in requital of his kindneſſe inuited *Antipater* likewiſe to ſupper, though he knew right well what perill he thruſt himſelfe into if he went, conſidering the wyly diſpoſition of the ſaid *Demetrius*: yet being aſhamed that *Demetrius* ſhould per-

ceiue him to be ſo miſtruſtful, would needs go, and there was miſerably ſlaine. This is a vice, named in the Greeke *Diſopia*, and which we may in Engliſh call vnfruitfull ſhamefaſtneſſe, wherewith we would not wiſh our yong man ſhould be any way acquainted, but onely with that generous baſhfulneſſe that may ſerue him for a ſpurre to vertue, and for a bridle from vice. But becauſe *Plato* ſaith, that though baſhfulneſſe be moſt properly fit for young men, yet that it is alſo ſeemly inough for men of al yeares. And that *Ariſtotle* contrariwiſe thinketh it not meete for men of riper years to bluſh: it may therefore be doubted to whether of theſe two great learned mens opinions we ſhould incline. For cleering hereof, you muſt vnderſtand that the *Platonikes* ſay two things among others are ſpecially giuen to for a diuine gift vnto man: Baſhfulneſſe the one, and Magnanimitie the other: the one to hold vs back from doing of any thing worthy blame & reproch: the other to put vs forward into the way of praiſe and vertue; whereby we might alwayes be ready to do well onely for vertues ſake, to the good and benefit of others, and to our owne contentment and delight. Of which courſe, the end is honour in this world, and glory after death. But becauſe the force of the Concupiſcible appetite is ſo great, and ſetteth before vs pleaſure in ſo many ſundry ſhapes, as it is hard to ſhun the ſnares which theſe two enemies of reaſon ſet to intrap vs, and that the coldneſſe of old age cannot wholy extinguiſh the feruour of our appetites; for my part I think that as in all ages it is fit that Magnanimitie inuite vs to commendable actions; ſo alſo that we haue neede of ſhamefaſtneſſe to correct vs whẽſoeuer we ſhal go beyond the boũds or limits of reaſon in what yeares ſoeuer, and to check vs with the bridle of temperãce. For though *Ariſtotle* ſay, that ſhame ought

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to die red in a mans cheekes, but for voluntary actions only: yet *Plato* conſidering that none but God is perfect without fault; and that euery man, euen the moſt vertuous falleth ſometimes through humane frailtie, thought (according to Chriſtianitie) that ripeneſſe of yeares or wiſedome ſhould be no hinderance to make them aſhamed, but rather make them the more baſhfull whenſoeuer they ſhould find in themſelues, that they had run into any errour vndecent or vnfitting for men of their yeares and quality. Not intending yet thereby that the errors of the ancienter men were to be of that ſort that yong mens faults commonly are, who through incontinencie runne oftentimes into ſin wilfully: whereas men of riper yeares erre or ought to erre only through frailty of nature. Much better were it indeede for men of yeares not to do any thing of which they might be aſhamed, if the condition of man would permit it, then after they had done it to bluſh thereat: and much more reprochfull is his fault, if he offend voluntarily then the young mans. But ſince no man (though he haue made a habite in wel-doing) can ſtand ſo aſſured of himſelfe, but that ſometime in his life he ſhal commit ſome error: it is much better (in what age ſoeuer it be) that bluſhing make him know his fault, then to paſſe it ouer impudently without ſhame. And accordingly Saint *Ambroſe* ſaid in his booke of Offices, that ſhamefaſtneſſe was meet for all ages, for all times, and for all places. And for the ſame cauſe perhaps haue wiſe men and religious held, that an Angell of heauen aſſiſteth euery man to call him backe from thoſe euils, which the ill Angell with his ſugred baite of delight and diſordinate appetite inticeth him vnto, onely for his ruine. For they thought that our forces were not able to reſiſt ſo mighty prouocations. As for *Plato* and *Ariſtotle*, it ſeemeth they

differed in opinion, for that, the one conſidered humane nature as it ought to be, and the other as it commonly is indeed. Which may the better be beleeued, becauſe *Ariſtotle* in his booke of Rhetorike, reſtrained not this habite of ſhamefaſtneſſe ſo preciſely to young men, but that it may ſometimes beſeeme an aged mans checkes alſo, though ſo farre as grace and wiſedome may preuaile, it would beſt beſeeme him neuer to do the thing whereof he need be aſhamed, as before was ſayd. And the ſame rule ought young men alſo to propoſe to themſelues, whereby they ſhall deſerue ſo much the more commendation, as the heate of their yeares beareth with them fierie appetites, and they the leſſe apt to reſiſt ſo ſharpe and ſo intollerable prickes. The way to obſerue that rule, is to ſtriue in all their actions to maſter themſelues, and to profit in vertue: whereunto will helpe them chiefly, that they endeuour themſelues to bridle ſuch deſires as they find moſt to moleſt them, not ſuffering them to tranſport them beyond the limits of honeſtie. But becauſe the day goeth away, and that to treate particularly of all that might be ſaid concerning the direction of youth to vertue, which leadeth him to his felicitie, would require more time then is remaining, I wil briefly knit vp the reſt that concerneth this matter. Young men haue naturall heate ſo much abounding in them, that they cannot reſt, but be ſtill in motion as well of body as of mind. The one with running, leaping, and other exerciſes, and when all they faile, the tongue ceaſeth not, which by reaſon of their age is the more bold and ready. The other with paſſing from one diſcourſe to another, and from one paſſion to another; now louing, now hating, now boyling with anger and choler, now ſtill and quiet, with ſuch like motions of the mind. And becauſe the motions of the body,

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and the affections of the minde muſt haue their meaſure and their rule, and the one and the other conuenient exerciſe and moderate reſt: therefore did the auncient wiſe men deuiſe two ſpeciall Arts, moſt apt and fit for both theſe purpoſes. Whereof, the one they called *Gymnaſtica*, which is a skilfull and moderate exerciſe of the body; and the other Muſike, by which name it is well knowne in all languages. And when they had cauſed their youth to ſpend part of the day in learning thoſe ſciences and diſciplines which they thought fit for that age (for of all other things they abhorred the training them vp in ignorance, becauſe ſeldome can an ignorant man be good, and that men without knowledge and learning are but figures of men, and images of death without ſoule or life) then would they draw them to honeſt exerciſes of the body by degrees. For they held it a thing moſt neceſſary for the wel-founding of a Common-wealth, to be continually carefull of the framing youth both in body and mind; becauſe they knew right well that good education maketh young men good: and that ſuch are Common-wealths and States, as are the qualities and conditions of the men which they do breed. Touching the body therfore, they did deuiſe to ſtrengthen and harden it with conuenient and temperate exerciſes: as the play at ball, leaping, running, danſing, riding, wraſtling, throwing the barre, the ſtone or ſledge, and ſuch like. For the minde, they thought beſt to ſtay and ſettle it ſelfe with the harmonie of Muſike: and from theſe two they reſolued, that two great good effects did enſue: From the firſt, ſtrength of body and boldneſſe of ſpirit; and from the latter, modeſty and temperance, inſeparable companions for the moſt part vnto fortitude. For ſome of them were of opinion, that our ſoules were compoſed of harmonie;

and beleeued that Muſike was able ſo to temper our affects and paſſions, as they ſhould not iarre or diſcord among themſelues, but be ſo interlaced the one with the other in a ſweet conſent, as wel guided and ordered actiō ſhould proceed from the ſame, euen as ſweet and delightfull Muſike proceedeth from the wel-tempering of tunable voices, or well conſorted inſtruments. Neither would they haue the one to be exerciſed, and the other omitted: for that they thought, if yong men ſhould giue themſelues onely to the exerciſes of the body, they wold become too fierce and hardy; and ſo be rather hurtfull to their commonweales then otherwiſe. And if they ſhould follow onely Muſike, which is proper to reſt and quietnes, and vſed as a recreation of the mind, as *Ariſtotle* ſaith, they would become ſoft minded and effeminate. But by ioyning both theſe faculties together in one, they ſought to make a noble temper, and to induce a moſt excellent habite, as well in the mind as in the body. So that if valor were required for the defence of their countrey, or vanquiſhing of their enemies, they were made fit and apt thereunto by the exerciſes of the body; but with ſuch meaſure and temper as ſhould not exceed. Which meaſure and temper, they obtained from that harmonie which Muſike imprinted in their mindes: vnder which they comprehended not onely the ordering of the voice and ſounds of inſtruments, but all other orderly and ſeemely motions of the body; which vpon their ſtages, or Scænes in the acting of Tragedies, was chiefly to be diſcouered. And that all orderly motions were comprehended vnder Muſicke, was held ſo certaine by *Pythagoras*, *Archetas*, *Plato*, *Cicero*, & other famous Philoſophers, that they were of opinion, that the orderly courſe and motions of the heauens could not be ſuch as it is, or con-

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tinue without harmony, though *Ariſtotle* do oppoſe him ſelfe to their opinion. And for this cauſe did *Lycurgus* deuiſe that Muſike ſhould be conioyned with the military diſcipline of the *Lacedemonians*, not onely to temper the heate and furie of their minds in fight; but alſo to cauſe them to vſe a certaine meaſure in that marching, and other occaſions of war. In which reſpect they were wont to battell without certaine pipes, according to the times whereof they vnderſtood how to vſe their bodies and weapons: from which reſpect alſo cometh our vſing of drums and trumpets to giue ſouldiers knowledge when to march, when to ſtand, when to aſſault, and when to retire: and conſequently how to ioyne order and meaſure with their valour againſt the enemy: and the Lanſknight and the Switzer vſe alſo the fife at this day with the drum. And to ſay truth, great is the force of Muſike skilfully vſed to ſtirre vp or to appeaſe the mind. For we reade, that *Pythagoras* finding a wanton yong man enraged with luſt, ready to force the doore of an honeſt woman, he ſo calmed his mind, onely by changing the Phrigian tune and number into the Spondean, that he gaue ouer his wicked purpoſe. And *Therpander*, when a great ſedition was raiſed among the *Lacedemonians*, he with his muſike ſo quieted their mindes bent to fury, that he reduced them to a perfect peace. It is alſo written of the great *Alexander*, that he was ſo moued by that tune and nũber of Muſikes, which the greeks called *Orthios nomos*, which was a kind of haughtie tune to ſtirre men to battel, that he roſe from the boord to arme himſelfe, as if the trumpet had ſounded the allarme. But what talke we of the auncient opinions concerning the force of Muſike to moue mens minds, when we find they beleeued that their Gods were forced by the vertue of Muſike to ap-

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peaſe their wrath? For, the *Lacedemonians* being infeſted with a great peſtilence, *Thales* of *Candia* was ſaid by muſike to haue mitigated their anger, and ſo to haue deliuered them frō that mortality. The which thing *Homer* alſo ſignified, when he ſaid, that the yongmen of Greece with their ſongs did appeaſe *Apollo* his wrath, and cauſed the plague to ceaſe which had infected their campe. And the Romanes likewiſe being annoied with a great peſtilence, receiued then firſt the ſinging of Satires into the Citie though but rudely tuned then, as a remedy for that infectiō. The force & efficacie of muſike then being ſuch as I haue declared, it is no maruel that the Ægiptiās, after they had once receiued it into their Commonwealth, as meet for the inſtruction of their youth, wold neuer after allow that it ſhold be altered or changed, but ſuch as it was whē they firſt admitted it, ſuch they continued it without altering the ſpace of ten thouſand yeres, according to their manner of contemplation, hauing a conceit or rather a firme opinion that they could not alter muſike but with danger to their State. Which opinion the Lacedemonians likewiſe ſo embraced, that when *Timotheus* an excellent Muſition in Sparta, had preſumed to adde but one ſtring to the Cyther, they baniſhed him out of the citie and territories, as a violater of lawes, and a corrupter of honeſt diſcipline. Albeit with *Phrine* they dealt more mildly, who hauing added to the Cyther two cords, one ſharpe, and another graue or flat, they onely cauſed him to take them away againe, ſuppoſing that ſeuen ſtrings were enough to temper the ſound thereof, as a number comprehending all muſike; and that the increaſing therof was but ſuperfluous and harmefull. Theſe ancient examples & conſiderations, are not ſleightly to be paſſed ouer: for though many other occaſions of corruption in our

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age may be aſſigned; yet one of the principall, in the iudgement of wiſe men, may wel be imputed to the qualitie of that corrupted muſike which is moſt vſed now a dayes; carrying with it nothing but a ſenſuall delight to the eare, without working any good to the mind at all. Nay, would God it did not greatly hurt and corrupt the mind. For as muſike well vſed is a great help to moderate the diſorderly affections of the minde: ſo being abuſed it expelleth all manly thoughts from the heart, and ſo effeminateth men, that they are little better then women: and in women breedeth ſuch laſciuious and wanton thoughts, that oftentimes they forget their honeſtie, without which they cannot be worthy the name of women. Not that I would hereby inferre, that muſike generally were to be miſliked, or vnfit for women alſo: but my meaning is of this wanton and laſciuious kind of muſike, which is now a dayes moſt pleaſing, and reſembleth the Lydian of old time, which *Plato* ſo abhorred, as he would not in any ſort admit it into his Common-weale, leſt it ſhould infect the minds of men and women both. And from him may we learne what kinde of muſike he would haue men to embrace, to ſtirre their mindes vp to vertue, aud to purge the ſame from vice and errour. Like as alſo frō *Ariſtotle* in his 8. booke of Politikes, taken perchance out of the writings of his maſter. But if that auncient kinde of muſike, framed and compoſed wholy to grauitie, were now knowne and vſed, which kinde was then ſet forth with the learned and graue verſes of excellent Poets, we ſhould now alſo ſee magnificall and high deſires ſtirred vp in the minds of the hearers. Which verſes contained the praiſes of excellent and heroicall perſonages, and were vſed to be ſung at the tables of great men and Princes, to the ſound of the Lyra; whereby they in-

flamed the mindes of the hearers to vertue and generous actions. For the force of Muſike with Poeſie, is ſuch, as is of power to ſet the followers and loúers thereof into the direct way that leadeth them to their felicitie. *Socrates* demaunding of the Oracle of *Apollo*, what he ſhould do to make himſelfe happie: he was willed to learne Muſike; whereupon he gaue himſelfe forthwith to the ſtudie of Poeſie, conceiuing with himſelfe, that verſes and Poeticall numbers are the perfecteſt Muſike, and that they enter like liuely ſparkes into mens minds, to kindle in them deſires of dignitie, greatneſſe, honor, true praiſe and commendation, and to correct whatſoeuer is in them of baſe and vile affection. In auncient time therfore men cauſed their children to be inſtructed in Poeſie before all other diſciplines, for that they eſteemed good Poets to be the fathers of wiſedome, and the vndoubted true guides to ciuill life, and not without cauſe. For they raiſe mens thoughts from humble and baſe things, ſuch as the vulgar and common ſort delight in, and make them bend their endeuours wholy to high, yea heauenly things. As who ſo liſt to attend diligently the excellencie of the Pſalmes and Hymnes compoſed by the Kingly Prophet *Dauid*, and others called the ſingers of the Hebrew Church, ſhall eaſily diſcerne. But ſince our muſike is growen now to the fulnes of wantō and laſciuious paſſions, and the words ſo confuſedly mingled with the notes, that a man can diſcerne nothing but the ſound and tunes of the voices, but ſence or ſentence he can vnderſtand none at all; euen as it were ſundry birds chanting and chirping vpon the boughes of trees: yong men are much better in the iudgement of the wiſe, to abſtaine from it altogether, then to ſpend their time about it. For as good diſciplines are the true and proper nouriſhment of vertue:

tue: ſo are the euill the very poiſon of the ſame.

Then ſaid Captaine *Carleil*, as concerning the difference between the auncient muſike and ours in this age, I do eaſily agree with you, and wiſh it were otherwiſe, that we might ſee now a dayes thoſe wonderfull effects of this excellent Art, which are written of it in auncient authors. But where you ſo highly extoll the ſtudie of Poeſie, you make me not a little to maruel, conſidering how *Plato*, being ſo learned a man, did not onely make ſmall eſtimation thereof, but baniſhed it expreſly from his common-weale.

Let not that ſeeme ſtrange vnto you, ſaid I: for *Plato* condemned not Poeſie, but onely thoſe Poets that abuſed ſo excellent a facultie, ſcribling either wanton toyes, or elſe by fooliſh imitation taking vpon them to expreſſe high conceirs which themſelues vnderſtood not. And ſpecially did he reprehend thoſe Poets, who in their fictions did aſcribe to the Gods ſuch actions as would haue bin vnſeemely for the moſt wanton and vicious men of the world: as the adultery of *Mars* and *Venus*, thoſe of *Iupiter* with *Semele*, with *Europa*, with *Danaë*, with *Caliſto*, and many moe. Though ſome haue vnder ſuch fictions ſought to teach morall and maruellous ſences, which *Plato* likewiſe in his ſecond *Alcibiades* declareth. But he blamed not thoſe Poets, who frame their verſes and compoſitions to the honor of God, and to good examples of modeſtie and vertue. For in his books of Lawes he introduceth Poets to ſing Himnes to their Gods, and teacheth the maner of their Chori in their ſacrifices, and to make prayers for the Common-weale. Howbeit, to ſay truth, though he ſo do, he would not haue it lawfull for euery man to publiſh any compoſition that he had made, without the allowance and view of ſome magiſtrate elected

in the citie for that purpoſe. Which magiſtracy he would haue to be of no fewer in number then fiftie men of grauitie and wiſedome: of ſuch importance did he hold the compoſitions of Poets to be. Which regard if it were had now a dayes, we ſhould not ſee ſo many idle and profane toyes ſpred abroade by ſome that think the prepoſterous turning of phraſes, and making of rime with little reaſon, to be an excellent kinde of writing, and fit to breed them fame and reputation. Suppoſing (as men blinded in their owne conceits) that they exceed all other writers, and that from them only others that write in that kind ſhold take their rules and example. So drowning their corrupted iudgements in their ignorance, that where they be worthy blame, they eſteeme themſelues comparable to the moſt famous and excellent Poets that euer wrote, and that they ought to be partakers of their glory and greateſt honors. But to men of iudgement, and able to diſcerne the difference betweene well writing and preſumptuous ſcribling, they miniſter matter of ſcorne and laughter, when they conſider their diſioynted phraſes, their miſſhapen figures, their ſhallow conceits lamely expreſſed, and diſgraced, in ſtead of being adorned, with vnproper and vnfit metaphors, well declaring how vnworthy they be of the title of Poets. Such are they, who being themſelues ful of intemperance and wantonnes, write nothing but diſhoneſt and laſciuious rimes and ſongs, apt to root out all honeſt and manly thoughts out of their mindes that are ſo fooliſh as to loſe their time in reading of them. Theſe indeed ought to be driuen out, and baniſhed frō al Commonweales, as corrupters of manners, and infecters of young mens mindes: who may well be compared to rocks that lie hidden vnder water, amid the ſea of this our life, on which, ſuch yong men as chance to ſtrike, are like

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to ſuffer ſhipwracke, and ſinking in the gulfe of luſt and wantonneſſe, to be drowned and dead to all vertue. But true Poeſie well vſed, is nothing elſe but the moſt ancient kind of Philoſophie, compounded and interlaced with the ſweetneſſe of numbers and meaſured verſes. A thing (as ſaith *Muſæus*) moſt ſweet and pleaſing to the mind, teaching vs vertue by a ſingular maner of inſtruction, and couering morall ſences vnder fabulous fictions: to the end they might the ſooner be receiued vnder that pleaſing forme, and yet not be vulgarly vnderſtood, but by ſuch onely as were worthy to taſt the ſweetneſſe of their inuentions. For ſo did the Philoſophers of old write their myſteries vnder ſimilitudes, to the end they might not be ſtraight comprehended by euery dul wit, and loſe their reputation, by being common in the hands and mouth of euery ſimple fellow. This maner firſt began among the wiſer Ægiptians, and was afterwards followed by *Pythagoras* and *Plato*. And *Ariſtotle*, though he wrote not by ſimilitudes and allegories, yet wrapt he vp his conceits in ſo darke a maner of ſpeech and writing, as hardly were they to be vnderſtood by thoſe that heard himſelfe teach and expound his writings. But to make an end with Poets, he that marketh thoſe fictions which *Homer* hath written of their Gods, like as thoſe of *Virgil*, and other of the heathen Poets, though at the firſt they ſeeme ſtrange and abſurd; yet he ſhall find vnder them naturall and diuine knowledge hidden to thoſe that are not wiſe and learned: which neither time nor occaſion would, that I ſhould here inſiſt vpon. Let it ſuffice that yong men are to make great account of that part of Muſike which beareth with it graue ſentences, fit to compoſe the mind to good order by vertue of the numbers and ſound; which part proceedeth from the Poets, whom *Plato* himſelf cal-

led the fathers and guides of thoſe that afterwards were called Philoſophers. But this that by varietie of tunes, and warbling diuiſions, confounds the words and ſentences, and yeeldeth onely a delight to the exterior ſenſe, and no fruit to the mind, I wiſh them to neglect and not to eſteeme.

Indeed (ſaid captain *Carleil*) I agree with you, that our muſike is far different from the ancient muſike, and that well may it ſerue to pleaſe the eare: but I yeeld that it effeminateth the minde, and rather diuerteth it from the way of bliſſe and felicitie, then helpeth him thereunto. But are there not other diſciplines, beſides theſe two which you haue ſpecified laſt, wherein yong men are to be inſtructed to further them to the attaining of that end, about which all this our diſcourſe is framed?

Yes marry (ſaid I) and ſo far as youth is capable, it might well be wiſhed that he had knowledge of them all. But of theſe our author hath firſt ſpoken, ſuppoſing that from Grammer, and ſuch other the liberall Arts, as thoſe firſt yeares could reach to vnderſtand, he ſhould be ſtraight brought to the excerciſe of the body and to Muſike. Neuertheles it is requiſite withal, that, as his yeares increaſe, he ſhould apply himſelfe without loſſe of time to learne principally Geometry and Arithmetike, two liberal arts, and of great vſe and neceſſitie for all humane actions in this life; becauſe they teach vs meaſure and numbers, by which, all things mans life hath need of are ordered and ruled. For by them we meaſure land, we build, we deuiſe Arts, and ſet them forth, all things are directed by number and meaſure, as occaſions ſerue: and without the help of theſe two faculties, all would be confuſed and diſordered. And therefore did the Ægyptians ſet their children carefully to learne them: for that by them they decided

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the diſcords and differences growing among the dwellers along the banks of the riuer of Nyle, which with her inundations, and breaking of their meares and limits did giue them often cauſe to fall at variance and ſtrife among themſelues. For nauigation likewiſe how needfull they are, all men do know, that know the neceſſitie of the vſe thereof for humane life, ſince all that nature produceth to all people and nations in the world particularly, is thereby made common to all, with the helpe of commutation and of coyne. From theſe two alſo cometh the exact knowledge, not onely of the earth and of the ſea, but of the heauens likewiſe and of their motions, of the ſtarres and courſe of time, of the riſing and ſetting of the plannets: and to conclude all in few words, of the whole frame and order of nature, and of her skill, by which ſhe knitteth and vniteth together in peace and amitie things in themſelues moſt contrary. All done ſo cunningly by number and meaſure, as a whole yeares diſcourſe would not ſerue to diſplay the ſame at large. The Art of warre in like maner, ſo needful for States and Commonweales, to keepe in due obedience ſtubborne and rebellious ſubiects, and to repell the violence of forreine enemies, if it were not directed by meaſure and number: what would it be but a confuſion, and a moſt dangerous and harmfull thing, which would ſoone fall from the reputation it hath and euer had. For theſe conſiderations therefore and others, is youth, that bendeth his courſe to vertue, to exerciſe it ſelfe in Geometry and Arithmetike, which in ancient times men would acquaint their children withall, euen from their childhood: as Arts that haue more certainty then any other. But they are not to be attained without Logike, becauſe from it are gotten the inſtruments and the maner to deuide, to compound, to inuent

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and find out reaſons and arguments; and finally to diſcerne and iudge of truth and falſhood. But here I muſt tel you, that he meaneth not of that Logike which is vſed now a dayes moſt in ſchooles, ſtanding for the moſt part vpon brawlings and contentions, and propounding of friuolous queſtions, ſeruing to nought elſe but ſubtilties, and inextricable knots, fitter to nouriſh arguments then to teach or explane the truth. Which abuſe *Antiſthenes* miſliking, ſaid, it was meeter to inſtruct him that contended, then by contention to ouercome him. For Logike being indeed the way and meane to inſtruct and teach, and (as before is ſaid) the proper inſtrument of ſciences, ſuch as learne it onely to contend, forſake the right end and ſcope of that Art, and are as fruitleſſe to their followers or ſcholers, as myre is to the wayfaring man, which beſides the defiling of his garments, doth oftentimes make him alſo to fall. Therfore *Plato* in his time cried out vpon the ſame, iudging it not without cauſe to be a meer folly that hindred the knowledge of truth, and the learning of thoſe things which the ſoundeſt and wiſeſt Philoſophers taught as well touching vertuous and ciuill actions, as naturall and diuine ſciences: from which, this vaine ſcience putteth men aſtray, ſo long as it teacheth onely to argue and to contend. Whereby it commeth to paſſe, that whiles they are more intentiue to the words and circumſtances then to the matter, the more they ſtriue to ſeeme learned and ſubtill, the leſſe they ſhew themſelues to vnderſtand. Next to Logike is Rhetorike to be placed, or the Art of Oratory, which *Leontinus* did preferre before all other, becauſe it maketh it ſelfe Ladie ouer mens minds, not by force or violence, but by their owne conſents and free-will. And as *Zeno* expreſſed the difference betweene theſe two Arts, by reſembling the

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former to his hand cloſed, and the latter to his hand ſtretched out. So doth Rhetorike vſe arguments with leſſe force and efficacie then Logike; yet feteheth them from Logike, as from a fountaine or well head, not to ſeek out the truth exactly, but only to perſwade or diſſwade with them that, which he thinketh moſt profitable for the ſpeaker, or the perſon for whom he ſpeaketh. And of this Art, haue all publike and priuate actions appertaining to ciuill life need to perſwade what is good and profitable, and to diſſwade what is hurtfull or vnprofitable, to appeaſe tumults and diſſentions, to treate of leagues and peaces, to ſtirre vp the mindes of men to the defence of their friends, their parents, their Prince and country, and their Religion: to ſearch out and inueſtigate the truth of all things, to aſſiſt the innocent and oppreſſed in courts of iudgement, to accuſe the faultie and offenders: and finally to giue vnto vertue her due praiſe and commendation; and vnto vice due blame and reproch. By theſe meanes and ſtudies which we haue briefly touched, rather then perfectly declared, ought a young man to be framed to ciuill conuerſation, and inſtructed with all carefulneſſe, that he may learne to bridle his concupiſcible deſires, his angry and diſordinate motions, occaſioned by the ſenſes, and ſtirred vp by thoſe two parts of the minde, which are rebellious and contrary to reaſon: whereby he may giue himſelfe wholy to honeſt and vertuous endeuours. And becauſe ſtore of wealth oft times cauſeth young men (when they poſſeſſe it) to turne aſide from vertue, becauſe riches is the nurſe of wantonneſſe in thoſe yeares, great regard is to be had, that as the father, ſo farre as his ſtate requireth, is not to ſuffer his ſon to want any thing that is neceſſary for his calling; ſo muſt he take heede that he be not ſo fed with money, as fee-

ding therby his luſts and ſenſuall appetites, he may abandon the good thoughts of vertue, and receiue in ſteed of them the ſeeds of vnruly and diſorderly affections, which of themſelues are by nature in youth much more mightie then were fit, and need not to be holpen by plentie of riches. For to giue a yong man money at will, to diſpoſe as he liſt (vnleſſe the father find, as in ſome yong men it happeneth, that he hath preuented his yeares with ſtaidneſſe and diſcretion) is euen as much as to put a ſword into the hands of a furious or mad man.

By this the Sun was ſo farre declined towards our horizon, as all the companie thought it time to depart, that they might before ſun-ſet reach to the citie.

Wherfore ſir *Robert Dillon* riſing vp, ſaid: Howſoeuer the latenes of the day call vs away, yet the deſire to heare on further the diſcourſe of ſo good a matter, hath drawne vs on in ſuch ſort, as we haue ſcarce perceiued how the time is paſt. And for your ſecond feaſt, you haue right daintily and plenteouſly entertained vs. We muſt now expect the third, which to morow (God willing) we wil not faile to come and accept: in hope that though we be cõberſome & troubleſome vnto you, yet as wel in regard of diſcharging your promiſe, as of accompliſhing the deſire of ſo many your friends, you will not thinke it much to affoord vs your patience and your breath in deliuering to vs the ſubſtance of your authors third dialogue of Ciuil life; by which we may learne as much as he hath written of the Ethike part of Moral Philoſophie, teaching the ready way for euery man in his priuate courſe of life to attaine his felicitie, and that end, of which all this diſcourſe of yours hath had his beginning. And ſo taking their leaue all together they departed.

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The third dayes meeting, and diſcourſe of Ciuill life.

I Was not yet fully apparelled on the next morrow, when looking out of my window towards the citie, I might perceiue the companie all in a troupe coming together, not as men walking ſoftly to ſport, or deſirous to refreſh themſelues with the morning deaw, and the ſweete pleaſant ayre that then inuited all perſons to leaue their ſluggiſh neſtes; but as men earneſtly bent to their iorney, and that had their heads buſied about ſome matter of greater moment then their recreation. I therefore haſted to make me ready, that they might not find me in caſe to be taxed by them of drowſineſſe, and was out of the doores before they came to the houſe: where ſaluting them, and they hauing courteouſly returned the good morrow vnto me; the Lord Primate asked me whether that company made me not afraide to ſee them come in ſuch ſort vpon me being but a poore Farmer: for though they came not armed like ſoldiers to be ceſſed vpon me, yet their purpoſe was to coynie vpon me, and to eate me out of houſe and home. To whom I anſwered, that as long as I ſaw Counſellers in the companie, I neede not feare that any ſuch vnlawful exactiō as coynie ſhould be required at my hand: for the lawes had ſufficiently prouided for the aboliſhing thereof. And though I knew that among the Iriſhry it was not yet cleane taken away, yet among ſuch as were ameynable to law, and ciuill, it was not vſed or exacted. As for ſouldiers, beſides that their peaceable maner of coming freed me from doubt

of ceſſe, thanked be God the ſtate of the realme was ſuch as there was no occaſion of burthening the ſubiect with them, ſuch had hin the wiſedome, valour and foreſight of our late Lord Deputie, not onely in ſubduing the rebellious ſubiects, but alſo in ouercoming the forreine enemie: whereby the garriſon being reduced to a ſmall number, and they prouided for by her Maieſtie of victual at reaſonable rates, the poore husbandman might now eate the labors of his owne hands in peace and quietnes, without being diſquieted or harried by the vnruly ſouldier.

We haue (ſaid ſir *Robert Dillon*) great cauſe indeed to thanke God of the preſent ſtate of our country, and that the courſe holden now by our preſent Lord Deputie, doth promiſe vs a continuance, if not a bettering, of this our peace and quietneſſe. My Lord *Grey* hath plowed and harrowed the rough ground to his hand: but you know that he that ſoweth the ſeede, whereby we hope for harueſt according to the goodneſſe of that which is caſt into the earth, and the ſeaſonableneſſe of times, deſerueth no leſſe praiſe then he that manureth the land. God of his goodneſſe graunt, that when he alſo hath finiſhed his worke, he may be pleaſed to ſend vs ſuch another Bayly to ouerſee and preſerue their labours, that this poore countrey may by a wel-ordered and ſetled forme of gouernement, and by due and equall adminiſtration of iuſtice beginne to flouriſh as other Common-weales do. To which all ſaying Amen, we directed our courſe to walke vp the hill, where we had bene the day before; and ſitting downe vpon the little mount awhile to reſt the companie that had come from Dublin, we aroſe againe, and walked in the greene way, talking ſtill of the great hope was conceiued of the quiet of the countrey,

countrey, ſince the forreine enemie had ſo bin vanquiſhed, and the domeſticall conſpiracies diſcouered & met withall, and the rebels cleane rooted out, till one of the ſeruants came to call vs home to dinner. Where finding the table furniſhed we ſate downe, and hauing ſeaſoned our fare with pleaſant and familiar diſcourſes, as ſoone as the boord was taken vp, they ſollicited me to fetch my papers that I might proceede to the finiſhing of my laſt diſcourſe of the three by me propoſed. But they being ready at hand in the dining chamber, I reached them, and layd them before me, and began as followeth. Hitherto hath bin diſcourſed of thoſe two ages, which may for the cauſes before ſpecified, be wel ſaid to be void of election, and without iudgement, becauſe of their want of experience. For which cauſe haue they had others aſſigned to them, for guides to leade them to that end, which of themſelues they were not able to attaine, that is, their felicitie in this life. And now being to ſpeake of that age which ſucceeds the heate of youth; we muſt a litle touch the varietie of opinions concerning the ſame. *Tully* ſaith, that a citizen of Rome might be created Conſul (which was the higheſt ordinary dignitie in that citie) when he was come to the age of 23. yeares. *Plinie* in his *Panegyrike* ſaith, that it was decreed *lege Pompeia*, that no man might haue any magiſtracie before he were thirtie yeeres old. And *Vlpian*, *lege 8. Digeſt.* treating of honours, writeth, that vnder the age of 25. yeares no man was capable of any magiſtracie. Among theſe three opinions, the laſt of the ciuill lawyer holdeth the *medium*, and is therefore the fitteſt to be followed: for then is a young mans mind ſetled, and he is become fit (being bred and inſtructed as hath bin before declared) to be at his owne guiding and direction: and then doth the ciuill law allow him libertie

to make contracts and bargaines for himſelfe, which before he could not do, being in pupillage and vnder a tutor. Howbeit our common law cutteth off foure yeeres of thoſe, and enableth a yong man at 21. yeeres of age to enter into his land, and to be (as we terme it) out of his wardſhip. Which time being (I know not for what reſpect) aſſigned by our lawes, may well be held not ſo well conſidered of, as that which the ciuill law appointeth, if we marke how many of our yong men ouerthrow their eſtates by reaſon of their want of experience, and of the diſordinate appetites which maſter them: all which in thoſe other foure yeares from 21. to 25. do alter to better iudgement and diſcretion. Whereby they are the better able to order their affaires.

Why, ſaid Captain *Dawtry*, I haue knowne, and know at this day ſome young men, who at 18. yeeres of age are of ſounder iudgement and more ſetled behauiour, then many, not of 25. yeeres old onely, but of many moe, yea then ſome that are grey-headed with age.

Of ſuch (ſaid I) there are to be ſeene oftentimes as you ſay ſome, that beyond all expectation, and as it were forcing the rules of nature, ſhew themſelues ſtayed in behauiour, and diſcreete in their actions when they are very yong, to the ſhame of many elder men. Of which companie, I may well of mine owne knowledge, and by the conſent I thinke of all men, name one as a rare example and a wonder of nature, and that is ſir *Philip Sidney*; who being but ſeuenteene yeeres of age when he began to trauell, and coming to Paris, where he was ere long ſworne Gentleman of the chamber to the French King, was ſo admired among the grauer ſort of Courtiers, that when they could at any time haue him in their companie and conuerſation, they would be very ioyfull, and no leſſe

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delighted with his ready & witty anſwers, thé aſtoniſhed to heare him ſpeake the French language ſo wel, and aptly, hauiug bin ſo ſhort a while in the countrey. So was he likewiſe eſteemed in all places elſe where he came in his trauell, as well in *Germanie* as in *Italie*. And the iudgement of her Maieſtie employing him, when he was not yet full 22. yeeres old, in Embaſſage to congratulate with the Emperour that now is his comming to the Empire, may ſerue for a ſufficient proofe, what excellencie of vnderſtanding, and what ſtayedneſſe was in him at thoſe yeeres. Whereby may well be ſaid of him the ſame that *Cicero* ſaid of *Scipio Africanus*, to wit, that vertue was come faſter vpon him then yeeres. Which *Africanus* was choſen Conſull being abſent in the warres, by an vniuerſal conſent of all the tribes of Rome, before he was of age capable to receiue that dignitie by the law. But theſe are rare examples, vpon which rules are not to be grounded: for *Ariſtotle* ſo long ago ſaid, as we do now in our common prouerbe, that one ſwallow makes not ſummer. Among young men there are ſome diſcreete, ſober, quicke of wit, and ready of diſcourſe, who ſhew themſelues ripe of iudgment before their yeeres might ſeeme to yeeld it them: ſo are there among aged men on the other ſide ſome of ſhallow wit and little iudgement; of whom the wiſeſt men of al ages haue eſteemed, that to be old with a yong mans mind, is all one as to be yong in yeeres. For it is not grey haires or furrowes in the face, but prudence and wiſedome that make men venerable when they are old: neither can there be any thing more vnſeemly, then an old man to liue in ſuch maner as if he begā but then to liue; which cauſed *Ariſtotle* to ſay, that it imported little whether a man were young of yeeres or of behauiour. Neuertheleſſe, becauſe dayly experience teacheth vs,

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that yeares commonly bring wiſedome, by reaſon of the varietie of affaires that haue paſſed thorough old mens hands, and which they haue ſeene managed by other men: and that commonly youth hath neede of a guide and director, to take care of thoſe things which himſelfe cannot ſee or diſcerne. Therefore haue lawes prouided tutors for the ages before mentioned, vntill they had attained the yeers by them limited, & thenceforth left men to their owne direction, vnleſſe in ſome particular caſes accidentall, as when they be diſtraught of their wits, or elſe through extreme olde age they become children againe, as ſometimes it falleth out. Knowledge then is the thing that maketh a man meete to gouerne himſelfe; and the ſame being attained but by long ſtudie and practiſe, wiſe men haue therefore concluded, that youth cannot be prudent. For indeed the varietie of humane actions, by which, from many particular accidents, an vniuerſall rule muſt be gathered; becauſe (as *Ariſtotle* ſayth) the knowledge of vniuerſalities ſpringeth from ſingularities, maketh knowledge ſo hard to be gotten, that many yeares are required thereunto. And from this reaſon is it alſo concluded, that humane felicitie cannot be attained in yong yeares, ſince by the definition thereof it is a perfect operation according to vertue in a perfect life: which perfection of life is not to be allowed but to many yeers. But the way vnto it is made opē by knowledge, and ſpecially by the knowledge of a mans ſelfe. To which good education hauing prepared him and made him apt, when he is come to riper iudgement by yeares, he may the better make choiſe of that way which ſhall leade him to the ſame, as the moſt perfect end and ſcope of all his actions. And this by cōſidering wel of his own nature, which hauing annexed vnto it a ſpark of diuinitie, he ſhal not only

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as a meere earthly creature, but alſo as partaker of a more diuine excellency, raiſe himſelf, & haue perfect light to ſee the ready way which leadeth to felicitie. To this knowledge of himſelfe, ſo neceſſary for the purchaſing of humane felicitie, is Philoſophie a ſingular helpe, as being called the ſcience of truth, the mother of ſciences, and the inſtructor of all things appertaining to happie life: and therefore ſhould yong men apply themſelues to the ſtudie thereof with all carefulneſſe, that thereby they may refine their mindes and their iudgements, and find the knowledge of his wel-nigh diuine nature, ſo much the more eaſily. And as this knowledge is of all other things moſt properly appertaining to humane wiſedome; ſo is the neglecting thereof the greateſt and moſt harmefull folly of all others: for from the ſaid knowledge (as from a fountaine or well head) ſpring all vertues and goodnes; euen as from the ignorance thereof flow all vices and euils that are among men. But herein is one ſpecial regard to be had, which is, that ſelfloue cary not away the mind from the direct path to the ſame: for which cauſe *Plato* affirmed, that men ought earneſtly to pray to God, that in ſeeking to know themſelues, they might not be miſled by their ſelfe loue, or by the ouer-weening of themſelues.

M. *Spenſer* then ſaid: If it be true that you ſay, by Philoſophie we muſt learne to know our ſelues, how happened it, that the *Brachmani* men of ſo great fame, as you know, in *India*, would admit none to be their ſchollers in Philoſophy, if they had not firſt learned to know themſelues: as if they had concluded, that ſuch knowledge came not from Philoſophie, but appertained to ſome other skill or ſcience.

Their opinion (ſaid I) differeth not (as my author thinketh)

keth) from the opinion of the wiſe men of Greece. But that the ſaid *Brachmani* herein ſhewed the ſelfe ſame thing that *Ariſtotle* teacheth, which is, that a man ought to make ſome triall of himſelfe before he determinate to follow any diſcipline, that he may diſcerne and iudge whether there be in him any diſpoſition wherby he may be apt to learne the ſame or no. And to the ſame effect in another place he affirmeth, that there muſt be a cuſtome of wel-doing in thē that wil learne to be vertuous, which may frame in them an aptneſſe to learne, by making them loue what is honeſt and commendable, and to hate thoſe things that are diſhoneſt and reprochfull. For all men are not apt for all things: neither is it enough that the teacher be ready to inſtruct and skilfull, but the learner muſt alſo be apt of nature to apprehend and conceiue the inſtructions that ſhall be giuen vnto him. And this knowledge of himſelfe, is fit for euery man to haue before he vndertake the ſtudie of Philoſophie, to wit, that he enter into himſelfe to trie whether he can well frame himſelf to endure the diſcipline of this mother of ſciences, and the patience which is required in al thoſe things beſides, which appertaine to honeſtie and vertuous life. For he that will learne vertue in the ſchoole of Philoſophie, muſt not bring a mind corrupted with falſe opinions, vices, wickedneſſe, diſordinate appetites, ambitions, greedie deſires of wealth, nor wanton luſts and longings, with ſuch like, which will ſtop his eares that he ſhall not be able to heare the holy voice of Philoſophie. Therefore *Epictetus* ſaid very well, that they which were willing to ſtudy Philoſophie, ought firſt to conſider well whether their veſſel be cleane and ſweet, leſt it ſhould corrupt that which they meant to put into it. Declaring thereby withall, that learning put into a vicious mind is dangerous. But this ma-

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ner of knowing a mans ſelfe, is not that which I ſpake of before, though it be that which the ſayd Indian Philoſophers meant, and is alſo very neceſſary and profitable. For to know a mans ſelfe perfectly, according to the former maner, is a matter of greater importance then ſo. Which made *Thales*, when he was asked what was the hardeſt thing for a man to learne, anſwer, that it was, to know himſelfe. For this knowledge ſtayeth not at the conſideration of this exteriour maſſe of our body, which repreſents it ſelfe vnto our eyes, though euen therein alſo may well be diſcerned the maruellous and artificiall handy-work of Gods diuine Maieſtie, but penetrateth to the examination of the true inward man, which is the intellectuall ſoule, to which this body is giuen but for an inſtrument here in this life. And this knowledge is of ſo great importance, that man guided by the light of reaſon, knoweth that he is, as *Triſmegiſtus* ſaith, a diuine miracle, and therefore not made (as bruite beaſts are) to the belly and to death, but to vertue and to eternall life, that thereby he may vnite himſelfe at the laſt with his Creator and maker of all things, when his ſoule ſhall be freed from theſe mortall bands and fetters of the fleſh. Towards whom neuertheleſſe, it is his part to raiſe himſelfe with the wings of his thoughts euen whiles he is here in this world, ſoaring aboue mortall things, bending his mind to the contemplation of that diuine nature, the moſt certaine roote of all goodneſſe, the infallible truth, and the aſſured beginning and foundation of all vertues. And therefore ſaid *Ariſtotle*, that the ſcience of the ſoule was profitable to the knowledge of all truth. Whereunto may be added that which *Plato* and his followers haue affirmed, to wit, that the ſoule knowing her ſelf, knoweth alſo her maker; and diſpoſeth her ſelfe not onely to obey

him, but alſo to become like vnto him: whereof in another place occaſion of further ſpeech will be miniſtred. Moreouer, a man by knowing himſelfe, becommeth in this life ſage and prudent, and vnderſtandeth that he is made not to liue onely, as other creatures are, but alſo to liue well. For they that haue not this knowledge, are like vnto bruite beaſts: and he ſeeth likewiſe, that nature, though ſhe produceth man not learned, yet ſhe hath framed vs to vertue, and apt to knowledge. And that a man is placed as a meane creature betweene bruite beaſts and thoſe diuine ſpirits aboue in heauen, hauing a diſpoſition to decline (if he liſt) to the nature of thoſe bruite beaſts, and alſo to raiſe himſelfe to a reſemblance of God himſelfe. Which things he weighing and conſidering, he reacheth not onely to the knowledge of himſelfe, but of other men alſo. And by the guiding of Philoſophie, to direct himſelfe and others to the well gouerning of himſelfe, of families, and Common-wealths, to the making of lawes and ordinances for the maintaining of vertue and beating downe of vice; and finally to ſet men in the way to their felicitie, by giuing them to vnderſtand, that they onely are happie which be wiſe and vertuous, and meete to be Lords and rulers ouer other men, and ouer all things elſe created for the vſe of mankind. Of all which things when they ſhall conſider man onely to be the end, maruelling at his excellencie, they are driuen to acknowledge how much they are bound to the heauenly bountie and goodneſſe, for creating him ſo noble a creature, and ſetting him ſo direct a courſe to euerlaſting ioy and felicitie. Hence groweth a deſire in them of what is good, beautifull, and honeſt, and of iuſtice, and to make themſelues like vnto their maker: who-

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(as the *Platonikes* ſay) is the centre, about which all ſoules capable of reaſon turne, euen as the line turneth about the mathematicall point to make a circle: and ſo by good and vertuous operations to purchaſe in this life praiſe and commendation, and in the life to come eternal happineſſe. Theſe were the men whom the *Lacedemonians* accounted diuine, and the *Platonikes* called the images of God.

Then ſaid Captain *Carleil*, this your diſcourſe, whereby you haue ſhewed the importance and right meane of knowing our ſelues, hath bin very wiſe & fruitful, and fit to declare how we ought to frame our life in this world. But I make a doubt, whether all this that you haue layed before vs to be done, be in our power or no? for it ſeemeth ſtrange, that, if it be in our power to giue our ſelues to a commendable life, there be any (as we ſee there are many) ſo peruerſe, and of ſo crooked iudgement, as to bend themſelues to wickedneſſe and naughtie life, who, when they might be vertuous, would rather chuſe to be vicious. And this maketh me oftentimes to thinke that the doing of good or euill is not in our power; but that either deſtinie (which as *Thales* was wont to ſay) ruled and maſtred all things, or the ſtarres with their influences doth draw vs to do what we do.

To this demaund of yours, ſaid I, you ſhal haue an anſwer, ſuch as mine author maketh, who, as a Philoſopher naturally diſcourſing of the actions of the ſoule, deliuereth his minde according to the ſentence of all Philoſophers. But becauſe ſome part of your queſtion toucheth a point now in controuerſie concerning Religion, it is good we haue a ſafe conduct of my Lord Primate, that his ſence as a Philoſopher may haue free paſſage without danger of his cenſure.

That ſhall you haue (ſaid my Lord Primate) with a good will: for ſince we are here to diſcourſe of Morall Philoſophie, we wil for this time put Diuinitie to ſilence, ſo farre forth as your author ſay not any thing ſo repugnant to the truth, as that it may breed any errour in the minds of the hearers.

Then (ſaid I) the demaund of Captaine *Carleil* hath three ſeuerall points or articles: the one is, whether vertue and vertuous actions be in our power or no? Another, that it ſeemeth ſtrange, if vice & vertue be in our power, that any man ſhould be ſo ſenſleſſe as to apply himſelfe to vice and forſake vertue. The laſt is, whether the good or euill we do, proceed frō the influence of the heauens, or from neceſſitie of deſtinie, and not from our owne free election. And my author beginneth with the laſt, which he affirmeth to be moſt contrary to truth, and to the excellencie of mans nature, proceeding thence to the ſecond, and laſtly to the firſt. Therefore he ſaith, that whoſoeuer holdeth mans will and election to be ſubiect to the neceſſitie of deſtiny, deſtroyeth vtterly (according to *Ariſtotles* ſaying) all that appertaineth to humane prudence, either in the care of himſelfe or of his family, or in the ordering of lawes, and the vniuerſall gouernment of Kingdomes and Common-weales, as well in peace as in warre: for if it were ſo, what need haue men to do any thing, but idly to attend what his deſtinie is to giue him or to denie him, or to prouide for any of thoſe things whereof our humane life hath neede. What difference were there betweene the wiſe man and the foole, the carefull and the rechleſſe, the diligent and the negligent? The puniſhment of malefactors, and the rewarding of wel-doers, ſhold be vniuſt and needleſſe. For euery thing being done by the order of fatall diſpoſition, and not by

by election, no man could either deſerue praiſe, or incurre blame. Beſides, nature ſhould in vaine haue giuen vs the vſe of reaſon, to diſcourſe or to conſult, or the abilitie to will or chuſe any thing; for whatſoeuer were appointed by deſtinie, ſhould of neceſſitie come to paſſe; and if of neceſſitie, then neither prudence, counſell, nor election can haue any place. And the vſe of free-will being ſo taken from vs, we ſhould be in worſe ſtate and condition then bruite beaſts; for they guided by inſtinct of nature, bend themſelues to thoſe things whereunto their nature inclineth them: whereas we notwithſtanding the vſe of reaſon, ſhould be like bond-ſlaues, tied to what the neceſſitie of deſtinie ſhould bind vs vnto. This was the cauſe why *Chryſippus* was worthily condemned among all the auncient Philoſophers, for that he held deſtinie to be a ſempiternal and vneuitable neceſſitie and order of things which in maner of a chaine was linked orderly in it ſelf, ſo as one ſucceeded another, and were fitly conioyned together. By which deſcription of deſtinie appeereth, that he meant to tie all things to neceſſitie. For albeit he affirmed withall, that our mind had ſome working in the matter, yet did he put neceſſitie to be ſo neceſſary, that there could no way be found, whereby our mind might come to haue any part. For to ſay that our mind or will concurred, by willing or not willing whatſoeuer deſtinie drew vs vnto, was nought elſe but a taking away of free choice from our vnderſtanding or will, ſince our mind like a bond-ſlaue was conſtrained to will, or not to will, as deſtinie did inuite it, or rather force it. And like to this were the opinions of *Demetrius*, of *Parmenides*, and of *Heraclitus*, who ſubiected all things to neceſſitie, and deſerued no leſſe to be condemned then *Chryſippus* Prince of the Stoikes. Among which, ſome there were, who ſeeing

ing many things to happen by chance or fortune; whereby it appeared that it could not be true, that things came by neceſſitie, leſt they ſhould denie a thing ſo manifeſt to ſenſe, they ſuppoſed the beginnings and the endings of things to be of neceſſitie, but the meanes and circumſtances they yeelded to be ſubiect to the changes and alterations of fortune. And of this opinion was *Virgil* (as ſome thinke) in the conducting of *Æneas* into *Italie*. For it ſhould ſeeme that he departed his country to come into *Italie* by fatall diſpoſition, that he might get *Lauinia* for his wife: but before he could arriue there, and winne her, he was mightily toſſed and turmoyled by fortune; which neuertheleſſe could neuer croſſe him ſo much, but that in the end he obtained his purpoſe, which by deſtiny was appointed for him. But howſoeuer *Virgil* thought in that point, which here need not to be diſputed, ſure I am, that he in the greateſt part of his excellent Poeme, is rather a *Platonike* then a *Stoike*. Howbeit ſome *Platonikes* (as I thinke) were not farre different in opinion from the *Stoikes*: for they ſay, that fortune with all her force was not able to reſiſt fatall deſtinie. Though *Plotinus* thought otherwiſe, and indeed much better, who anſwering them that would needs haue the influence of ſtarres to induce neceſſitie, prooued their reaſons to be vaine onely by an ordinary thing in dayly experience: which is, that ſundry perſons borne vnder one ſelf ſame conſtellation, are ſeene neuertheleſſe to haue diuers ends and diuers ſucceſſes, which they could not haue, if thoſe influences did worke their effects of neceſſitie. And as for *Epicures* opinion, which was, that the falling of his motes or *Atomi* ſhould breed neceſſitie in our actions; he rather laughed at, then confuted. Yea he was further of opinion, that not onely humane prudence, and our free election, was able to reſiſt

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the influences of the ſtarres, but that alſo our complexiō, our conuerſation and change of place might do the like: meaning that the good admonitions, and faithfull aduice and counſell of friends, is ſufficient to ouercome deſtinie, and to free our mindes from the neceſſitie of fatall diſpoſition. Wherefore though it be granted that there is a deſtinie, or that the ſtarres and heauens, or the order of cauſes, haue power ouer vs to incline or diſpoſe vs more to one thing then to another; yet is it not to be allowed that they ſhall force vs to follow the ſame inclination or diſpoſition. For though the heauens be the vniuerſall principle or beginning of all things, and by that vniuerſalitie (as I may call it) the beginning of vs alſo according to naturall Philoſophie; yet is it not the onely cauſe of our being and of our nature: for to the making man, a man muſt concurre, and ſo reſtraine this vniuerſall cauſe to a more ſpeciall. And as the heauen, or the order of higher cauſes, cannot ingender man without a man (ſpeaking according to nature): ſo can they do nothing to bind the free election of man without his conſent, who muſt voluntarily yeeld himſelfe to accompliſh that whereunto the heauen or the order of cauſes doth bend and incline him. And if we haue power to maſter our complexion, ſo, as being naturally inclined to luſt, we may by heed and diligence become continent; and being couetous, become liberall (though *Ariſtotle* ſay, that couetiſe is as incurable a diſeaſe of the mind, as the Dropſie or Ptiſike is to the body): what a folly is it to beleeue that we cannot reſiſt the inclinations of the ſtars, which are cauſes without vs, and not the onely cauſes of our being; but haue need of vs, if they will bring forth their effects in vs? The beginning of all our operation is vndoubtedly in our ſelues: and all thoſe things that haue the beginning of

their working in themſelues, do worke freely and voluntarily. And conſequently we may by our free choiſe and voluntarily giue our ſelues to good or to euill, and maſter the inclination of the heauens, the ſtarres, or deſtinie, which troubleth ſo much the braines of ſome, that in deſpite of nature they will needes make themſelues bond being free: whom *Ptolomie* doth fitly reprehend, by ſaying, that the wiſe man ouer-ruleth the ſtarres. For well may the heauens or the ſtars, being corporall ſubſtances, haue ſome power ouer our bodies, but ouer our mindes which are diuine, ſimple, and ſpirituall ſubſtances, can they haue none: for betweene the heauens & our minds is no ſuch correſpondence, that they may againſt our wils do ought at all in our minds which are wholy free from their influences, if any they haue. And therefore do the beſt of the *Platonikes* ſay very wel, that man muſt oppoſe himſelfe againſt his deſtinie, fighting to ouercome the ſame with golden armes and weapons, to wit, vertues, which is (as *Plato* ſaith) the gold of the mind. For he that behaueth himſelfe well, that is to ſay, ruleth wel his mind or ſoule, which is the true man indeed, as we haue formerly ſhewed, ſhall neuer be abandoned to deſtinie or fortune: againſt which two powers mans counſell and wiſedome reſiſteth in ſuch ſort, if he ſet himſelf reſolutely thereunto, as it may wel appeere that he is Lord and maſter ouer his owne actions. Neither without cauſe did *Tully* ſay, that fatall deſtinie was but a name deuiſed by old wiues, who not knowing the cauſes of things, as ſoone as any thing fell out contrary to their expectation, ſtraight imputed it to deſtinie; ioyning thereunto ſuch a neceſſitie, as it muſt needs (forſooth) force mans counſell and prudence. A thing moſt falſe, as hath bin declared. Is it not ſaid in the Scripture, that God created man, and

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left him in the power of his owne counsell? How then doth *Menander* say, that men did many euils compelled by necessitie? I meane not by necessitie, as commonly we do, want or pouertie, but by necessitie of destinie. We may then conclude, that our will and election is free, and that it is in our power to follow vice or vertue. Neuertheless true it is that man may abuse this his libertie, and of a free man make himselfe bond if he will: and therefore do the *Platonike* say, that a good and a wel-minded man doth all his actions freely; but that if he giue himself to do euill, forsaking the light of reason, he becommeth a bruite beast, and looseth the diuine gift of his libertie: for thenceforth doth he work no more freely of himself, but yeeldeth his minde, which ought to be the Lord of our libertie, slaue to the two baseſt parts of the soule, and then reigneth no more the reasonable soule, but the brutish, which maketh him abandon the care of the minde, and onely to attend the pleasures of the body, as brute beasts doe.

Hitherto (said my Lord Primate) I find nothing to be misliked in your discourse, which (as a Philosopher) is declared according to morall reason. But, as a Christian, what sayth your author to Gods predestination? Is it not necessary, that whatsoeuer God hath determined of vs from the beginning in his fore-knowledge (being the most certaine and true knower of all things) shall come to passe?

This is (said I) no small question to be fully answered, and being also not very pertinent to the matter we haue in hand (being meerely morall) my author medleth not with the particular points of the same: onely hereof he saith, that *Euripides* had little reason to say, that God had care of greater things, but that he left the care and gui-

ding of the leſſer to fortune. For we are bound by holy writ to beleeue (and ſome of the auncient Philoſophers haue likewiſe ſo thought) that there moueth not a leafe vpon a tree, nor falleth a haire from our heads, but by the will of God. Whereupon the holy Prophet *Dauid* ſayd, that God dwelleth on high, and beholdeth the things that are humble in heauen and in earth. And the *Peripatetikes* ſeemed to conſent thereunto, when they ſayd, that the heauenly prouidence foreſeeing that the particulars were not apt to preſerue themſelues eternally, had therfore ordained that they ſhould be continued in their vniuerſalities, which are the ſeuerall kinds or *ſpecies*, containing vnder them the particulars, which of themſelues are mortal and periſhable, but are made perpetual in them through generation. He ſayth alſo, that predeſtination is an ordinance or diſpoſition of things in the mind of God from the beginning, of what ſhal be done by vs in this life through grace. But he thinks not that it tieth our free wil, but that they go both together; that our well doing is acceptable and pleaſing to God, and our euil deeds diſpleaſing and offenſiue to his diuine Maieſtie: and that for the good we ſhall receiue reward, and puniſhment for the euill. The further diſcuſſing whereof appertaining rather to Diuines then Morall Philoſophers, he thinketh fit to referre vnto them, and to beleeue that this is one of thoſe ſecrets which God hath layed vp in the treaſury of his mind, whereunto no mortall eye or vnderſtanding can reach or penetrate, humbling our ſelues to his holy will, without ſearching into that which we cannot approch vnto. And if *Socrates* in that time of darkneſſe and ſuperſtition of the heathen could exhort men to aſſure themſelues, that God hauing created them, wold haue no leſſe care of them, then a good and iuſt Prince would haue of

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his ſubiects: how much more are we to beleeue that our heauenly Lord and God Almightie, who hath ſent his onely begotten Sonne to redeeme vs from the bondage of Sathan, doth diſpoſe and ordaine of vs as is beſt for vs, and for the honor of his diuine Maieſtie. For as they are to be commended that referre themſelues humbly to whatſoeuer he hath determined of them, doing their beſt endeuours to purchaſe his grace and fauour: ſo are they to be miſdoubted, who ouer-curiouſly will needes take vpon them the iudgment of Gods predeſtination or preſcience. And that ſentence cannot but be very good, which ſayeth, that *he that made thee without thee, will not ſaue thee without thee.* For were a man certaine to be damned, yet ought he not to do otherwiſe then well, becauſe he is borne to vertue and not to vice: which the very heathen by the onely light of reaſon could well perceiue. Beſides, it is thoght, that al they, that are ſigned with the character of Chriſt in baptiſme, may ſtedfaſtly beleeue that they are predeſtinated and choſen to ſaluation: not that our predeſtinatiõ giueth vs a neceſſitie of wel doing, but becauſe we hauing the grace of God to aſſiſt vs, diſpoſe our ſelues by the ſame grace to keep his cõmandements for our ſaluation, and for the honor and glory of his maieſtie: whereas by doing otherwiſe it is our owne wickedneſſe that excludeth vs from that bliſſe. And further mine author ſaith not.

In good ſooth (ſaid ſir *Robert Dillon*) this ſeemeth to me to be well and Chriſtianlike ſpoken. For he that acknowledgeth not ſo great a gift from God, being a ſpeciall marke or token by which we are diſtinguiſhed from brute beaſts, who wanting the vſe of reaſon, can haue no free election, is not onely vnthankfull, but doth fooliſhly thruſt himſelfe into the number of vnreaſonable crea-

tures, while he will needs depriue himſelf of that he hath ſpecially different from them. Neither doth the reuerent regard to Gods prouidence impeach our free wil: which prouidence the *Platonikes* partly vnderſtanding, affirmed (as I haue heard) that it did not alter or change the nature of things, but guided and directed deſtinie: impoſing no neceſſitie of doing good or euill vpon vs. And if any it did impoſe, it ſhould be onely to good, and neuer to euill. For what is diuine muſt needes worke diuinely, and diuine working can produce none but good effects. Wherefore they concluded that our election was not conſtrained by Gods prouidence. This they confirmed by common experience. For (ſayd they) if prouidence tie things to neceſſitie, then chance or fortune can haue no place in the actions of men. But we ſee dayly many things maturely debated, which ſhould by the naturall and ordinary courſe of cauſes haue a determinate and certaine end, yet miſſe their effect whereunto they are ordained, and another produced which was neuer intended, which is the proper worke of fortune. I haue alſo heard ſome Diuines ſay, that it ſhould ſeeme ſtrange, if wiſe & prudent men in this world by their prouidence and foreſight, ſeek euermore to bring perfection to thoſe things which are vnder their gouernement, God contrariwiſe (who is the fountaine of all wiſdome & prudence, and the true and abſolute preſeruer and conſeruer of all things by him produced) ſhould not giue perfections and continuance through his prouidence to ſo ſingular a gift giuen vnto man aboue all other creatures of the earth, but ſhold ſuffer it to periſh, to bind vs to ſeruitude. And that if his prouidence ſhould tie our free will to neceſſitie, he ſhould do that which is contrary to his owne nature: for that therby he ſhould take from vs the reward

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of vertue, ſince doing well by neceſſitie, we could deſerue neither praiſe nor recompence; he ſhould alſo take from vs all counſell and deliberation, which is needleſſe and ſuperfluous in all things, that of neceſſitie muſt come to paſſe: and laſtly iuſtice it ſelfe, whereby malefactors are puniſhed, if conſtrained by neceſſitie they did wickedly, for then were their puniſhment vniuſt: which made S. *Auguſtine* ſay, that God would neuer damne a ſinner, vnleſſe he found that he had ſinned voluntarily. We may therefore (as I think) conclude, that being created by God, and endowed with ſo excellent a gift, as free choice and election, which, beſides the place of Scripture aboue mentioned, is confirmed by another, where it is ſaid, that God ſet before man life and death, good and euill, that he might take whether he liſt to chuſe; he by his diuine foreſight doth rather giue perfection thereunto, then take it from vs. Yet the particular conſideration and debating of this matter being fitter for Diuines then for vs, let vs leaue the ſcanning of it to them, and be content like men ſeeking by the rules of Morall Philoſophie to find the ready way to humane felicitie in this life, to referre our ſelues in that point to the mercifull goodneſſe of Almightie God. And therefore (I pray you) proceed to the reſt of your diſcourſe, and ſhew vs the cauſe why ſo many giue themſelues rather to vice then to vertue, when they may do otherwiſe, which your author ſaid he would declare in the ſecond place.

So ſhall I (quoth I) and for the reſoluing of the ſame, you ſhal vnderſtand that *Plato* was of opiniõ, that no man willingly was wicked, becauſe the habite of vice was not voluntarily receiued by any man. And for confirmation of this his opinion, this reaſon he made: as vertue (ſayd he) is the health of the mind, ſo is vice the infirmitie of

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the ſame: and as the body receiueth willingly his health, and ſickneſſe againſt his will; euen ſo the mind receiueth willingly vertue as his health, and vice vnwillingly; knowing that thereby it becometh ſicke and infected. But *Plotinus* aſſigned another reaſon, not needfull here to be rehearſed. Now *Ariſtotle* was of another mind, for he affirmed that man had free will by his owne choice and election.

How can man voluntarily embrace vice (ſaid M. *Dormer*) which of all things is the worſt, ſince the ſame author ſaith, that al men couet what is good, and ſince without vertue there can be no good.

Theſe two ſayings (ſaid I) are not contradictory: for the moſt wicked man aliue deſireth what is good: and if vice ſhould ſhew it ſelfe in his owne proper forme, he is ſo vgly and ſo horrible to behold, that euery man would flie from him: therefore knowing how deſeruedly he ſhould be hated and abhorred, if he were ſeene like himſelfe, he preſents himſelfe vnder the ſhape of goodneſſe, and hiding all his il fauoured face, deceiueth the ſenſitiue appetite; which being intiſed by the falſe image of goodnes, is ſo ſeduced, and through the corruption of his mind and iudgement, by the ill habit, contracted from his child hood, he embraceth that which (if his iudgement were ſoũd) he wold neuer do. Wherfore *Plato* his meaning was (as it may be thought) that no mã was willingly vicious, ſince, euill couering it ſelfe vnder the cloke of goodneſſe, he was induced to do euill, thinking to do good: and ſo the opinions of both Philoſophers concurre. But *Pythagoras* by the report of *Ariſtotle*, *lib. 8. Ethicor.* aſſigneth another cauſe, to wit, that ill doing is an infinite thing, and that by a thouſand wayes men are led to wickednes and vicious actions, all eaſie to be taken: but to vertue there is

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but one onely way, and the ſame ſo enuironed and croſſed with the bypaths that guide men to vice, as it muſt needs be hard to keepe it without entring into ſome of the by-wayes leading to vice and errour. For the eye that is not made cleere ſighted by Philoſophie, is not able to diſcerne that way from the reſt.

It ſhold ſeeme (ſaid M. *Dormer*) by this, that ignorance is the cauſe of well doing, and not mans choice or election: for where ignorance is, it may be ſaid there is no election.

Not ſo (ſaid I) if *Ariſtotle* be to be beleeued, who ſaith that ignorance ſo farre foorth as it concerneth mens actions, is of two ſorts: the one is, when a man doth ill, not through ignorance, but ignorantly: the other is, when he doth it of meere ignorance, becauſe he neither knoweth nor might know that ſuch an action was euill. In the firſt caſe, are thoſe that are haſtie & cholerike, and drunkards: for though they knew before, that haſtineſſe and drunkenneſſe be euill, yet when the heate of choler, or the diſordinate appetite of wine blindeth them, they erre ignorantly, but not of ignorance. In the latter are they that fall through meere ignorance, not knowing that what they do is euill. As if a Prince make a reſtraint or prohibition, that no man vpon paine of death ſhall enter into his Forreſt to hunt there, and a ſtranger not knowing this reſtraint, cometh thither with his hounds to hunt, as in former time haply he had done. This ſtranger breaketh the will of the Prince, and committeth a fault, but altogether through ignorance, becauſe he had no knowledge of the prohibition. But if a haſtie man knowing of the reſtraint, purſuing his enemy in his rage, or a drunken man, when wine hath made him not to diſcerne his way, entring into that forreſt, haue his dog following him, and the dog

kill a Deere; his fault though it be ignorantly committed ſhould not be through ignorance. And as the ſtranger, being ſorie for his offence, and thereby ſhewing that he meant not to breake the Princes commaundement, were worthy pardon: euen ſo the other were iuſtly to be puniſhed, ſince knowing the penaltie threatned to the offender, he would not bridle his furie, or abſtaine from wine, but by following his paſſion or vnruly appetite, incurre the danger of the ſame. And as the one may well be iudged to haue made a fault againſt his wil; ſo may the other be deemed to haue wilfully broken the commandement. In which latter caſe of ignorance are all they that be vicious or wicked, who through the ill habite which they haue made in vice, do any act contrary to law and the ciuill ſocietie of men, for which they deſerue to be adiudged wilfully euill, and by their owne free choice and election. For all men ought to know thoſe things that generally are to be knowne, touching honeſt and ciuil conuerſation; and if they do not know them when they do il, it is becauſe they chuſe not to know that which is neceſſary for them to know. In which reſpect it is determined, that who ſo for want of knowing this generalitie will do amiſſe, ſhould be eſteemed wicked by his owne free wil and election. *Seneca* ſaid very fitly, that ſuch men did in the mids of the cleere light make darknes to themſelues. And this is that ignorance which *Plato* calleth the defiling of the ſoul. Let vs ſuppoſe that there may be one that knoweth not adultery to be ſin or vice, and that in ignorance committeth adultery; ſhal we ſay he deſerueth to be excuſed? God forbid: for he is cauſe of his owne ignorance, ſince it is in his power and in the power of all reaſonable men to know what is fit and honeſt for vertuous life; and that the ſame is made knowne, as well by

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Gods law, as by the ordinances and cuſtomes of man, to all thoſe that will not wittingly hood-winke themſelues. Wherefore it is a wilfull ſin committed by free election, and worthy puniſhment as a voluntary offence. And S. *Auguſtine* ſayed not without cauſe, that all ignorance was not worthy pardon, but onely that of ſuch men as had no meanes to attaine knowledge or learning: but they that haue teachers to inſtruct them, and for want of ſtudie and diligence abide in their ignorance, and ſo do euill, are not onely vnworthy excuſe, but deſerue alſo ſharpe puniſhment. So in another place he ſayth, that no man is puniſhed for that which naturally he knowes not: as the child for that he cannot ſpeake, or becauſe he cannot reade. But when he will not ſet his mind to learne as he ought, being of yeeres, and vrged thereunto, he deſerueth to be chaſtiſed, becauſe it is in euery mans power to be able to learne all that is neceſſary for him to know how to liue well, and what things are to be embraced as good, and what to be eſchewed as euill: and he that will not learne them, remaineth wilfully in his ignorance.

Yea but if I ſhould chance (ſaid Captaine *Dawtrey*) to be abroade with my bow and arrowes, and perceiuing ſomewhat to ſtirre in a buſh, ſhould ſhoote thereat, ſuppoſing it to be a Deere or ſome other game, and ſhould ſo kill my wife that were hidden there, as *Cephalus* did, ſhould not my ignorance in that caſe excuſe me?

This caſe (ſaid I) appertaineth to the ſecond part of ignorance, already ſpoken of, which is about the circumſtances of the particular things, the ignorance whereof deſerueth excuſe, and ſo ſhould this. But this ignorance ſhould become wilfull wickedneſſe, if when you ſaw you had ſlaine your wife, intending to kill a Deere, you

were not heartily ſory therefore, but rather glad to be ſo rid of her: and ſo farre ſhould you then be from excuſe, that you ſhould deſerue to be ſeuerely puniſhed for the fact. Much like to the caſe of *Cephalus* was that of *Adraſtus*, but more miſerable, in ſlaying of *Atys* the ſonne of *Cræſus* King of *Lidia*. For *Cræſus* hauing giuen in charge to *Adraſtus* his ſonne, and they being one day gone to hunt a great wild Bore that did great harme in the countrey, accompanied with many yong gentlemen of *Lidia*, whiles the Bore was ruſhing forth, *Adraſtus* threw a dart at him, and *Atys* comming by chance in the way, the dart hit him and ſlew him. Now though *Atys* were the only ſonne of *Cræſus*, and were ſlaine by the hand of him that had him in charge; yet finding that it was done by meere miſchance and through ignorance, and knowing how grieuouſly *Adraſtus* ſorrowed for the ſame, he not onely freed him of any puniſhment therefore, but frankly pardoned him. And the repentance of the fact might haue ſufficed the doer; but he ouercome with extreme griefe ſlew himſelfe at the funerall of the dead young Prince, being vnable to beare with a ſtout courage the anguiſh and vexation of minde that his miſhappe did breed him. But this ſhewed *Adraſtus* to be rather faint-hearted and weake of minde, then otherwiſe: for the purchaſing of death to auoyde griefe or any other annoyance of the mind, is not the part of a valorous and couragious man, as the beſt among the ancient Philoſophers haue alwaies held. And becauſe we know by the rule of Chriſt, that it is no matter diſputable, it needeth not that thereof any further words be made.

You ſay well (ſaid my Lord Primate) and I know that *Ariſtotle* is of minde, that it is a vile act for a man to kill himſelfe to auoyde ignominie or afflictions. But to omit

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the iudgement of the auncient Romanes, who held it the part of a ſtout heart, for a man to kill himſelfe rather then to ſuffer ſhame or ſeruitude, as we reade that *Cato* did, and *Caſsius* and *Brutus*: yet it ſeemeth that *Plato*, whom your author determined to follow as well as *Ariſtotle*, maketh *Socrates* (in his dialogue intituled *Phædon*) to ſay, that a Philoſopher ought not to kill himſelfe, vnleſſe God lay a neceſſitie of doing it vpon him. Out of which words it may well be gathered, he thought that not onely the common ſort, but euen Philoſophers themſelues, when neceſſitie conſtraineth them, might ridde themſelues of their life.

That place (ſaid I) is aduiſedly to be examined: for *Socrates* there meant not that any man willingly ſhould lay violent hands vpon himſelfe; but if there be no remedy but that die he muſt, and that diuers kindes of deaths are propoſed vnto him, he may chuſe that kind which is leſſe noyſome to him or leſſe grieuous: as *Socrates* choſe to die with the iuice of hemlocks, and *Seneca* by the opening of his veines.

You may haply conſter that meaning out of that place (ſaid my Lord Primate): but what will you ſay to that which is in his bookes of the Common-weale, where he writeth, that a man ſicke of any grieuous or long infirmitie, when he ſhall ſee himſelfe out of hope to procure remedie, he ſhould then make an end of his life.

To that place I ſay (quoth I) that it is to be conſidered how *Plato* ſought to frame his Common-wealth in ſuch ſort as it ſhould be rather diuine then humane: and therfore as the citizens of the heauenly Common-wealth liue in continuall happineſſe and contentment, without feeling any annoyance or moleſtation at all: euen ſo was his purpoſe, that the citizens of his Common-wealth

ſhould haue no grieuance, paine or moleſtation among them: but in an ordinary humane Common-wealth he would not haue ſet downe any ſuch precept.

You haue ſalued that ſore reaſonable well alſo (ſayed my Lord Primate) though there might be obiections made againſt your anſwer. But how will another place of his be defended, which is in his booke of Lawes, where he ſayth, that whoſoeuer hath committed any offence in the higheſt degree, and findeth, that he hath not power to abſtaine from the like eftſoones, ought to rid himſelfe out of the world.

The anſwer to that (ſaid I) is eaſie: for *Plato* his meaning therein is, that whoſoeuer is wickedly giuen, and of ſo euill example as there is no hope of his amendment, ſhould rather kill himſelfe, then by liuing inuite ſo many others to the like courſe of life: not vnlike to the opinion alreadie recited, that it is better one die for a people, then that his life ſhould be the occaſion of the death of many. For *Plato* aymed euermore at the purging of all cities frō ſuch caterpillers; which appeereth manifeſtly by the pain he would haue inflicted vpon parricides. But that it was abhomination to him for a man to kill himſelfe, he plainely ſheweth in his ninth booke of Lawes, by the ſentence he ſetteth downe againſt ſuch men. Neuertheleſſe this indeed may be found in *Plato*, that vice was ſo odious vnto him, that he would rather haue a man to die, then to vndertake any vile & vicious action, which might breed him perpetuall infamie. And *Ariſtotle* in this point agreeth with his maſter (though in many he delight to carpe him) that a man ought to chuſe rather to die then commit any abhominable or grieuous fact, or do that which might be for euer reprochful vnto him. And *Plato* his expreſſe ſence of this matter, is to be vnderſtood in

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the ſame dialogue which you firſt ſpake of, where *Socrates* is brought to ſay, that the Lord and Ruler of this whole world hauing ſent vs into this life, we are not to deſire to leaue it without his conſent: and who ſo doth the contrary, offends nature, offendeth God. And this is the myſtery of that precept of *Philolaus*, which forbiddeth a man to cleaue wood in the high way: meaning that a man ſhould not ſeuer or deuide the ſoule frō the body, whiles he was in his way on this earthly pilgrimage; but ſhould be content, that as God and nature had vnited and tied the ſoule to the bodie, ſo by them it might be vnlooſed againe: therefore the *Peripatetikes* alſo thought, that they which die a violent death, cannot be thought to haue ended their dayes according to the courſe of time and nature. And with this my Lord Primate reſted ſatisfied. I turned me to Captaine *Carleil*, and ſayd: Now (ſir) concerning your doubts propoſed, you may haue perceiued, that whatſoeuer deſtinie be, neither it, nor the diuine prouidence of Almightie God impoſeth any neceſſitie vpon vs: that vertue and vice are in our power, vertue growing in vs by the right vſe of our free choice, and vice by the abuſe of the ſame, when through corruption of the iudgement to do that is in apparance good, it chuſeth the euill: and laſtly what kind of ignorance is excuſable, and which not.

Concerning my demaunds (ſayd Captaine *Carleil*) I am reſolued. But ſince I ſee our doings proceed from election, I would gladly know of you what maner of thing it is; for I cannot perceiue whether it be a deſire, or an anger, or an opinion, or what I ſhould call it.

None of all theſe (ſaid I) but rather a voluntary deliberation, following a mature and aduiſed counſel: which counſell by *Plato* was termed a diuine thing. For election

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is not made in a moment; but when a thing is propoſed either to be accepted or refuſed, there muſt firſt be a counſell taken, reſpecting both the end of the action, and the meanes by which the ſame is to be compaſſed: ſo as there is required a time of conſultation: and therefore it is ſaid, that haſt is enemie to counſell, and that oftentimes repentance followes them that reſolue without diſcuſſing or debating of matters. Next vnto counſell cometh iudgement, and after iudgement followeth election, and from election iſſueth the action or the effects that are reſolued vpon, and accepted as the beſt. And becauſe fortune (though ſhe be a cauſe rather by accident then of her ſelfe) hath no ſmall part in moſt of our actions, the wiſeſt men haue ſaid, that counſel is the eye of the mind, by helpe whereof, men of prudence ſee how to defend themſelues from the blind ſtrokes of fortune, and eſchuing that which may hurt them, take hold of that which is profitable.

Why then (ſaid my Lord Primate) it ſhold ſeeme that our counſell were wholy in our power. But *Xenophon* is of a contrary opinion: for he ſayeth, that good counſell cometh from the Gods immortall, and that their counſels proſper who haue them to be their friends, and theirs not, who haue them to be their enemies.

To haue God fauourable vnto vs (ſaid I) in all our doings, is not onely deſirable, but that it may pleaſe him to grant his grace ſo to be, ought all men to craue by humble prayer at his hands. But that God is the author of our counſels otherwiſe then as an vniuerſall cauſe, is to be doubted: not that the ſingular gift of the mind, and the power thereof to deliberate and conſult, commeth not from him; for the not acknowledging thereof, were not onely a groſſe ignorance, but alſo an expreſſe impietie,

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& an vnexcuſable ingratitude. Howbeit ſince it hath pleaſed him to beſtow vpon vs ſo great and liberal a gift as the mind, we may well beleeue that he will not take from vs the free vſe therof. For to ſay that God were the imediate cauſe of our counſell, were as much as to take from vs the vſe of reaſon, without which we are not any more men, as of late was ſayd. And therfore beſides *Ariſtotles* authoritie, grounded in that point vpon good reaſon, we find in the Scripture, that after God had made man, and giuen him (by breathing vpon him) the ſpirit of life, which is the ſoule of vnderſtanding, he left him in the hand of his owne counſell. Whereby it appeereth, that counſel commeth from our ſelues, and that election is the office of prudence, which is called the ſoule of the mind, and the *Platonikes* call the knowledge of good and euill: whereunto it ſeemed that *Tullie* agreed, when he ſaid, that prudence was the ſcience of things deſirable, or to be eſchued: which ſentence S. *Auguſtine* reporteth. And *Fabius Maximus* ſaid, that the Gods through prudence and our vertues, did grant vs proſperous ſucceſſes in our affaires: as if he ſhould haue ſaid, that though God (as an vniuerſall cauſe) concurred to accompliſh our deliberations; yet we were to endeuour our ſelues, and to ſharpen our wits to conſult on the beſt meanes to compaſſe our good purpoſes, if we deſire to haue his fauour, and not to ſit idle, expecting what will fall out. And to end the diſcourſe hereof, the auncient Philoſophers of the beſt ſort held, that the Gods ſeeing vs employ our vertues and faculties of the mind (which hath a reſemblāce vnto them) well and wiſely, become our friends, and the rather grant vs their helpe and fauour. According to which opinion *Euripides* ſayed, that the Gods did helpe them that were wiſe. But becauſe we ſhall haue occaſion to ſpeake more

largely hereafter of Prudence, we will now returne to that which we left long ſithens to ſpeake of, by the interpoſing of the doubts moued: and that is the knowledge of our ſelues, as the thing that muſt guide vs to that beſt and moſt perfect end; the inquiry wherof is the occaſion of all this diſcourſe. And becauſe we are not of a ſimple nature, but compounded of ſeuerall qualities, and (as we may ſay) liues, according to that which in our firſt dayes diſcourſe was declared: it is alſo neceſſary that theſe powers & faculties of the ſoule which are in vs, and by which we participate of the nature of all things liuing, ſhould haue their ends and ſeuerall goods, as I may terme them: and that thoſe ends ſhould orderly anſwer ech to his ſeuerall power or facultie of the ſoule, though *Ariſtotle* thinke otherwiſe. Theſe ends or goods are firſt profite, which reſpecteth the *vegetatiue* power: next, delight or pleaſure, peculiar to the *ſenſitiue* power: and laſtly honeſtie, proper to the reaſonable part or facultie of the ſoule. Wherefore *Zeno* may wel be thought to haue bin aſtray, when he aſſigned one onely end or good to nature, and the ſame to be honeſty. For albeit I cannot, nor meane to denie, but that honeſtie is not onely a good, but alſo the greateſt good among all thoſe that concurre to our felicitie; and without which, there can be no vertue: yet to ſay it is the onely good, I cannot be perſwaded. For peruſing euery thing that hath life, common ſenſe it ſelf ſheweth vs, that ech kind of life hath his peculiar and ſeuerall end and good; and that honeſtie is the only proper good of creatures capable of reaſon, and not of other ſenſible creatures, or of plants and *vegetables*. And becauſe it is a greater good, and containeth both the other, therefore is it more to be priſed and valued then they. And man being the moſt perfect creature of the earth, is by nature framed

med to haue a deſire and an inſtinct vnto them all, and to ſeeke to purchaſe them all three for the perfection of his felicitie in this life. Now foraſmuch as all theſe three powers are in vs, to the end we may enioy the benefite that redoundeth from them, we cannot ſeuer them one from another, if we meane to be happie in this life: neither yet ought we ſo to apply our ſelues to any one, or two of thē leſſe proper vnto vs, that therefore we forſake or neglect that other which is of moſt worth and proper to our nature; and that is honeſtie, which neuer can be ſeuered frō vertue. For that is it that giueth to vs dignitie and excellency, not ſuffering vs to do any thing vnſeemely, but ſtil directing vs in all our actions, which proceed from reaſon. For he that ſtayeth himſelf only vpon profit, or vpon pleaſure, or vpon them both, ſheweth plainly that he knoweth not himſelfe: and therefore ſuffereth thoſe things that are not proper to his nature, to maſter and ouer-rule him. And not knowing himſelfe, he cannot vſe himſelfe, nor take hold of that which is his proper good and end. Thus following (through the not knowing of himſelfe) that which is good to other natures, he looſeth his owne good, and falleth into euill, by the deſire of profit, or diſordinate appetite to pleaſure. The conſideration hereof perhaps cauſed ſome of the auncient Poets to faine, that men were turned into brute beaſts, and into trees; to ſignifie vnder that fictiō, that ſome propoſing to themſelues onely profite, ſome onely delight, without regard to reaſon and their owne proper good, had loſt the excellent ſhape or forme of men, and were transformed into beaſts or trees, hauing made the moſt excellent part of man, which is the mind and reaſonable ſoule, ſubiect to the baſeſt and ſenſual parts and pleaſures of the bodie. And this ignorance, concerning the knowledge of a mans ſelfe, is

the cauſe that he cannot tell how to vſe himſelf. For theſe vnreaſonable affections do ſo darken the light of reaſon, that he is as a blind man, and giueth himſelfe ouer to be guided, as one that hath loſt the right way, to as blinde a guide as himſelfe, and ſo wandreth aſtray which way ſoeuer his bad guide doth leade him. For he hath loſt the knowledge of truth, which *Plato* ſayeth, is the beſt guide of men to all goodneſſe, and is comprehended by the mind onely, which (according to the ſaying of *Epicarmus*) doth only ſee & heare, all the reſt of the parts of man being blind and deafe. They then which follow profite only, liue the baſeſt life of all, & may well be reſembled to flies & gnats, the moſt imperfect among liuing creatures, or like to the ſhel-fiſhes that cleaue to the rockes, as theſe men do to their pelfe; and ſo hauing propoſed to themſelues the baſeſt end of all others, they may worthily be eſteemed the baſeſt ſort of men.

Nay, in good faith ſir (ſaid Captaine *Dawtry*) not ſo, for I ſee them onely honored and eſteemed that are rich; and I haue knowne, and yet know ſome of very baſe and abiect condition, who being become rich, are cheriſhed and welcome in the beſt companies, & accepted among honorable perſonages: therefore (me thinketh) he ſpake aduiſedly that ſaid,

Honour and friends by riches are acquired,
But who is poore ſhall ech where be deſpiſed.

And I remember I haue read, that ſometime there was a citizen in Rome, who was commonly held for a foole, and therefore in all companies his words were litle regarded, the rather becauſe he was alſo poore; but after that by the death of a rich man to whom he was heire, he poſſeſſed wealth, he grew to be had in great eſtimation, euen in the Senate, and his opinion euermore ſpecially requi-

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red in matters of greateſt moment.

Yea marry (ſaid M. *Dormer*) and *Ariſtotle* alſo affirmeth, that the end of the father of a families care is, the purchaſing of riches; which being ſo, they are not ſo ſleightly to be regarded, as your author ſayes.

Did I not tell you (ſaid I) that truth being gone, the true light and knowledge of things is taken out of the world; for it is ſhe only that giueth vs light to know, what and of what price all things are. And euen as if the Sunne were taken away from the earth, there would remaine nought but darknes and blindneſſe among men: ſo truth being taken away, man is blinded from diſcerning any thing aright. This I ſay, becauſe rich men onely for their wealth are eſteemed worthy honour and dignity by ſuch chiefly as want the light of truth, which is the vulgar ſort, whoſe iudgement is ſo corrupt and crooked, that they cannot diſcerne what true honor and dignity is. For they being weake minded and imperfect, admire ſhowes and ſhadowes, being dazeled with the bright gliſtring of gold and precious ſtones, and cannot diſtinguiſh betweene things neceſſary and ſuperfluous. Which ignorance of theirs, *Byas*, one of the ſeuen ſages of Greece, conſidering anſwered one of thoſe baſe minded fellowes, who wold needes perſwade him, that they were happie that could compaſſe great wealth: My friend (quoth he) much more happie are they that do not deſire the ſame. The iudgement of the wiſer ſort, hath euer bin farre different from this vulgar opinion. For they vnderſtand, that riches is none of thoſe goods which alone make men happie; and that they do but go and come, as tides flow and ebbe, euen at the pleaſure of fortune, who giueth and taketh them as ſhe liſt. And therefore they are no otherwiſe to be eſteemed, then as they are neceſſary for the ſuſtaining

of life, nature being content with little, and the deſire of hauing being infinite; neuer content with what it hath, but euer coueting what it hath not. Therefore right wiſe men haue held that *Alexander* the Great was in truth poorer and needier then he that ſaid

Let others hardly ſeeke to hoord vp wealth
For me I force not, though that pouertie
Chaſe from me idleneſſe, and breed me health, &c.

For that mans deſires had their determinate ſtint, wheras *Alexanders* increaſed ſtil, the more he enlarged his dominions, being grieued that he had not conquered one world, becauſe he had heard ſay, that *Democritus* was of opinion there were many. And although *Epicurus* in many things hath deſerued blame, becauſe he placed the higheſt good of man in pleaſures proceeding from the ſenſes; yet deſerued he praiſe in that he ſaid, that they to whom a little ſeemeth not enough, a great deale wil ſeem but a litle. Much to the like effect *Curius*, hauing conquered the Samnites, and for recompence of his great ſeruice the Romanes purpoſing to giue him a far larger portion of the conquered land, then to the reſt of the ſouldiers: he who had taught his deſires to be brideled, and could cut ſhort the ſuperfluitie of his appetites, would in no wiſe take any more then a like ſhare or portion, as was allotted to the reſt of the ſouldiers, that were waxen olde in the warres, for their liuing and maintenance; ſaying, that he that could not content himſelfe to liue with that which ſufficed others, could not be a good citizen. This worthy man made it appeere, that he indeede is to be accounted rich who deſireth not to haue much: and that in reſpect of what is needfull for mans life, euery man may be rich; but in regard of our deſires, euery man is poore, and cannot be rich, becauſe they be infinite. *Socrates* (according

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to the saying of *Byas* before rehearsed) said that it was far better not to desire any thing, then to compas what a man desireth. For it was not vnknowne to that graue wise mā, that from immoderate desires cometh greedinesse of the mind, whereby it is made vnreasonable, and disposed to thinke a great deale to be but a little; whereas not to desire, maketh a little to seeme much. The way therefore to quiet the minde, is not to increase wealth, but to plucke from a mans desires, which otherwise will still increase as riches increaseth: for it is the honest and necessary vse of riches that causeth them to be had in consideration among wise men, who esteeming them accordingly, are easily contented with a little; and where others admire those that haue their coffers full of golde and pelfe, they little regard them, but despising superfluities, turne their minds to better thoughts, meete to make them purchase that felicitie which none of them can haue, who amid great abundance of wealth & worldly riches, are voyd of vertue. For this respect did *Crates* the Philosopher (considering how the great care of gathering them withdrew the minde, which of it owne nature is excelse and high, from the knowledge of sublime matters, sinking it into the depth of base and vile cogitations) gaue ouer his patrimony, which was in value neere fifteen hundred pounds, and betooke himselfe to those studies which he thought were aptest to set him the right course of getting (in steed of exterior riches) the true gold of the mind, which is vertue. And in truth happie is that man that can get store of that gold, by meanes whereof he may compasse his felicitie, which the other can neuer purchase, and are not to be coueted but for humane necessitie, as being of no value, or litle among wise men in respect of happines. For to say truly, what happines can there be in any thing

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that alike diſquieteth as well them that haue it, as them that haue it not. Since he that wants it, by deſiring it, keepeth his mind in continuall anguiſh and trouble; and he that hath it, is euermore tormented with feare of loſſe of it: and if he happen to looſe it indeed, is miſerably crucified for the loſſe thereof. Which thing made *Democritus* to ſay, that man was in his eſtimation ſo farre from being made happie by his riches, as he could not in truth account them to be to him any good at all. So *Solon* being with *Cræſus* King of *Perſia*, who accounted himſelf of all men in the world the moſt happie, becauſe of his exceſſiue treaſure; when the King had cauſed his treaſury to be be ſhewed vnto him, ſeemed to make ſleight eſtimation of the ſame: whereupon the King, as one dazeled with the glittering ſhow of his gold, held him but for a foole. But fooliſh indeed was he himſelf, & not *Solō*, who knew very wel, that ſuch things came to him by his great power and ſoueraignetie, not by his vertue, and therefore could they not make him happie. Neuertheleſſe *Cræſus* yet deſirous to vnderſtand what *Solons* opinion was touching happines, asked him if he euer knew any man more happie then he: who anſwered him, yes; and among many, one named *Pellus* a citizen of *Athens*, who being a vertuous man, and hauing begotten children like himſelfe, was dead in the field, fighting valiantly againſt the enemie in defence of his countrey, leauing after him an immortall fame of his valour. So much more did this wiſe man eſteeme vertue then riches, that he thought ſo mightie a Monark with all his treaſure not comparable to a meane citizen of *Athens* furniſhed with vertue. For he held them as needleſſe and ſuperfluous to him that had them without vſing them, as to them that did admire them and could not enioy them. Let vs therefore conclude, that

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plentie of wealth makes not any man happie :and that they who hunt after profit to become rich,are of al others the moſt baſe and ignoble,though the vulgar ſort deeme them otherwiſe.And when *Ariſtotle* ſayd,that the end of *Oeconomie* (for ſo he calleth the orderly diſtributing of things for houſhold) was riches, he ſpake according to the cómon vnderſtanding and phraſe: for in his Ethikes he ſheweth plainely, that riches is but a certaine aboundance of neceſſary inſtruments for the vſe of a family. Whereby it may be vnderſtood,that for themſelues they are not deſirable, but as they are directed to a better end, which end is humane felicitie. As for the Senator you ſpake of,whom the whole Senate grew to eſteeme when he was growne rich: you may be ſure that it was not for nought that *Cicero* ſcoffed at them, when he asked one day in the aſſembly, whoſe that inheritance was,which was called Wiſedome. And thus much may ſuffice for ſuch as follow profite onely. Now for thoſe that apply themſelues wholy to their pleaſures and delights, it is to be held, that they neither can be accounted happie, becauſe forſaking their proper end and good, which is honeſtie, they bend themſelues to the *ſenſitiue* part onely which is common with them to brute beaſts.

Here M. *Dormer* interrupting me,deſired that I would ſtay a while to reſolue him of one doubt,which my former words had bred in his mind,which was,that hauing ſaid riches were of ſmall account among wiſe men, and could not make men happie, it might ſeeme that nature had in vaine produced them.

That followeth not(ſaid I)of any thing which I haue ſpoken.For I haue not ſaid,that they were not neceſſary for the vſe of them : for common ſence, experience,and the want of things behouefull to mans life,would ſay the

contrary. Beſides that, *Ariſtotle* in his tenth booke of Ethikes affirmeth, that not onely to the attaining of ciuill felicitie, but alſo for the contemplatiue life, theſe exterior goods are needfull, becauſe a man may the better thereby contemplate when want diſtracteth not his minde: though among the *Platonikes*, ſome ſay the contrary; alledging that men are better diſpoſed to contemplation without them, then with them. But thus much indeede I ſaid, that they are not the true end or good of man, nor could yeeld him happineſſe of themſelues, or make him worthy honour. And that they, that bend their mindes onely to ſcrape and heape together mucke and pelfe, are of all others the baſeſt and vnworthieſt: yet being vſed as they ought to be, for the behoofe and maintenance of mans life, and not as an end, or the proper good of man, I do not only not diſcommend them, but do alſo eſteeme them in their quality ſo far forth as the infirmity of mans nature hath neede of them; whereof, ſince we ſhall haue occaſion to ſpeake more hereafter, let vs in Gods name proceed to ſpeake of the life of them that haue ſubiected their minds to that part of the ſoule which is wholy bent to ſenſualitie and delight. Theſe men are like vnto brute beaſts wanting reaſon, and worſe: for brute beaſts following their naturall inſtinct and appetite, paſſe not the bonds of nature, and though they get no praiſe thereby, yet incurre they not any blame in that behalfe. But man, who ſetting reaſon aſide, chuſeth vaine pleaſures as his ſcope and end, and ſo plungeth his minde in them, that reaſon cannot performe her office and dutie, can in no wiſe eſcape from exceeding blame and reproch for the ſame. Of which ſort of men, the *Platonikes* opinion was, that they were ſo far from being happie, as they were not to be reputed among the liuing, but the dead: not only

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in reſpect of the body, but of the ſoule likewiſe. For they held that the ſoule being drowned in delights, might wel be reckoned as dead, becauſe beaſtly delight (like an ill weed) ſpreadeth it ſelfe in mans mind, till it ouergrow all goodneſſe, and ſo taketh away the vſe of reaſon, as it depriueth him of the qualitie proper to man, and draweth him into the pure qualitie of vnreaſonable creatures: which, how grieuous and hatefull a thing it is, neede not be declared. *Ariſtotle* reſembleth them to wilde young Stiers, that muſt be tamed with the yoke. But to ſhew you how this diſordinate or tickling itch of delight proceedeth, in this ſort it is: wheras man is compoſed of two principall parts, the body, and the ſoule or mind: the latter to rule and commaund, the former to obey and ſerue. They, which propoſe to them their delight and pleaſure, onely take a cleane contrary courſe, making the body to commaund and rule, and the minde to ſerue and obey. And as in a houſhold or family, al wold go to wrack, if the maſter or father of the family being prudent and carefull, ſhould be conſtrained to obey his ſonne or ſeruant, who were fooliſh and negligent: euen ſo muſt it of neceſſitie be in him, that by vice maketh his mind ſubiect to the bodie, making it ſerue onely for the delighting thereof, and neglecting that which he ſhould moſt earneſtly ſtudy to maintaine and cheriſh; whence cometh (as *Socrates* ſaith) all euill and ruines among men. For from theſe diſordinate pleaſures, which ſpring from the ſenſes of the body, through that power which the facultie of the ſoule miniſtreth vnto them, do all wicked affections take their beginning, as angers, furies, fond loues, hatreds, ambitions, luſtes, ſuſpicions, ielouſies, ill ſpeaking, backbiting, falſe ioyes, and true griefes; and finally the conſuming of the body and goods, and the loſſe of honor and reputation.

And oftentimes it is ſeene, that whiles a man ſpareth nothing ſo as he may purchaſe the fulfilling of his appetites, how vnruly ſoeuer they be, he looſeth by infirmitie or other vnhappie accidents, his owne bodie, for whoſe pleaſures he ſo earneſtly trauelled. For ſo it is writtē of *Epicurus*, who being growne ful of ſicknes through his diſordinate life, died miſerably tormented with pains & griefes: the like wherof we may daily ſee in many, if we conſider their life and end. In reſpect hereof, ſome wiſe men haue thought that pleaſures are not in any wiſe to be accounted among the goods that are requiſite for the attaining of humane felicitie: and *Antiſthenes* ſo hated them, that he wiſhed he might rather become mad, then to be ouer maſtered by his ſenſuall delight. And in very deed they are no otherwiſe to be eſteemed then mad men, who ſet their delights and pleaſures before them as their end, not caring what they do, ſo as they may compaſſe the ſame. *Plato* therfore not without good cauſe ſaid, that pleaſure was the baite which allured men to all euil. And *Architas* the Tarentine was of opinion, that the peſtilence was a leſſer euill among men then pleaſure of the bodie: from whence came trecheries, and betraying of countries, deſtructions of common-weales, murders, rapes, adulteries, and all other euils, euen as from a ſpring or fountain. The cauſe whereof *Pythagoras* deſiring to find out, ſaid, that delight firſt crept into cities, then ſatietie, next violence, and laſtly the ruine and ouerthrow of the Common-wealth. And to this opinion *Tullie* in his firſt booke of Lawes ſeemeth to leane, where he ſayth, that this counterfetter of goodneſſe, and mother of all euils (meaning pleaſure) intruding her ſelfe into our ſenſes, ſuffered vs not to diſcerne thoſe goods which are naturall and true goods indeed, and cary not with them ſuch a ſcabbe and itch,

itch, which pleaſure euermore hath about her; who finally is the roote of thoſe principall paſſions, from which (as from the maine roote) all the reſt do ſpring, as hope and feare, ſorrow and gladneſſe. For we receiue not any pleaſure, but that ſome moleſtation hath opened the way for it into our mindes: as no man taketh pleaſure to eate vntill the moleſtation of hunger call him thereunto, nor yet to drinke, if the annoyance of thirſt go not before: to ſhew that the vnnobleſt and baſeſt power of the minde muſt miniſter vnto vs the matter of thoſe pleaſures which we ſeek. And as we haue ſaid that moleſtation goeth before vaine and vnruly delight, ſo doth diſpleaſure and griefe follow, as if it ſhould finally reſolue into his firſt principle and beginning. The feare whereof diminiſheth part of the hope a man might haue to liue ſtil contented, & diſturbeth the ioy which he feeleth in his vnruly pleaſures and delights. But to thoſe pleaſures and delights which accompany vertue, which are pleaſures of ſuch a kind as they neuer carry with them any diſpleaſure or annoyance at all: wheras the other that are vnruly, beginne with pleaſure and end with bitter paine. And this moued *Ariſtotle* to ſay, that the right iudgment of thoſe pleaſures is to be made at their farewell, not at their comming; for that they leaue behind them euermore ſadnes and repentance. So ſaid *Theocritus*, that he that ſtroue to fulfill his pleaſures and delights, prepared to himſelf matter of perpetual griefe and ſorow. There was a Sophiſt called *Ileus*, who though he had ſpent his youth wantonly in pleaſures, yet he ſo called himſelfe home when he was come to riper yeeres, that he neuer after ſuffered any vaine delights to tickle him, neither beauty of women, nor ſweetnes of meates, nor any other ſuch pleaſures to draw him from a ſober and temperate life. To which ſobrietie and

temperance of life *Licurgus* being deſirous to draw the *Lacedemonians*, by his lawes he forbad them all thoſe things that might turne their minds frō manly thoughts, and make them ſoft and effeminate: for he ſaid, that wanton pleaſures were the flatterers of the mind. And as flatterers by their deuices and arts, draw men that giue eare vnto them beſides themſelues, as hath bin already declared: ſo pleaſures through their ſweetneſſe corrupt the ſenſes, together with the mind to whom they are the miniſters. And *Ageſilaus* being once asked what good the lawes of *Lycurgus* had done to *Sparta*: Marry (ſayd he) they haue brought our men to deſpiſe thoſe delights which might haue made them to be no men. There are ſo many wiſe and graue ſayings to this purpoſe, that to repeate them all, the day would be too ſhort. It may therefore ſuffice what is already ſayed, and confirmed by the cōſent of all the wiſe mē in the world, to ſhew you manifeſtly, that the true & proper end of man is not to be atchieued by this ſenſual kind of life. And ſince that which is truly proper to any thing, cannot be common with any other (as to laugh is ſo proper to man, as no other creature can laugh but he) and pleaſure is common to other creatures beſides man, therefore it cannot in any wiſe be proper to him.

It cannot be gainſaid with any reaſon (ſaid my Lord Primate) and therefore no doubt but euery man ought to apply himſelfe to follow that which is moſt proper to his owne nature; for that is his beſt: and pittie it is, and maruell eke, to ſee ſuch numbers, that neither for loue of vertue, nor feare of God, will frame themſelues to a good and comendable courſe of life, but follow their vaine delights and pleaſures inſatiably.

Pittie indeed it is (ſaid I) but no great maruell, becauſe perfect

perfect iudgements are rare; and many there be, who though they know the truth of things, yet ſuffer themſelues to be caried away with apparances. For their delight propoſing to them certaine figures or images of what is good and faire, they are content to be deceiued, and to become bondſlaues to their ſenſes, or rather charmed by them, as by ſome witch or inchantreſſe, and by them to be guided. But this notwithſtanding I muſt aduertiſe you, that I haue not ſo abſolutely ſpoken againſt pleaſures, that you ſhould therefore inferre that vertues ſhould be without their pleaſures alſo. For albeit pleaſure be not vertue, nor yet mans true good, yet doth it follow vertue, euen as the ſhadow followeth the bodie. And though vertues haue difficulties and trauels before they be gotten; yet when they are gotten, pleaſure is the inſeparable companion vnto them; not ſuch as keepeth company with laſciuious and wanton affections, and is ſoone conuerted to griefe and repentance, but a delight that is permanent and ſtable: inſomuch as ſome of very good iudgement, haue thought there is no pleaſure worthy the name of delight, but that which proceedeth from vertue, and maketh our actions perfect. For this cauſe did *Ariſtotle* ſay, that moſt perfect was that delight which was comprehended by the moſt perfect part of the ſoule, which is the vnderſtanding. And this delight is ſo perfectly perfect in God, that he is far from any annoyance or moleſtation: for delight is not in God a paſſion, as in vs our delights are, which neuer come to vs without moleſtation, it being (as hath bin ſaid) the begining of them. Therfore the pleaſures of the mind are eſteemed ſo much the more perfect, as the vnderſtanding is more perfect then the ſenſe: which vnderſtanding delighteth onely in that pleaſure that is accompanied with honeſtie, and this

this pleaſure he eſteemed to be ſo excellēt, that he wiſhed ſome new excellent name to be found for the ſame. But we hauing no other name to giue it, call it by ſimilitude with that name which is fit for the delightfulleſt thing that the ſenſes can yeeld vs: and therefore we call as well the imperfect delight of the ſenſes, as that moſt perfect of the vnderſtanding, by the name of pleaſure, though the one of them conſiſt in extremes which is vicious, and the other in the meane where vertues haue their place.

Here Captaine *Norreis* ſpake, ſaying; We haue heard you ſundrie times ſay that vertues conſiſt in the meane betweene two extremes, but how that meane is to be found, you haue not yet declared to vs: therefore (I pray you) let vs be made acquainted with the way to compas the ſame, that we may learne to take hold of vertue, and not be deceiued with the falſe ſemblance thereof to fall into vice.

This meane (ſaid I) is found, when a man doth what he ought to do, when time ſerueth, in maner as he ſhould, for ſuch as becommeth him to do, and for cauſes honeſt and conuenient. And whoſoeuer ſetteth this rule to himſelfe in all his actions, which being ſo conditioned, ſhall be farre off from the extremes, and neere vnto vertue.

Yea (ſaid Captaine *Norreis*) this is ſoone ſaid, but not ſo ſoone done: for it is not ſo eaſie a matter to hitte vpon theſe conditions, but that a man may more eaſily miſſe them. But ſince by your words, neither delight alone, nor profit onely can worke humane felicitie, it ſhould ſeeme (the qualitie and trade of the world conſidered) that it may well be gathered, that they which haue them both linked together, are worthy to be eſteemed happie: ſince

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plenty of wealth may yeeld them all their deſires, and fulfill their delights. And this haply may be the cauſe why Kings and Princes are ſo accounted in this life.

Of the happineſſe or vnhappineſſe of Princes, this is no place to treate (ſaid I) neither appertaineth it to our matter: onely thus much I may remember by the way, that *Antigonus* affirmed it to be but a kind of pleaſing ſeruitude to be a King. And *Phalaris* the cruell tyrant conſidering wel his eſtate, ſaid likewiſe, that if he had knowne before he made himſelf tyrant of his country, what trouble, care and danger followed rule and Segnorie, he wold rather haue choſen any ſtate of life then to be a King. Neuertheleſſe no ſort of men place their felicitie more in pleaſure then Princes do, when they haue not due regard to their charge: for then they think that whatſoeuer may nouriſh their delight and pleaſure, is lawfull for them to do. But miſerable are the people ouer whom God hath ſet ſuch to raigne, as put their pleaſure or their profit only, before all reſpects, as the end of their gouernement: though Almightie God who is the King ouer Kings, oftentimes in his iuſtice plagueth them, euen with thoſe things wherein they placed their greateſt felicitie. *Dionyſius* the yonger being borne in wealth and plentie, ſetting all his thoughts vpon his pleaſures, was therefore in the end driuen out of his kingdome. For he thinking it lawfull for him to take all that he would haue, euen in his fathers life time began to defloure certain virgins of honeſt families: which thing his father vnderſtanding ſharpely reprehended him for the ſame; and among other things told him, that howſoeuer himſelfe had taken vpon him by tyrannie the kingdome of Sicilie, yet he neuer had vſed any ſuch violences. But his wanton ſonne made him this anſwer: It may well be (quoth he) for you were not

the ſonne of a King. At which word the father grieuing, replied vnto him; Neither art thou like to leaue thy ſonne a King, vnles thou change thy conditions. Which prognoſtication was verified, in that the ſonne following his lewd courſe of life, ſhortly after his fathers death was chaſed out his kingdom by his ſubiects, and driuen to get his liuing by keeping a ſchoole in Corinth: where on a time one ſeeing him liue ſo poorely, asked him what he had learned of his ſchoole-maſter *Plato*, that he could no better behaue himſelfe in his royaltie; taxing him that for not applying himſelf to *Plato* his doctrine, he had bin the cauſe of his owne ruine. But his anſwer was better then his former cariage, for he ſaid, that he had learned more then haply he could imagine. And what is that (quoth the other) I pray you teach it me. I haue (ſaid he) learned to beare this my aduerſe fortune patiently, & with a frank courage. And had he learned to obſerue that worthy ſentence of *Ageſilaus*, who was wont to ſay, that Kings and Princes ought to endeuor to exceed other mē in temperance & fortitude, and not in wantonnes & pleaſures, he had neuer brought his high eſtate to ſo baſe a fortune as to keepe a ſchoole. But omitting to ſpeake of Kings, I wil tel you that they are greatly deceiued that think that profite ioyned with delight may make men happie: for the more that profite and delight are knit together, the more doth wanton luſt and vnruly deſires ſwell and increaſe, if they be not tempered by the rule of reaſon. Which made *Ouid* to ſay,

From out the bowels of the earth is fet
That curſed pelfe, mens minds on ill to ſet.

And *Plato* in his books of lawes ſaith, that a very rich man is ſeldome ſeene very good. Which ſaying you know our Sauiour Chriſt confirmed, when he ſayed, it was harder

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for a rich man to enter the kingdom of heauen, then a cable to paſſe through a needles eye. And though *Ariſtotle* in one place ſayth, that riches are neceſſary to make vp a perfect humane felicitie: yet in another he calleth them but a fooliſh happineſſe. Yea *Plato* affirmeth, that great riches are as harmeful in a citie as great pouertie, by reaſon of the deliciouſnes & wantonnes which they breed. For which reaſons it may be very wel concluded, that neither wealth nor pleaſure, nor yet they both together, ought to draw any man to propoſe them to himſelfe for his end: but the more he hath of wealth, and vſeth it but for his pleaſure, the further he goeth aſtray from his felicitie and his proper end. And that riches in a wanton laſciuious mans poſſeſſion, are like a ſword in a mad mans hand. *Pythagoras* ſaid, that as a horſe cannot be ruled without a bit: ſo riches are hardly wel vſed without prudēce, which wil in no wiſe dwell with them, who abādon themſelues wholy to vaine delights. If to the vulgar ſort therefore ſuch men ſeeme happie, yet are they in very truth moſt miſerable and vnhappie. For theſe diſordinate pleaſures are inteſtine enemies, which neuer ceaſe working til they ouerthrow a man, and breed him diſhonour and ſhame: neither do they faile to bring him to an euill end, that ſuffers them to maſter him, and vſeth hs wealth to the pleaſing of his appetites. As by *Dionyſius* aforeſayd may appeere, and alſo by *Sardanapalus*, who being a mightie Monarke, ſwimming in wealth and pleaſures, and ſparing nothing that might glut his laſciuious appetites, grew ſo effeminate thereby, that as ſoone as he was aſſaulted by contrary fortune, he was driuen to conſume himſelfe, his treaſure, and all his filthy luſtes at once in the fire. Which two examples among infinite moe that might be mentioned, ſhall for this time ſuffice to verifie that which hath

bin ſaid, to wit, that Gods iudgements light for the moſt part vpon ſuch Princes, as, forgetting the great care and charge which is layd vpon them, giue themſelues to care for nothing but their owne vaine appetites and delights. To whō *Antiſthenes* ſpake, when he ſaid, that riches were no goods if they were not accompanied with vertue that might inſtruct men how to vſe them well. And *Chilo* the *Lacedemonian* likewiſe, who was the firſt author of that graue ſentence, *Magiſtratus virum indicat*, whereunto he added riches alſo, becauſe they both together draw him the more eaſily to diſcouer himſelfe. *Socrates* wiſely wiſhed that he might haue the grace to eſteem no man rich but him that was giuen to the ſtudie of wiſedome and knowledge: for ſuch (he ſaid) had the true gold, which is vertue, a thing much more precious then all the golde in the whole world, and that which leadeth man the right way to his felicitie.

Then, ſaid Captaine *Norreis*, ſince by your diſcourſe, all they are vnhappie that tread the ſteps which leade to either of thoſe two ends before mentioned of profite or pleaſure; or to them both ioined together: it muſt of force follow, that happy be they that direct their actions to that end which is proper to man, whereof I hope your next ſpeech will be.

So muſt it (ſaid I) for there remaineth nothing elſe to be treated of. And if mine author miſtruſted his eloquēce (as he doth) in a matter meete to be ſet forth ſo effectually as this; what may I ſay of my ſelfe, that am tied to declare to you in our lāguage, inferior much to the *Italian*, al that he hath ſet downe touching the ſame? Sure it is, that if I were able to ſet before the eyes of your mindes a liuely image of this excellent end, you wold be ſo delighted therewith that in regard thereof you would contemne and ſet light

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by all other pleaſures in the world. But howſoeuer my vtterance be, which I will do my beſt to fit as wel as I can to ſo high a ſubiect, you ſhall heare what he in ſubſtance ſaith therupon; and I aſſure my ſelf that the quality of the matter will eaſily ſupply whatſoeuer defect you may find in my phraſe or maner of ſpeech. You are therefore to vnderſtand, that as they whoſe iudgements are corrupted, and minds informed with an il habite, to make them liue after the maner before mentioned, do ſwarue frō the nature of man ſo much, as they become like brute beaſts or inſenſible plants voide of reaſon: euen ſo are they among men, as diuine creatures, who apply themſelues to liue according to reaſon. And ſuch haue aunciently bin called *Heroes*, becauſe they approched in their actions neerer to God then others that liued not ſo. For they put all their endeuours to adorne and ſet foorth that part of man which maketh him like vnto the diuine nature, or rather partaker of the ſame; teacheth him what is good, comely, honeſt, and honorable; and inuiteth him continually to that which may conduct him to the higheſt and ſupreme good. This part is the minde, with the vſe of reaſon proceeding from it, as from a roote. But becauſe two ſpeciall offices appertaine to the vſe of reaſon (ſo farre foorth as ſerueth to this purpoſe) the one contemplation, and the other action. Touching the firſt, it raiſeth vs by the means of Arts and ſciences (which purge the minde from baſe and corrupt affections) to the knowledge of thoſe things that are vnchangeable, and ſtill remaine the ſame, howſoeuer the heauens turne, time runne on, or fortune or any other cauſe rule things ſubiect vnto them. By means of which ſciences, the minde climbing by degrees vp to the eternall cauſes, conſidereth the order & maner wherewith things are knit together, & linked in a perpetual bād.

And thence it comprehendeth the forme of regiment, which the Creator and mouer of all things vſeth in the maintaining and keeping them euerlaſtingly in their ſeuerall offices and duties. And out of the conſideration hereof we learne, that he that directeth not his courſe of gouernment by this rule, as neere as he can, to guide himſelfe, his family, and the Common-wealth, can ſeldome or neuer attaine a good and happie end. Wherefore he draweth the celeſtiall gouernement to the vſe of humane and ciuill things, ſo farre as mans frailtie will permit. As *Socrates* did, who was ſaid to haue drawne Philoſophie from heauen to the earth, to reforme the life and mãners of men. Thus turning himſelfe to the knowledge of his owne nature, and finding that he is compoſed of three ſeuerall natures, whereof ech hath her ſeuerall end, yet ſeeketh he to draw the ends of the two leſſe perfect, to the end of that which is moſt perfect and proper to him. But finding that continuall contemplation of higher things, would be profitable onely to himſelf and to none other, in that he ſhould thereby purchaſe no happineſſe to any but to himſelfe. And becauſe he knoweth that he is not borne to himſelfe alone, but to ciuill ſocietie and conuerſation, and to the good of others as well as of himſelfe, he therefore doth his endeuour with all care and diligence ſo to cary himſelfe in words and in deeds, as he might be a patterne and example to others of ſeemly and vertuous ſpeeches and honeſt actions, and do them all the good he could in reducing them to a good and commendable forme of life. For the performance whereof, he perceiueth how requiſite it is, that honeſtie and vertue be ſo vnited with profite and pleaſure, that by a iuſt and equall temper of them, both himſelfe and others may attaine that end which is the *ſummum bonum*, and the thing where-

wherupon all our diſcourſe hath bin grounded. This end is not to be attained but by the meanes of morall vertues, which are the perfection of the minde, & ſetled habits in ruling the appetite which ariſeth out of the vnreaſonable parts of the ſoule: for vertues are grounded in thoſe parts which are without reaſon, but yet are apt to be ruled by reaſon. He therefore ſeeing morall vertues are not gotten by knowing onely what they be, but through the long practiſe of many vertuous operations, whereby they faſten themſelues ſo to the mind, as being conuerted once into an habite, it is very hard afterwards to loſe the ſame: euen as of vicious actions on the other ſide the like enſueth: therefore with all carefulneſſe and diligence poſſible he laboreth to embrace the one, and to eſchue the other; euermore ſtriuing to hold himſelfe in the meane, and to auoide the approching of the extremes: to which, profite and delight vnder deceitful maskes of good, would entiſe and allure him.

I pray you (ſaid Captain *Norreis*) tel vs (ſince you ſay that vertue is in the mids betweene two extremes) whether that meane you ſpeake of, wherin vertue ſits, be ſo equally in the midſt, as the extremes which be vicious, be alike diſtant from the ſame or no?

No (ſaid I) they are not in that manner equidiſtant, for oftentimes vertue approcheth neerer to one of the extremes, then to the other. As for example, Fortitude, which conſiſteth in a meane betweene fearefulneſſe and foole-hardineſſe, hath yet a neerer reſemblance to foole-hardineſſe then to cowardiſe, and conſequently is not alike diſtant from them both, and is in this manner to be vnderſtood, that albeit vertue conſiſt in a meane betweene two extremes, whereof the one is a defect, and the other a ſuperabundance, yet ſhe is neither of them both, as by

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our example of Fortitude appeereth, which is neither foole-hardines, nor yet cowardiſe, but onely a commendable meane or temper betweene them both. And therfore *Ariſtotle* ſaid right well that the meane of vertue betweene two extremes, was a *Geometricall* meane which hath a reſpect to proportion, and not an *Arithmeticall* meane which reſpecteth equall diſtance: ſo as you muſt vnderſtand that vertue is not called a meane betweene two extremes, becauſe ſhe participateth of either of them both, but becauſe ſhe is neither the one nor the other.

And why (ſaid Captaine *Norreis*) is the *Geometricall* proportion rather to be obſerued therein, then the *Arithmeticall?*

Becauſe (ſaid I) though vertues are in the meane, yet do they bend oftentimes towards one of the extremes more then to the other, as hath bin ſaid already: and by proportion *Geometricall* they are in the middeſt, which by *Arithmeticall* would not be ſo. For thereby they muſt be in the iuſt middeſt, and equally diſtant from both the extremes. As for example, let vs ſuppoſe 6. to be the meane betweene 4. and 8; for 6. hath two more then 4, and ſo hath it two leſſe then 8, and in reſpect of it ſelfe ſtandeth iuſt in the midſt betweene 4. and 8, and equally diſtant from them both. And this is your *Arithmetical* meane. But the *Geometrical* proportiō is after another maner. For ſuppoſe 2. and 8. to be the extremes, and 4. to be the mean: here you ſee that 2. & 4. haue a double proportion, and ſo hath 4. and 8. the one to the other, and ſo 4. participateth of that double proportion as well with 8. as with 2, and yet is neerer to 2. then to 8; which it doth likewiſe in another reſpect: for if the two extremes be multiplied together, as 2. with 8. they make 16: and ſo much

much doth 4. likewiſe being multiplied in it ſelf, for foure times 4. makes 16. And thus you ſee what difference is betweene *Geometricall* and *Arithmeticall* proportion. Now though euery vertue haue peculiar extremes betweene which it is placed: yet Philoſophers ſay, that they conſiſt all generally about matter of pleaſure, or the contrary.

How can that be (ſaid M. *Dormer*) when you haue told vs already, that vertue is not pleaſure?

It is (ſaid I) one thing to ſay vertue is pleaſure, and an other to ſay that it conſiſteth in matter of pleaſure or annoyance. And true it is that pleaſure is not the matter of vertue, neither meant I ſo to ſay; but onely that vertue is buſied about theſe two paſſions of pleaſure and diſpleaſure, whereof the fitteſt example may be taken from temperance. For as the temperate man embraceth the delight of the mind, ſo taketh he pleaſure to abſtaine from the vnſeemely delights of the body. And contrariwiſe, the intemperate man is ſad, becauſe he hath them not.

Well (ſaid M. *Dormer*) that matter is ſoone anſwered: but becauſe I haue heard the Stoikes were of opinion, that vertue was true felicitie, and that *Plotinus* ſaid, that a man endued with vertue was ſufficiētly furniſhed for his felicitie, as being poſſeſſed of all the good that could be among men, I pray you what is your authors opinion in that point?

If I well remember (quoth I) it is a good while ſithens I told you that mans felicitie is attained by vertue; but that vertue is his felicitie, that ſaith not mine author. And ſure the opinion of *Ariſtotle* is better in that matter then that of the Stoikes. For reaſon it ſelfe telleth vs that thoſe things which are ordained to an end, cannot be the end it ſelfe to which they be ordained. And ſince vertues are

ordained for the attaining of mans felicitie, which is (as hath bin ſayd) a perfect action according to vertue in a perfect life. It is plaine, that vertue cannot be felicitie, though he that is vertuous approcheth neere to his felicitie.

You ſay true (ſayd M. *Dormer:*) I remember you expounded the clauſe of a perfect life to be intended a long life, yet the ſame Stoikes held that a yong man might be happie: alledging felicitie was not to be meaſured by quantitie, but by qualitie; and that not length of time, but perfection onely is to be reſpected, which (they ſay) may be as well in a yong man as in an old. And they giue the example of hunger and thirſt: for ſuppoſe (ſay they) that two hungry or thirſtie folke be called to eate or to drink, and the one to aſſwage his hunger or thirſt be ſatisfied with a little, and the other require much meate or drink to be ſatiated, yet is he as well ſatisfied with the little whoſe nature requireth little, as he that requireth a great deale: euen ſo (ſay they) in humane felicitie, the length of time or number of yeeres is not to be reſpected, but happineſſe it ſelfe; and as happie is the young man who in a few yeeres hath attained his felicitie, as the olde man that hath bin many yeeres about it. For *Plotinus* ſaith, that the happie man cannot reckon vpon the yeeres paſt of his felicitie, but onely on the preſent.

The Stoikes held ſtrange opinions (ſayd I) in many things. But if experience be needfull (as hath bin formerly ſayd) and many actions, to make an habite in vertue, ſo as a man may by cuſtome be brought to that paſſe as he ſhall not do any thing but according to vertue, then is length of life neceſſary for the attaining of vertue, which muſt firſt be gotten before a man can hope for any felicitie. Moreouer, if Prudence be the very knot and band

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of all the morall vertues, and that the young man cannot be prudent, how can he then haue perfect vertue? Wherfore the diffinitiō of humane felicitie to be a perfect operation according to vertue, hath need of this addition in a perfect life, which muſt be long and haue a happie end. For though a man haue runne through many yeeres in continuall proſperitie, and afterwards fall into grieuous calamitie, though he cannot be thereby made miſerable (which vice onely and not aduerſitie may bring him vnto) yet may he not be rightly intitled happie. Youth therfore hath this defect in it, that albeit man be the ſubiect of felicitie, yet a yong man cannot be properly and actually the ſubiect thereof, and the child much leſſe, becauſe he is furder off from prudence, and becauſe neither of them can haue either perfect life or perfect vertue. And as for the opinion of *Plotinus*, he (as a *Platonike*) conſidered the ſoule ſimple and pure, freed from the other two powers that are rebellious to reaſon: and meant him onely to be happie, who ſeparating the vertues of the mind from the ſenſes, from worldly delights and concupiſcences, did ſo interne himſelfe with his thoughts in the contemplation of his Creator, as he deſpiſeth riches, dignities, and honors, with all tranſitorie and fraile commodities: ſtill looking to that good which is the higheſt and perfecteſt among all goods, which is God Omnipotent. And this he called the chiefe action of the vnderſtanding, and higheſt felicitie. And becauſe he ſuppoſed that the mind ſhould neuer depart from that action, he ſayd that the time paſt was not to be accounted of in mans felicitie. By which it may appeere, that he ſpake not in that place of humane or ciuil felicitie, wherof our diſcourſe is now according to *Ariſtotles* opinion, neither doth the authoritie of *Plotinus* help the Stoikes any whit at al, whoſe opinion

is in that point to be reiected.

Since we are resolued (said Capt. *Carleil*) that vertues are but the meane to purchase felicitie, and not felicitie it selfe, we would be glad to heare you declare how many they are, and of what qualitie, that we may know them, and make our selues happie by the purchase of them.

To answer you to this question (said I) according as I find the matter set downe by mine author, wold perhaps not satisfie you so fully as you would desire, or I could wish: for that (in my opinion) he hath treated of some of these morall vertues somewhat too briefly, and confusedly: I haue therefore to helpe mine owne vnderstanding had recourse to *Picolomini* when I came to this place, in whom hauing found a more plaine and easie method in the description of them, I haue for the more perspicuitie of the translation, added somewhat taken frō him, and (as well as I could) interlaced it with this discourse, where mine author seemed to me too brief, or too obscure. And if it may worke the same effect in you, that it hath done in me, to make you the better vnderstand how many and of what qualitie those vertues are, I hope you will not mislike my attempt therein, but excuse me, though it be not so fully accomplished as I desire it were. There are then by the generall consent of all men foure principall vertues appertaining to ciuill life, which are, Fortitude, Temperance, Iustice, and Prudence; from which foure are also deriued (as branches frō their trees) sundry others to make vp the number of twelue, and they are these ensuing, Liberalitie, Magnificence, Magnanimitie, Mansuetude, Desire of honor, Veritie, Affability, and Vrbanitie: of euery of the which vertues, I will speake particularly, following chiefly mine author; but where need or occasion shall require, I wil for the cleerer vnderstanding

ſtanding of the matter, ſupply out of *Picolomini* what I think is wanting. And to begin firſt with Fortitude. This vertue ſtandeth in the meane betweene foole-hardineſſe and cowardiſe; which two paſſions may iuſtly be termed matter of Fortitude: and this vertue is exerciſed in things terrible and fearful, which are alſo difficult, cauſing griefe and paine, which the valiant man is willing to endure for vertues ſake. For though his life be deere vnto him, as it ought to be to euery man of vertue, in reſpect of himſelf, of his friends, and of his countrey; and will not therefore vpon ſmall occaſions expoſe himſelfe to perill: yet when time and occaſion require it, and that any honeſt cauſe call him thereunto, he will vndertake cheerfully whatſoeuer dangerous enterpriſe, and with a ſtout courage, and readily performe the ſame. Neither ſhall labour or trauel, hazard, nor death it ſelf diſmay him; but eſteeming more his reputatiō then his life, he wil reſolutely aduenter him ſelf for honeſties ſake. But among all the actions of Fortitude, to fight for our countrey, and (if need be) to die for defence of the ſame, deſerueth the greateſt praiſe & commendation: as on the other ſide, to quarrel, & put a mans life in danger vpon euery trifling occaſion, is not the part of a valiant man, but of a foole-hardy. *Cato* the elder therfore ſaid very wel, that to know a valiant man, it imported much, to vnderſtand whether he made more account of his life or of his vertue, becauſe not the aptnes to quarrell for euery occaſion, but the venturing his life for vertue & honeſtie maketh a man to be accounted valiāt among wiſe mē, who hold ſuch men to be fools & miſerable that thruſt thēſelues raſhly into quarels, as many do, through the corruptiō of our age, vpō fantaſticall points of honor, as if they were weary of their liues. Neuertheles there are ſome kindes of death, which a vertuous man abhorreth,

as to die by tempeſt at ſea, by thunder, by earthquake, and ſuch other violent deaths where vertue cã haue no place. All which deaths, though they cannot diſmay a vertuous mind, yet he cãnot but be ſory that he is brought to ſuch an end, as affoordeth him no meanes to make of his valor. There be ſundry vices which haue a reſemblance of this vertue: but becauſe we haue in our firſt dayes diſcourſe ſpokẽ of them ſufficiẽtly, we ſhal not need at this time to ſay any more cõcerning the ſame. It is alſo to be conſidered, that this is a vertue as wel of the body as of the mind: for to the exerciſe of fortitude, a man muſt haue a ſtrong body, & of a good complexion, his lims wel framed, and thereto a ſtout and a conſtant mind fitly coupled, that it may rule and guide the body prudently. For (as *Iſocrates* ſayd to *Demonicus*) vnleſſe ſtrength of body be matched with wiſedom, it is doubtles harmfull to him that hath it. The mind muſt be ſo diſpoſed & armed againſt fortune, be ſhe froward or fauorable, it may ſtand alwayes inuincible againſt all misfortunes and aduerſities, and yet not raiſe it ſelfe for proſperous ſucceſſes. For it is as true a token of a baſe mind to be proud & inſolent in proſperitie, as to be daunted and faint-hearted in aduerſitie and affliction. Amid which afflictions, that part of Fortitude which is called patience hath place, of which *Plato* hath written largely, and among other things this he ſayth, that the valiant man hath gotten ſuch a habit in his mind of Fortitude, that amid pleaſures or amid calamities, he is alwayes the ſame man; reſiſting the aſſaults of fortune with the vertue of his minde. But the Chriſtian writers haue much more extolled this vertue then any other; yet *Ariſtotle* toucheth it, where he ſayth, that the vertue of Fortitude is cleerly diſcerned by the voluntary enduring of grieuous accidents, which in effect is that ſame habite

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whch we call patience. *Alexander Mamea* (as *Herodian* reporteth) was wont to ſay, that valiant men, and modeſt or temperate men, ought to wiſh for proſperous eſtate: but that if things fall out contrary to their deſire, they are to beare them with an inuincible courage. And *Plotinus* defining the ſayd vertue, ſayd that it was a habite of the mind, which was not ſubiect to paſſions: as in another place he deſcribeth the valiant man to be he, that is not moued from the vertuous habit of his mind, neither by pleaſing or delightfull accidents, nor yet by grieuous or diſpleaſant; yea he ſo abhorred that a man ſhould be maſtered by happie or vnhappie accidents, that he ſticked not to affirme, that from this baſenes of mind proceeded that opinion which wold take from vs our free election. For their cowardiſe, who ſuffer themſelues to be ouercome by ſuch paſſions, perſwades them that ſuch things happen of neceſſitie, and through the immutable order of things: and ſo they make themſelues wittingly ſlaues where they were free, wanting either will or power to vſe that libertie of their mind, either in the one fortune or in the other. For who ſo is armed with true fortitude, outward things whatſoeuer they be, neither giue nor take ought frō thē. But they that cānot temper themſelues in proſperitie, nor beare aduerſitie ſtoutly, make it apparant that fortune maſtreth them. Whereunto S. *Ambroſe* alluding, ſaith to *Simplician*, that vertuous men become neither greater nor meaner by the change of mortall ſucceſſes, becauſe by this vertue they ouercome both fortunes. Such a man was *Socrates*, whoſe wife ſayd of him, that whatſoeuer had befallen him, he neuer came home but with one and the ſelfe ſame countenance, neuer altered or changed. To the ſame effect *Seneca* ſayd, that a wel diſpoſed minde holdeth euermore one courſe howſoeuer the

the world fare; whether fortune beſtow her gifts plentifully vpon him, or frowardly take them away. For the valiant man neuer grieueth at any thing that happeneth in this life to other men, Fortitude being a ſure ſhield for humane weakneſſe, which maketh all the darts of fortune how ſharpe ſoeuer they be, to turne point againe, without once ſo much as raſing, much leſſe entring thereinto. There is nothing in the world that ought to be more deere to a man then his children, who are his true and liuely images, and after a ſort the miniſters of his immortalitie: wherefore the loſſe of them (eſpecially when they are vertuous) ſhould of all other things be moſt grieuous vnto him. Neuertheleſſe *Anaxagoras* when newes was brought him that his onely ſonne was dead, anſwered the meſſenger, It is no new thing that thou telleſt me, for I hauing begotten him, know right wel that he was mortall. So well had Philoſophie taught him to beare the freakes of fortune, and armed his minde in ſuch ſort, as it could not be ſurpriſed with any ſudden paſſion. Our very birth hath death faſtened vnto it: therefore the Poet ſayd right well:

Whiles borne we are we die, ſo that our ending
From our firſt being taketh his beginning.

And to conclude touching this vertue, we muſt haue ſuch an habit thereof in our mindes, and ſo accompany the ſame with Prudence, as Fortune either good or bad may not preuaile againſt vs; neuer thinking our victorie ouer her aſſured, vntil we haue cleane daunted and beaten her downe. *Carneades* in this behalfe aduiſed wel, that in time of proſperitie we ſhould forethinke ſome aduerſities, and ſuppoſe them to be already fallen vpon vs, whereby we might be the better prepared in minde to beare them if they came indeed. And *Zeno* when he receiued

ceiued aduertiſement that a ſhippe wherein he had great wealth was wracked and caſt away, ſhewed himſelf farre from being grieued thereat: for he thanked fortune, that by taking againe thoſe goods which ſhe had giuen him, he had gotten ſo good an occaſion to forſake the care of inriching himſelf temporally, & to betake himſelf wholy to the ſtudy of Philoſophie.

Next followeth the vertue of Temperance, whoſe ſubiect is that power of the ſoule whence cometh the *concupiſcible* appetite; and ſhe is exerciſed ſpecially about the ſenſes of taſting and feeling, but chiefly about the wanton luſts of the fleſh: for though the taſt ill vſed, be a cauſe of intemperance, yet is it by the meane of the ſenſe of feeling. In which reſpect it may be ſaid, that the diſordinate luſt of the body that maketh men intemperate, is in the ſenſe of feeling, not ouer all the body, but only in thoſe parts which ſerue for thoſe delights. And they being moſt mightie, are by temperance to be reſtrained with the bridle of modeſtie, and kept within due termes. For which cauſe *Plato* called her the gardien or ſafe keeper of all humane vertues. For ſhe with ſober and aduiſed language telleth vs, that nothing is comely that is not honeſt, nor nothing honeſt that is not comely: far from the diſordinate appetites perſwaſion, which ſayth, whatſoeuer pleaſeth is lawful, and that all is lawful that pleaſeth. But Temperance with her wholeſome aduertiſements withdraweth vs from all that is vnfitting or vndecent, if we giue eare vnto her. Which vndecency or vnfittingnes cometh neither from the ſenſes of ſeeing, nor yet of hearing or ſmelling. For men by delighting beyond meaſure in the obiects of thoſe ſenſes, are not called Intemperate, but runne into other leſſer defects, not needful here to be ſpoken of. But Intemperance groweth principally (as

we haue ſaid) out of the taſt and the feeling, two ſenſes that make vs moſt like vnto brute beaſts, if we ſuffer our ſelues to be led by them, following our delights as they do: for they corrupt mans prudence, put his mind aſtray, & take away frō him the light of reaſon, which frō other creatures they cannot take. I remember that among the Grecians it was reported, how vnder the images of *Anacarſis* a moſt continent Philoſopher was euer written, that temperance was to be vſed in the tongue, in the belly, & in the priuie parts, thereby giuing vs to vnderſtand in which ſenſes principally Temperance ſhould be vſed. And though all other creatures haue their exterior ſenſes as well as man, yet none take delight in them, but accidentally. For the hound delighteth not in the ſent of the hare, but inſomuch as he hopeth to feede vpon her: nor the wolfe delighteth in the bleating of a Lambe, but as he intendeth to deuoure it: neither doth the ſight of a bullock pleaſe the Lion for any reſpect, but that he expecteth to ſlake his hunger on the carcaſſe of it. All their principall delight is in the taſt and in the feeling: and becauſe they haue nō light of reaſon, but are guided onely by naturall inſtinct, therefore they are not called temperate or intemperate, as hauing no free choice, which proceedeth from reaſon onely. But men who haue the gift of the mind from God, and are capable by their iudgement to diſcerne and chuſe what is good, and to eſchue what is euill, vnles they be miſled by their appetite, deſerue, when they chuſe that which is iuſt and reaſonable, to be called temperate. And to ſuch men *Plotinus* was wont to ſay, that delight of the ſenſes was giuen for a refreſhing and lightning of the heauy burthen of cares and troubles, which this mortall life bringeth vpon vs. Shewing thereby that ſuch delights are not in themſelues euil,

but

but onely when they be ill vſed. Which thing *Ariſtotle* before him ſignified, when he ſayd, that euery man was not to be called intemperate, that ſought for ſome pleaſure; but that to ſuch only, as hunted after diſhoneſt and vnlawfull delights, that name was to be applied: for honeſt delights for recreation of the mind are not to be diſallowed; ioyning therein with *Anacarſis*, who ſayd, that the continuance of trauell, without intermiſſion, was a thing impoſſible: wherefore it was requiſite for men ſometime to ſport themſelues, that they might returne the freſher to their honeſt labours. Whence *Ouid* tooke his verſes, ſaying,

Long cannot laſt the labour that doth want
An interchangeable repoſe ſome-while:
For it reſtores the forces languiſhant,
And doth refreſh the members ſpent with toile.

And *Cicero* the father and light of Romane eloquence, ſayth, that games and ſports were permitted for the refreſhing of the mind, euen as meate and drinke for the reſtoring of the body; eſpecially after the attending of graue and weightie affaires. But ſuch as haue made an ill habit, and ſuffered their iudgements to be corrupted, making choice of diſhoneſt delights to follow their ſenſes onely, are rightly called intemperate, becauſe they procure onely the pleaſures of the body, without regard of the mind. And they are ſo much worſe then incontinent men: as theſe feele yet ſometimes a remorſe of their ill actions, and thereby correct themſelues; whereas the other perſeuere in their ill choiſe (if we may properly cal that a choiſe which proceedeth from a corrupted iudgement) and care not to amend themſelues; and are like to a man full of dropſie: for their viciouſneſſe is as hopeleſſe of recouery, as is the dropſie when it is ful growne within

the body. And therfore they may well be accounted of a loſt life, who haue contracted ſo ill an habit, that they ſtill keepe reaſon ſubiect to their paſſions & appetites, which is called by *Plotinus* the infirmity of the mind. But where Temperance ruleth & bridleth the inordinate delights, it is not ſo: for this vertue which is the meane in all actions, and a ſeemlineſſe in all things appertaining to ciuill life, doth increaſe mans praiſe and cõmendations, multiplieth honor vpon him, lengtheneth his life, and lightneth the burthen of all his troubles: finally it ſo faſhioneth a man, as whether he be alone or in company, whether he be in publike or in priuat, he neuer vndertaketh any thing but that which carieth withall reputation, dignitie & honor. For it withholdeth him from all that is vnſeemly, and leadeth him to all that is honeſt and commendable. Neither is this vertue exerciſed only in things appertaining to the appetite, but (as *Ariſtotle* ſaith) ſhe is the conſeruer of prudence: and by *Plato* his opinion, ſhe ſtretcheth her power to thoſe actions that appertaine to Fortitude alſo. For ſhe teacheth man to know the meane of fearfulnes in caſes of danger apparant, & in what meaſure paine or trouble is to be endured. *Pythagoras* ſaid ſhe was the mean of al things: and therfore as the beauty of the body is a meet & ſeemly diſpoſition of the members, breeding grateful ſweetnes, and being tempered with freſh colours, draweth the eyes of men to behold it with wonder & delight: euen ſo this vertue cauſeth al the actions of a temperate man with her bright ſhining light to be admired and extolled; for ſhe is called by *Pythagoras* the rule of al decency & comelines. Of her hath youth more need (according to *Ariſtotle*) then old age, becauſe young men are much more ſtirred with concupiſcence and vnruly affections then old men. And the Philoſophers haue aſſigned her for companiõs, ſhamefaſtnes (which holdeth men from doing any filthy act)

act) honeſtie, abſtinence, continency (which bridleth the concupiſcible paſſions that they ouer-rule not the will) manſuetude or mildnes (which tempereth the fury of anger) modeſtie (which is the rule of decent motions of the body) and to be ſhort, al thoſe gifts of the mind which accompany ſeemlines and decency, of which we ſhal particularly ſay ſomewhat as briefly as we may. And becauſe this vertue ſtretcheth her branches ſo far, *Plato* ſaid it was hard to define her, and more hard to vſe her: the one becauſe ſhe is hardly diſcerned frō other vertues: the other, becauſe we bring with vs frō our mothers wōb the deſire of delight, wherby we are noriſhed, grow, & draw out the line of our life: for which cauſe *Ariſt.* ſaid, that it was harder for a mā to reſiſt the pleaſures of the body, then pain.

Next followes the excellent vertue of Liberality, which is buſied about giuing and receiuing conueniently, and is placed between two extremes; the one Auarice, which taketh more or giueth leſſe then is meet: the other Prodigalitie, which giues more then is conuenient: and he that can cary himſelf euen between theſe two extremes, may iuſtly be called a liberall man; giuing where, whē, to ſuch perſons, and in ſuch ſort as is fit, for reſpect of honeſtie. Vnto liberality is ioyned magnificence, which is a vertue concerning riches alſo; which the magnificall man vſeth in great things, and ſuch as are to haue long continuance, & are done in reſpect of vertue, as ſumptuous buildings, rich furnitures, and the like: therfore a poore man cannot actually attaine to be either magnificent or liberal. The liberall man is not magnificent, becauſe magnificence is more then liberalitie: but the magnificent man is liberal.

Arme in arme with Magnificence goeth Magnanimity, waited vpō by Manſuetude, deſire of honor, veritie, affablity & vrbanity. Al which vertues appertain to ciuil conuerſatiō, & are very profitable, breeding decēcy, honeſty,

dignitie and honour. And though honor be reckoned in the number of thoſe things that are called exterior goods yet is it highly to be priſed among all other, becauſe it is the certaine token of vertuous life, and is the due reward of vertue. For vertue hath two ſorts of rewards: the one that is outward, and that is honour (which cometh from others that honor vertue, and is not in the vertuous man himſelfe): the other inward, which is felicitie, the true and perfecteſt end of all our vertuous actions whiles we are aliue. And man hauing all theſe vertuous habits in him, gotten by continuall wel doing, which conſiſteth in particulars: he hath alſo need of the conuerſation of other men, leſt the occaſiō of doing vertuouſly ſhold faile him. For though a mā haue neuer ſo perfect a knowledge of al the vertues, vnles he put them in action, he can neuer be happie. And ſpecially therfore is friendſhip neceſſary for him, which either is a vertue, or faſt linked to vertue, and groweth out of the loue which men beare, firſt to their parents and kinſmen, next to their citizens or countrey-men, and laſtly to ſtrangers. For as concerning ciuill felicitie, man cannot, nor ought not to be alone: in which reſpect conuerſation and friendſhip are neceſſary for the accompliſhment of the ſame. Some therefore haue ſayd, that it were as hurtfull to take the bright ſhining beames of the Sunne from the world, as to depriue men of the benefite of friendſhip: ſince without friends, a man is ſo farre from being happie, as it may be ſaid, he cannot liue, or be at all. This friendſhip is a communion and knitting together of minds, which neither length of time, diſtance of place, great proſperitie, nor great aduerſitie, ne yet any other grieuous accident may ſeuer or ſeparate. And *Plotinus*, though all his drift were to raiſe man from all baſe affects of the mind, and to ſettle him in contemplation,

yet

yet he thought friendſhip neceſſary no leſſe for the mind then for the body. *Ariſtotle* ſayd, that he that liued alone could be none other then either a God or a brute beaſt. Solitarineſſe then is euill for all ſorts of men, but moſt of all for yong men, who wanting experience in themſelues, haue great neede of the good inſtructions and admonitions of others. Therefore *Crates* the Philoſopher ſeeing a yong man alone, went vnto him, & asked of him what he was doing ſo all alone: and the young man anſwering, that he was diſcourſing with himſelfe: take heed (ſaid *Crates* then) that thou talk not with an il man. Conſidering wiſely, that a man void of prudence (as yong mē commonly are) is like to buſie his head with ill thoughts, which will prouoke him to ill deeds alſo. Conuerſation therfore and friendſhip are neceſſary for the accompliſhment of ciuill felicitie, which without loue cannot be. And that friendſhip is firme and durable which groweth out of vertue, and from ſimilitude of behauiour and conditiōs. *Plato* ſaith, that beauty beareth the greateſt ſway in friendſhip, but that is the beauty of the mind, which vertue brings forth: but if to the beauty of the mind, that of the body alſo be ioyned, they both do the ſooner and the faſter tie together the minds of vertuous men. For the exterior beauty of the body prepareth the way to the knowledge of the other inward of the mind, which (as hath bin ſayd) is indeed the true man: but he that loueth but the body, loueth not the man, but that which nature hath giuen him for an inſtrument. And if this beauty of the bodie happen to draw any man to loue a foule or diſhoneſt mind, that loue cannot be termed rightly friendſhip, but a filthy and loathſome coniunction of two bodies, too much frequented by yong men with naughtie women, who are not onely vnworthy any loue, but ought of all

men:

men to be eſchued as abhominable, and driuen out of all well ordered Common-weales. This friendſhip tieth (though with diuers reſpects) children to their parents, kinred to kinred, the husband to the wife, and the minds of men of valour & vertue faſt together, as a thing agreeable to all the qualities which our ſoule containeth: but this friendſhip betweene men of valour and courage, ſpringeth from that faculty of the mind, whence cometh reaſonable anger, the heate whereof ſtirreth & inflameth the mindes of ſuch men to valour and fortitude. And though this friendſhip be good and commendable, yet is that more firme & permanent which groweth out of the that part of the mind which is garniſhed with reaſon and vertuous habits: for it bindeth mens minds ſo faſt together, and breedeth ſo firme a conſent in them, that they become as one; in ſo much as it ſeemeth that one mind dwelleth in two bodies to guide and rule them. Which made *Zeno* ſay that his friend was another himſelf. Now albeit we ſee dayly friendſhips to be broken off vpon ſleight occaſions, yet is that not to be imputed to any imperfection in the nature of friendſhip.

It is maruel (ſaid Captain *Carleil*) that friends ſhould ſo eaſily break the bonds of friendſhip, if they were ſo faſt knit as you haue ſayd: the cauſe whereof were worth the knowing.

That ſhall I declare vnto you (ſaid I:) Many apparances of friendſhip there are, which be as farre from true friendſhip, as the painted image of a man is from a man indeed: for ſome are friends for profit, ſome for pleaſure, and ſome for other reſpects: which reſpects failing, loue alſo quaileth; and ſo the foundation of friendſhip being gone, it muſt needs fall to the ground. Others firſt loue, and after beginne to iudge of the perſon: and when they find

find themſelues deceiued in their expectation whatſoeuer it were, they vntie the knot of friendſhip faſter then they haſted to knit the ſame before. But if iudgement leade the daunce, as it ought to do, and that a man chuſe to loue another, becauſe he eſteemeth him worthy for his vertues to be beloued; ſuch friendſhip is ſure and firme, neuer to be diſſolued, nay not ſo much as a miſlike can grow betweene ſuch friends. For *Ariſtotle* holdeth, that diſcord cannot poſſibly dwell together with friendſhip. All other friendſhips are ſubiect to quarrels & diſſentiõs, but eſpecially that which is grounded vpõ profit: wheras thoſe friends whom vertue coupleth together, as they haue but one wil, ſo haue they all things common, according to the lawes of *Pythagoras*. Which lawes *Plato* allowed, and *Ariſtotle* likewiſe, though in the communion of goods he were contrary to *Plato*, affirming that where all things were common, it was not poſſible that the commonwealth could ſtand. The ſtedfaſtneſſe of friendſhip therefore conſiſteth in the communion and equalitie of minds, betweene which neither anger, diſſention, nor ingratitude can grow; for true friends prouoke not one another with contention, anger or vnthankfulneſſe. And in regard hereof, the opinion of *Plato* was, that pleaſantnes and cheerfulneſſe was fitter among friends then grauitie or ſeueritie.

But I pray you (ſayd Captaine *Norreis*) tell vs whether this friendſhip you ſpeake of may be between many or no?

Sir (anſwered I) a man cannot in truth be friend to many at once, in this degree of friendſhip which we are treating of. For ſince the worker of this faſt friendſhip, is the likenes of minds and conditions. As there is a variety of faces infinite, inſomuch as it is a very rare thing

to find two altogether like the one to the other: ſo falleth it out likewiſe in minds: and the ſaying is, that one mind ruleth two bodies, and not mo; according to which ſaying, friendſhip cannot be in perfection betweene many. The reaſon wherof may be, that loue and true affection being the moſt excellent thing among the effects of friendſhip, and things excellent being rare, therfore true friendſhip is ſo rare, as not onely in our age, but alſo in all ages paſt, we find ſcarce two or three couples of friends to be recorded. Neither can a man indeed deuide his loue into many ſhares, without impairing it; nor giue like helpe, vſe like conuerſation, or do other friendly offices toward many, which are needfull, and required betweene two faſt friends, ſuch as we ſpeake of.

I cannot tell (ſayd ſir *Robert Dillon*) why you make friendſhip ſo rare a matter, when dayly example ſheweth vs, that there are many men who haue many friends. Let vs conſider priuatly or publikely our owne acquaintances, and we ſhall ſee ſo many kind offices of friendſhip ſtirring, as it may be thought, the auncient times brought forth men more ſauage & vnfit for amity; or elſe that our times are happier in that point then theirs. I remember yet that I haue read of *Epaminondas*, how he was wont to ſay, that a man ſhold not come home from the pallace vntill he had purchaſed ſome friends. The like is written of *Scipio* the yonger, who affirmed that the firmeſt and moſt profitable poſſeſſion that a man could haue in this world, was the hauing of many friends. Alſo the Emperour *Traian* was accuſtomed to ſay, that he accounted that day loſt wherein he had not gotten one friend.

All this (ſaid I) is true: but many are friends in name, who whē they be put to trial proue nothing ſo. And therfore was it ſaid, that there were many apparances & ſorts

of

of friendſhip, which properly are not to be eſteemed true friendſhip, but are rather to be termed ciuil beneuolence, or publike friendſhip; being a certaine generall loue, which the nature of man, and the communion of countries breedeth of it ſelfe. And this loue maketh one man courteous, gracious, and affable to another, if he degenerate not from his owne nature which hath framed him ſociable; it maketh him apt to help, and ready to defend, and to vſe all the offices of humanitie and beneuolence that become him towards all men: but ſpecially towards ſuch as either countrey, neighbourhood, likeneſſe of exerciſes or delights, or ſuch like things haue vnited and knit together. All which breed rather an accidentall then a ſound and true friendſhip. For among many ſuch, few will be found that will expoſe themſelues to perils or dangers for their friends, or in reſpect of their friends ſafetie will ſet light by their goods, yea their owne liues, as theſe few recorded in auncient writings haue done. This made *Demetrius Falareus* to ſay, that true friends went willingly to be partakers of their friends proſperity if they were called therunto: but that if aduerſitie or misfortune did befal them, they taried not then to be called, but ran of themſelues to offer their helpe and comfort. And *Anacarſis* eſteemed one good friend worth many common & ordinary, ſuch as we dayly ſee called friends, either for countries ſake, or becauſe they keepe company together in trauell by land or ſea, or traffike, or ſerue together in the warres, or ſuch like occaſions: all which are in truth but ſhadowes rather of friendſhip, then friendſhip indeed. A friend is not ſo eaſily to be diſcerned, but that a man muſt (as the prouerbe ſaith) eate a buſhell of ſalt with him before he account him a true friend. Wherupon followeth, that there can be no perfect friendſhip,

but after long experience and conuerſation. *Plato* reſpecting this, ſaid, that friendſhip was an habit gotten by loue long time growne: and in another place, that it was an inueterate loue, which is all one; to wit, that it muſt be purchaſed, and confirmed by long tract of time. Neuertheles though loue be the meane to knit friendſhip, yet is it not friendſhip it ſelfe, but the roote rather of the ſame. And as without the root nothing can proſper nor grow: ſo without loue no friendſhip can proſper. Thus then you may vnderſtand, that true friendſhip is not gotten by publike meetings, walkings or trading, nor in one day or two; and that all ſorts of beneuolence or mutuall offices of courteſie and ciuilitie, or euery ſhew of loue maketh not vp a friendſhip. For once againe I will tell you that friendſhip is ſo excellent a thing as it cannot be in perfection, but onely betweene two good and vertuous men of like commendable life and behauiour. That it is the greateſt externall good that can be purchaſed in this life, and that it is the ſame which *Ariſtotle* ſaid was more needfull then iuſtice, and therefore highly to be priſed of the man that laboured for ciuill happineſſe. Who although he haue all thoſe exteriour goods which appertaine to ciuil life, as wealth, health, children, and ſuch like, without which *Ariſtotle* holdeth that no man can be perfectly happie in this world, yet if he want friends, he lacketh a principal inſtrument for his felicitie; not only in reſpect of the many benefits which friends bring with thē, but chiefly for the delight of his own vertuous operatiōs, and the exerciſe of the like with them, when they ſhall be induced by him to vertuous actions: which breedeth an vnſpeakable contentment. Beſides that, ſolitarineſſe bereaueth a man of the ſweeteſt part of his life that is the conuerſation among friends, increaſing the contentation

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of a happie man, as he is to be a ciuill man: for of that other ſolitarineſſe which appertaineth to contemplation, this place ſerueth not to ſpeake. Wee may therefore right well conclude, that without friendſhip a man cannot haue his ciuill felicitie accompliſhed. But if I ſhould ſay all that might be ſaid concerning friendſhip, I ſhould be too long; neither would I haue ſaid ſo much thereof, had it not bin to ſhew you, how ſolitarineſſe cannot ſerue the turne of him that would be happie in this life. Wherfore companie being neceſſary to felicitie, will miniſter vnto the happie man occaſions to vſe his liberalitie: for ſweete and pleaſing conuerſation, and to ſupply the wants & neceſſities of friends, is the true & comfortable ſauce to friendſhip. It will make him to ſhew the greatnes of his courage in great things, guided alwayes by iudgement and reaſon, and to direct all his actions to the mark of honour, a thing eſteemed (as we haue ſaid) among all others the greateſt exterhall good: not that he ſhal ſet honor for his end (for that he knoweth would be vnfitting) but honorable and vertuous actions, contenting himſelfe that honor be the reward of them, and vertue be the hire for her ſelfe. For to her, others will giue honour as to a diuine thing, whereſoeuer they ſhall ſee her. But Magnanimitie is not a vertue fit for euery man, but for ſuch onely as are furniſhed with all other vertues, and among vertuous men are eſteemed in the higheſt degree. And he that is not ſuch a man, and will yet make a ſhew of Magnanimitie, will be but laughed at and ſcorned, becauſe vice and Magnanimitie, for the contrarietie that is betweene them, cannot dwell together in any wiſe; the one deſeruing all honour, and the other all reproch & blame. For Magnanimitie produceth effects agreeable to all the reſt of the vertues, which is the cauſe that ſo ſingular a gift

of the mind is not attained but with great difficultie: but the more trauell is taken in getting it, the greater is the praiſe to him that hath purchaſed the ſame. He that is adorned with this vertue, ioyeth when great honours fall vpon him, he little eſteemeth any perill, when honeſtie inuiteth him thereunto, and not anger, nor fury, nor deſire of reuenge, nor onely reſpect of honour. In matter of riches he alwayes obſerueth a due temper as wel as the liberall man, whom he excelleth in this, that the Magnanimous man exerciſeth his vertue in high matters that beare with them dignitie and importance; whereas the liberall man is buſied in things of leſſe moment. He hath alſo a due regard concerning honours, in the purchaſe whereof he is not iniurious or threatning, nor puffed vp with pride or ambition, but knowing right well that who ſo offereth iniury to another, cannot be rightly called Magnanimous, he abſtaineth from doing any: and if any man haue offered him iniurie, he holdeth it for the greateſt and honorableſt reuenge to forgiue, though he haue the partie in his power, & may ſatisfie himſelfe; and thinketh that the greateſt diſpleaſure he can worke to his enemy, is to ſhew himſelfe euermore garniſhed with vertue. Moreouer, he is alwayes higher then his fortune, be it neuer ſo great, and be ſhe neuer ſo contrary ſhe cannot ouerthrow him. He will neuer refuſe to ſpend his life (though it be deere vnto him, knowing his owne worth) for the defence of his countrey, of his friends, of his parents, of his religion, or for Gods cauſe, with whom he is continually in thought, though he be bodily here below on earth conuerſant among men, neuer buſied in baſe conceits or imaginations. His reputation is ſo deere vnto him, as he wil ſooner looſe his life, then ſpot it by any vile act: wherefore if he be in the field with his armes for any

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the cauſes before ſaid, he neuer turneth his backe to flie, but fighteth with a firme reſolution, either to ouercome or die. He is much more ready to beſtow a good turne or benefite then to receiue it; holding that it is more honorable for a man to part with his goods, then to take at any other mans hand: neuertheles if he chance to receiue any profite or commoditie by any other, he layeth it vp carefully in his remembrance, and neuer thinketh himſelf out of debt vntil he hath requited it double at the leaſt. A propertie well becomming a diuine mind rather then an humane: for of al others Ingratitude is the vileſt & abhominableſt vice, which among the Perſians was ſeuerely puniſhed. A vice that may be accounted not onely contrary to honeſtie, but alſo a cruell beaſtlineſſe. The Comike Poet ſaith, that wicked is the man that knoweth how to receiue a benefit, but not to recompẽce the ſame. Which ſentence is in effect alſo in *Euripides*, who ſayth, that he who forgetteth benefits receiued, can neuer be reputed of an honeſt or generous mind. Our Chriſtian writers haue ſaid, that it is enemie to grace, enemie to our ſaluation, to our life, & all ciuill ſocietie. And accordingly *Seneca* was of opinion, that no vice was more contrary to humanitie, or did ſooner diſſolue the vnitie of mens minds then ingratitude, more abhominable before God, or more odious to al vertuous & honeſt minds. But amõg vngrateful wretches, he that ſheweth ingratitude towards thoſe that haue inſtructed him in learning and vertue, opening to him the gate by which he muſt enter to attain to his felicitie, is the moſt beaſtly of all others: for that to them he ought to haue more regard then to his owne father, from whom though he hath his being, yet from the other he hath his well being, and is made fit and capable of dignitie and honour by the meane of vertue. And as

gratitude

gratitude or thankfulnes is the ornament of all other vertues, from which proceedeth the loue between the child and the parent, betweene the ſcholer and his maſter, the charitie towards our countrey, the honor toward God, the friendſhip betweene men, and the reuerence towards our ſuperiours: ſo no doubt ingratitude cannot be but directly contrary to all theſe, and therefore the fouleſt of al other vices; from which all the euils in the world proceed, to the perpetuall infamie of him that is vnthankful. Neither is it to be wondred, that ſuch men (like infernall furies) caſt behind them Religion, pietie, loue, faith, all goodnes, iuſtice, and humanitie it ſelfe, ſeeking like rauenous wolues to liue and feed vpon the bloud of other men. Not onely from priuate houſes therefore, but from Cities and Common-weales, ought this peſtiferous generation to be carefully baniſhed, as an infection among people, & the ruine of al conuerſatiõ, leſt their contagion ſpred that ſame euil ouer all the reſt. *Pythagoras*, who was the firſt that euer was called a Philoſopher (which is as much as to ſay, a louer of wiſedome, and conſequently of truth) did forbid all men to lodge an vnthankfull man vnder his roofe. And becauſe the Swallow (as *Plutarke* ſaith) betokeneth ingratitude, he would not haue them to be ſuffered to neſtle in a houſe. And to ſay truly, ſuch men are worſe then the moſt ſauage and cruell beaſts of the field: for of the gratitude of ſome of them, euen the fierceſt, many moſt notable examples haue bin recorded; namely this: One *Elpi* a dweller in the Ile of *Samos*, who traded into Afrike, comming with his ſhip on that coaſt, went a ſhore, where he met a Lion, in whoſe teeth a bone of ſome beaſt ſtucke in ſuch ſort as he could not cloſe his mouth, or make any ſhift to eate: *Elpi* pittying the beaſt, who ſeemed to craue at his hands releefe, tooke out the bone,

bone, and ſo deliuered him of that miſchiefe. But this thankfull Lion failed not euery day after ſo long as his ſhip lay there at rode to bring him duly his ſhare of what prey ſoeuer he tooke, which was ſufficient to feed him and all his company. Yea euen among ſerpents we reade examples of thankfulneſſe: for it is written, that a certaine child brought vp a young ſerpent, and fed it familiarly a long time; but when it was growne great, one day following the inſtinct of nature, it left the child and went to the woods. It happened that ſome while after that child being become now meete to trauell, paſſing thorough a wood was aſſaulted by robbers, who hauing taken him were purpoſed to haue ſlaine him: but he with pittifull voice intreating and crying to them that they ſhould ſpare his life, the ſame ſerpent (who by chance was then neere at hand) heard his crie, and knowing his voice, came ſuddenly out with ſuch fury vpon the theeues, that they were glad to take their heeles, and to leaue the yong man there to ſaue themſelues, who by the thankfulneſſe of the ſerpent was thus ſaued. But becauſe you may haply make doubt of theſe hiſtories, ſuppoſing them to be old and fabulous, giue me leaue (beſides mine author) to recite vnto you a ſtrange example of gratitude in a beaſt, which I haue vnderſtood from a perſon of ſuch credite, as I dare auouch it for a truth, ſince himſelfe affirmed that he knew the gentleman in the weſt country of England, to whom the thing happened euen of late yeeres. This gentleman had a maſtiffe, which he made much account of becauſe he was very faire and hardie, and therefore cheriſhed him ſo as his neighbours tooke knowledge of his affection to the dogge: in reſpect whereof, though they receiued harme from him (for I muſt tel you he had a qualitie to worry ſheepe by night) yet ſought they no

redreſſe, but by complaint to the maſter, who in no caſe could be induced to beleeue that his dogge had that qualitie, ſo cunning was he to take his times and to hide his fault. Howbeit vpon the renewing of complaints he cauſed a muzzle to be made, and euery night to be put on his dogs head; ſuppoſing thereby to be not onely aſſured himſelf, but to ſatisfie his neighbours alſo, that it was not he that committed thoſe outrages. But for all this, neither the harme nor the complaints were ſtopped; for this dog had gotten the knack with his feet to pull off his muzzle, and then going abroade to do his feate, at his returne he would thruſt his head into the muzzle againe, in ſuch ſort as any man would haue freed him of any ſuch fact. Yet no other dogge being neere to do the like but he, and ſtill the harme being freſhly done, his maſter once reſolued to watch his dogge a whole night to ſatisfie himſelfe and his neighbours of the truth: which thing he did ſo diſcreetly, as he diſcouered his dogs ſubtiltie, and ſaw him vnmuzzle himſelfe, go abroade, and returne ſo cleaned as no ſpot of bloud could be diſcerned about him, and thruſting his head into his muzzle to lie him downe as if he had bin free from any ſuch offence. The gentleman thus reſolued of his dogges conditions, went to bed, and ſlept the reſt of the night; and the next morning coming downe, he found his dogge lying in the hall, and looking ſomewhat angerly vpon him, he ſpoke theſe words, Ah thou ſheepbiter, thou ſheepbiter, thou muſt be hanged; and ſo indeed had purpoſed with himſelfe to haue had him executed. But whiles he was buſied in ſome houſehold affaires, the dog ſtole out of doores and ran away; ſo as when his maſter gaue order how he ſhould be hanged, he was no where to be found. And theſe circumſtances of the tale I haue the rather related, that you may

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wonder at the vnderſtanding of this beaſt. Now for his gratitude, thus it fell out: Some two yeeres after or leſſe that he was thus runne away to eſcape hanging, it was the gentlemans chance vpon ſome occaſions to trauell on foote through the countrey, and in a certaine wood fit for ſuch purpoſes, he met two tinkers that ſet vpon him ſuddenly to rob him: theſe two tinkers had with them a maſtiffe that caried their packes, as many in England do; which dog when in the fight (for the gentleman defended himſelfe manfully) he had knowne either by his voice or otherwiſe his old maſter, he ranged himſelfe to his partie, and ſet vpon his latter maſters ſo fiercely, that they loſt their courages, and being wounded ran away: and then the gentleman alſo refigured his old ſeruant, by whoſe meanes he was deliuered from ſo great a danger; and ſo tooke home his dog again, who had in the meane time forgone his naughtie qualitie, and was euer after much made of by his maſter as he right well deſerued. How ſhamefull a thing is it therefore to man, that brute beaſts ſhould giue him examples of gratitude; and he cõtrariwiſe, on whom God hath beſtowed ſo great a gift as reaſon to diſcerne the good from the bad, ſhould rather follow the example of the worſt ſort of beaſts in doing ill, then of ſuch as by naturall inſtinct ſhew him the way to goodneſſe? For the vngratefull man is of the nature of the wolfe, of whom it is written, that being ſuckled when it was yong by an Ewe; when it grew great, in recompence of his nouriſhment he deuoured her: declaring that the wickednes of the vnthankfull perſon cannot be ouercome by any benefits, be they neuer ſo great. But of this abhominable vice we haue ſaid enough, and more then needed, but that I was willing to giue you to vnderſtand, how farre it ought to be from him that is vertuous,

and would be rayſed to the reputation of a magnanimous man: of whom returning to ſpeake, thus much is to be added, that he vſeth himſelfe and all his abilitie euermore with greatneſſe of courage, ſpending when occaſion ſerueth magnifically, in workes worthy admiration, and in helping of others honorably. Towards all men he is courteous, gentle, and affable, neuer giuing occaſion of offence or miſlike in his conuerſation: ſuch due regard he hath to place, time, perſons, and other circumſtances, ſo as he neuer doth any thing vnſeemely or vnworthy himſelfe. And ſo he tempereth pleaſantneſſe with grauitie, benignitie with dignitie, that to the humble he neuer ſeemeth proud, nor to the great ones neuer baſe or demiſſe: but valewing him neither more nor leſſe then he is worth, inſiſteth ſtill vpon truth, diſcouering himſelfe modeſtly and decently as he is indeed a man of vertue, and with graue, yet gentle ſpeeches giuing ſatisfaction to all perſons of what degree ſoeuer. And finally in all his actions and behauior he taketh great heed that he commit not any thing whereby he may haue cauſe to die his cheeke with the purple bluſh; but euermore deſerue of all men praiſe and commendation.

If I ſhould not interrupt, or prolong your diſcourſe too much, I would be glad (ſaid Captaine *Norreis*) to learne what is the cauſe that ſhamefaſtneſſe maketh the red colour come into a mans face, and that feare doth make him pale?

The reaſon is (ſaid I) becauſe ſhamefaſtnes ſpringeth in vs for ſome thing that we thinke blame-worthy: and the minde finding that what is to be reprehended in vs, commeth from abroade, it ſeeketh to hide the fault committed, and to auoide the reproch thereof, by ſetting that colour on our face as a maske to defend vs withall. And albeit

albeit that ſhamefaſtneſſe or bluſhing ſeeme to be a certaine ſtill confeſſion of the fault, yet it carieth with it ſuch a grace, as paſſeth not without commendation, ſpecially in youth, as hath bin ſaid. But feare which proceedeth from imagination of ſome euill to come, and is at hand, maketh the mind which conceiueth it to ſtartle, and looking about for meanes of defence, it calleth al the bloud into the innermoſt parts, ſpecially to the heart, as the chiefe fort or caſtle; whereby the exterior parts being abandoned and depriued of heate, and of that colour which it had from the bloud and the ſpirits, there remaineth nothing but paleneſſe. And hereof it commeth to paſſe, that we ſee ſuch men as are ſurpriſed with feare, to be not only pale, but to tremble alſo, as if their members would ſhake off from their bodies: euen as the leaues fall from the tree as ſoone as the the cold wether cauſeth the ſappe to be called from the branches to the roote, for the preſeruation of the vertue vegetatiue. But ſuch feare is vnſeemly, and a token of a cowardly mind, and is ſeldom ſeene in men of valour. For they are neuer ſo ſuddenly ouertaken by any humane accident, but that they are armed, and know that their vertue is to be made knowne in fearfull and terrible occaſions, which are the very matter and ſubiect of their glory. Neither doth fortune with her ſmiling, ſo aſſure thē, but that they look for her frowning countenance to follow: and therefore in proſperity prepare thēſelues for aduerſity; whereby when others fal vnder her ſtrokes, they not only feare her not, but couragiouſly fight againſt her, & ouercome her. Yet you muſt vnderſtand that euery ſort of feare is not reprochfull: for that feare which withholdeth men from doing euill, or things that may breed them ſhame, is worthy cōmendatiō: which made *Xenophon* to ſay that he was moſt fearful

to do any thing that was diſhoneſt. And much more commendable is that feare which groweth from the reuerence and reſpect we beare to God, to our parents, and our ſuperiours: for that leades a man to goodnes, whereas the other bringeth a man to all euill and wickedneſſe. And now hauing ſatisfied your demaund, let me briefly runne through the reſt of the vertues before mentioned in their order. Next therefore to Magnanimitie cometh the goodly vertue of Manſuetude, being a meane betweene wrathfulneſſe with deſire of reuenge, ſtirred vp in the iraſcible appetite in reſpect of ſome iniury done or ſuppoſed to be done, and coldneſſe or lacke of feeling of wrongs when they are offered: which coldneſſe or inſenſibilitie of wrongs, is by this vertue kindled or ſtirred vp to feele and miſlike the iniuries which vnruly perſons do oftentimes offer to men of vertue. For as it is neceſſary vpon many occaſions to be angry, not with intention to offend others, but for the defence of a mans ſelfe, and of thoſe to whom he is tyed, and ſpecially of his reputation, leſt by being too dull and careleſſe in regarding iniuries done vnto him, he become apt to be ridden and depreſſed by euery ruffling companion: ſo to be either too ſudden or outragious in anger, and thereby to be incited to do any act contrary to reaſon, cannot in any ſort agree with vertue, or become a gentleman. For to ſpeak of that bearing which is vndertaken for Chriſtian humilitie, or feare of offending God, appertaineth not to this place. This vertue then of Manſuetude, is ſhe that holdeth the reines in her hand, to bridle the vehemency of anger, ſhewing when, where, with whom, for what cauſe, how farre foorth, and how long it is fit and conuenient to be angry; and likewiſe to let them looſe, and to ſpurre forward the mind that is reſtie or ſlow in apprehending the

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iuſt cauſes of wrath, with regard of like circumſtances: directing the particular actions of the vertuous man in ſuch caſes according to reaſon; to whom ſhe, as all other the vertues, is to haue a continuall eye and regard in euery thing.

Deſire of Honor ſucceedeth next, and is a vertue that is buſied about the ſame ſubiect with Magnanimitie. For as the magnanimous man reſpecteth onely great and exceſſiue honors: ſo doth this vertue teach the meane in purchaſing of ſmaller honours or dignities, ſuch as ciuill men of all ſorts are to be employed in. For as there are ſome that ſeeke by all meanes poſſible to catch at euery ſhew of honor, at euery office or degree that is to be gotten, and ſpare not to vndergo any indignity, or to try any baſe or vnlawfull meanes to compaſſe the ſame, heauing and ſhouing like men in a throng to come to be formoſt, though they deſerue to be far behind: ſo are there others ſo ſcrupulous and ſo addicted to their eaſe and quiet, that they cannot endure to take vpon them any paines, or any place that may bring them either trouble or hazard; abſolutely refuſing in that reſpect, and deſpiſing al dignities and offices, together with the honor they might purchaſe by the ſame. The firſt ſort of men are called ambitious: the other inſenſible and careleſſe of their reputation. Betweene which two extremes this vertue hath her place, to keepe the firſt from ſeeking, not by vertue, but by corruptiõ, deceit, or other vnfit meanes to compaſſe honors, dignities, or authoritie, as many do, ſlandering and backbiting ſuch as are competitors with them; or elſe moſt baſely flattering, and with cappe and knee crouching to thoſe that they thinke may yeeld them helpe, or fauour them in their purchaſe, which they ſeeke and beg to ſupply their owne vnworthineſſe: and to quicken the other,

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whoſe mindes haue no care of their credit & reputation, but liue in baſe companies, and eſtrange themſelues from all ciuill conuerſation, like brute and ſauage beaſts. And in this reſpect is ſhe worthy high eſtimation, and neceſſary for all them that eſteeme true honour (as they ought) to be the moſt excellent good among exteriour things: who neuertheleſſe temper themſelues from ambition, ſo as they are not drawne to commit any vile or baſe act for the atchieuing of the ſame, but ſtriue euermore by vertue to purchaſe their honor & reputation. Neither is this vertue all one with Magnanimitie, becauſe it requireth not ſo excellent an habit as doth Magnanimitie, though they both be buſied about the ſame ſubiect: for between them is the like difference as is betweene Magnificence and Liberalitie, whereof we haue already ſpoken.

Veritie is the vertue which followeth in order, by which a man in all his conuerſation, in all his actions, and in al his words ſheweth himſelfe ſincere and ful of truth, making his words and his deeds alwayes to agree, ſo as he neuer ſayeth one thing for another, but ſtill affirmeth thoſe things that are, and denieth thoſe that are not. The two extremes of this vertue, are on the one ſide diſſimulation or ieſting, called in Greeke *Ironia*, and on the other ſide boaſting. For ſome there are that ſeeke by this vice to purchaſe reputation and credit, or profit; or elſe euen for fooliſh delight giue themſelues to vanting and telling ſuch ſtrange things of themſelues, as though they be incredible, yet wil they needs haue men forſooth to beleeue them. Others for the ſame reſpects diſſemble the good parts that haply are in them, & ſeeme willing to make mẽ beleeue that their good qualities are not ſo great as they are; with a counterfeit modeſtie faining alwayes to abaſe themſelues in ſuch ſort as men may eaſily diſcouer them

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to be plaine hypocrites, and that vnder pretence of humilitie they labour to ſet pride on horſebacke: yea ſome euen of meriment, or by long cuſtome of lying, thinke it ſport ſufficient neuer to tell any thing but exorbitant and ſtrange lies, inſomuch as in fine, though they wittingly ſpeak no truth, yet themſelues fal to beleeuing what they ſay to be moſt true. Betweene theſe two vices ſitteth this bright-ſhining vertue of Truth (as ſhe is a morall vertue) by which men vſe the benefit of their ſpeech to that true vſe for which it is beſtowed vpon them by God, and purchaſe to themſelues not onely honour and praiſe, but alſo truſt and credit with all men, ſo as their words are obſerued as oracles: whereas of the others, no man maketh more account then of the ſound of bels, or of old wiues tales. This is that excellent vertue that is of all others the beſt fitting a Gentleman, and maketh him reſpected and welcom in all companies: which made *Pythagoras* to ſay, that next vnto God, truth in man was moſt to be reuerenced: whoſe contrary likewiſe is of all other things the moſt vnfitting, the very deſtroier of humane conuerſatiõ the mother of ſcandals, and the deadly enemy of friendſhip: the odiouſneſſe whereof may be diſcerned by this, that albeit we ſtick not ſometimes to confeſſe our faults, though they be very great, to our friends, yet we are aſhamed to let them know that we haue told a lie.

The vertue of Affabilitie which ſucceedeth, is a certaine meane, by which men ſeeke to liue and conuerſe with others, ſo as they may purchaſe the fauor and good liking of all men, not forgetting their owne grauitie and reputation. And becauſe there are ſome that thinke with pleaſing ſpeeches and pleaſant conceits to be welcom into all companies, they giue themſelues to flatter, to commend and extoll euery man, to ſooth all that they heare

ſpoken,and ſtill to ſmile or laugh in euery mans face;purchaſing thereby in the end to be eſteemed but as ridiculous ſycophants or baſe flatterers: and others,holding a contrary courſe,neuer ſpeake word that may be gratefull or pleaſing to any man, ſuppoſing thereby to be held for graue and wiſe men, euermore oppoſing themſelues to what others ſay,diſpraiſing al mens doings,and finally with frowning countenance making themſelues odious in all companies. Therefore is this excellent vertue ſet as a meane to direct men how to vſe their words and behauiour in honeſt and ciuill conuerſation, that they may be gratefull. For thereby they know how to diſtinguiſh the degrees and qualities of perſons, of times, of places, and by diſcreete cariage to make themſelues welcome euery where, without touch of flattery. And Affabilitie reſembleth very much friendſhip in the particular actions therof, both hauing a purpoſe to pleaſe, & neuer to diſpleaſe. But betweene them there is this difference, that friendſhip doth all things with a ſpeciall feruent affection interchangeably borne; whereas Affabilitie reſpecteth not the mutual affection,but only a deſire to be generally acceptable and pleaſing to all good men, to euery one in their ſeuerall degrees and qualities, and without regard of the conditions before ſpecified.In the exerciſe of which vertue, among other obſeruations, this is one principall,neuer to let paſſe a word out of the mouth before it be conſidered and examined whether it may offend any man or no.For many men through lack of this conſideration haue let ſlip words that they would afterwards haue redeemed at a high rate,but could not;whence ariſe oftentimes great miſchiefes, as dayly experience ſheweth vs. Laſtly,as the body hath need of reſt after trauell, ſo hath the mind(ouerwearied with ſtudy or affaires)need of recreation,

creation, that it may return the freſher to be buſied again. And this recreation is beſt found in certaine paſtimes or ſports, vſed by gentlemen when they meete to be merry together, wherein no baſeneſſe or vnſeemlineſſe is ſeene: and therefore are theſe ſports properly called, recreations of the mind. But becauſe in ſuch meetings where men come to paſſe the time together, they faile in their conuerſation two wayes by exceſſe, the one contrary to the other; therefore is the meane which teacheth the tempering of thoſe exceſſes, called the vertue of Vrbanitie, a Latine name, which in Engliſh we cannot better, and therefore muſt giue it paſſe to be denizened among vs. The one exceſſe of too much, is, when men ſeeke in ſuch aſſemblies or meetings onely to make the company laugh, and ſo they laugh, care not whether the occaſion be giuē of any wantō ſpeech or ſcurrilitie, or ouerbitter taunting, without reſpect of perſons, and if they may breake a ieſt vpon any man, either preſent or abſent, they will not forbeare it to ſhew their wit, though it be neuer ſo much to the ſhame and ignominie of the partie; yea and they will laugh thereat themſelues ſo exceedingly, that they will make others of force to laugh at their laughter, though they miſlike their ſpeech. And ſuch men may be iuſtly termed ieſters, or knauiſh fooles, ſpecially if to their words they adde geſtures and countenances vndecent for ciuill men, not ſparing alſo ribald ſpeeches euen in the preſence of ſober and modeſt gentlewomen. A thing that among honeſt and vertuous men is moſt odious, whoſe conuerſation ought to be farre from vncleanneſſe or malice. Oppoſite to theſe are certaine perſons, who in all companies neuer let fall any wittie ſpeech themſelues, or any merry conceit; nor yet when they heare them proceed from others, will once affoord to grace them with ſo much as a

ſmile: but rather bend the browes thereat, or ſeeme not to know or to conceiue any delight therein, behauing themſelues like rude clownes which want capacitie to comprehend the ſubſtance of a pithy & pleaſant ſpeech. Theſe *Ariſtotle* calleth harſh and ruſtike fellowes. Now betweene this ruſticity and this fooliſh ieſting is this vertue of Vrbanitie the meane, which the Greeks call *Eutrapelia*, and teacheth a man to frame all his ſpeeches in aſſemblies and meetings where he chaunceth to be for the reuiuing or recreating of his ſpirits, ſo as they may be ſharpe and wittie, and yet not bitter or ouerbiting to offend, nor yet to taxe or reproue any man ſo, as he may haue iuſt cauſe to complaine: though (to ſay truth) a diſcreet or wittie ieſt cannot be much worth, or moue men to laugh, vnles it haue a certaine deceit or offence intended towards ſome body, who neuertheleſſe muſt not be ſo pricked, as he may haue cauſe to be grieued thereat, but rather be merry at the conceit. For ſince words and geſtures are the true tokens commonly of the qualitie of the mind, he, that in his conuerſation cauſeth not the ſweetnes of his mind and the candor of his nobleſt part to ſhine through all his actions, words and geſtures, cannot be eſteemed a man of worth and vertue. He muſt continually haue great regard to the time, place, perſons, and other circumſtances, according to which he is ſo to order his pleaſant conceits and merry ieſts, not onely to moue meriment and laughter, but that withall he may keepe his grauitie & dignitie, and eſchue aboue all things licentious & wanton ſpeeches, which in no wiſe become a man that is deſirous to beare vp his reputation & credit as a ciuill man. And thus hauing giuen you a taſt of euery of the vertues aſſigned to wait vpon Magnanimity ſomewhat more amply then mine author, who hath (in my opinion)

pinion) a little too briefly touched them in the deſcriptiõ of a magnanimous man: I will now returne to his diſcourſe again, by which I am come to treate of Iuſtice; the efficacie and power wherof is ſuch, that ſome ſages haue held her only to be vertue, as if ſhe ſhould containe in her al other vertues: and that the reſt that are ſeuerally named ſhould be but as parts of her, diuerſly intituled in reſpect of the diuers obiects, about which they are exerciſed. It is therefore to be conſidered, that this vertue is to be taken two waies; the one when ſhe is generally conſidered, and then is ſhe alone al the vertues: in which reſpect *Ageſilaus* was wont to ſay, that where Iuſtice was, there needed no Fortitude. And *Antiſthenes* and *Plato* likewiſe were of opinion, that he that was iuſt needed no lawes, becauſe this vertue was ſufficient to keep him within the cõpaſſe of liuing wel and vertuouſly. The other way is, when ſhe is taken for one of the foure principall vertues, and ſo is ſhe a habit, whereby is knowne what is iuſt, and the ſame is accordingly deſired and done. This is that incorrupted virgin, which the auncients ſo termed, becauſe ſhe is ſuch a friend to baſhfulnes and modeſty, by which men are made worthy reuerence, by which they learne the meaſure of diſtributions and commutations, giuing recompence to vertue as much as it deſerueth, not by equality of number, but by equality of meaſure: to much vertue great reward, to meane vertue meaner recompence: and this is the Geometrical proportion which *Ariſtotle* ſpeaks of. For where much deſert is, though much be giuen, and leſſe, where leſſe is deſerued, and the rewards compared together be vnequall; yet as they haue ſeuerally deſerued, they are equally rewarded. With ſome example we ſhall make the thing more plaine. Suppoſe here be two veſſels, the one greater then the other, and that you

fill them both with wine or other liquor, the leſſer ſhall neuertheles be as well full as the greater: and if they both had ſpeech and vnderſtanding, neither could the one complaine for hauing too much, nor the other too little, both being full according to their capacitie, and ſo receiuing his due. In this ſort doth Iuſtice diſtribute to euery one that which is his due. She produceth lawes, by which vertue is rewarded, and vice puniſhed. She correcteth faults and errours according to their qualitie. She ſetteth vs in the direct way that leadeth to felicitie. She teacheth rulers and magiſtrates to commaund, and ſubiects to obey: and therefore ſhe is the true rule which ſheweth the inferiour powers and faculties of the ſoule how to obey Reaſon as their Queene and miſtris. Which commaund of Reaſon, *Plotinus* eſteemed to be ſo important to be exerciſed ouer the paſſions, as he eſteemed them only to be worthily called wiſe men, who ſubiected their paſſions in ſuch ſort to reaſon, that they ſhould neuer ariſe to oppoſe themſelues againſt her. She inſtructeth man to rule, not onely himſelfe, but his wife, his children, and his family alſo. She preſerueth and maintaineth States and Common-weales, by ſetting an euen courſe of cariage betweene Princes and their ſubiects. She maketh men vnderſtand, how the doing of iniury is contrary to the nature of mã, who is borne to be mild, benigne & gentle; and not to be (as wild beaſts are) furious, fierce and cruel: for ſuch they are that hurt others wittingly. And when iniuries happen to be done, ſhe diſtinguiſheth them, ſhe ſeeketh to make them equall, or to diminiſh them, or to take them cleane away: euermore teaching vs this leſſon, that it is better to receiue an iniury then to do it. It is ſhe that maketh thoſe things that are ſeuerally produced for the good of ſundry nations, common to all, by the meane

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of commutation, of buying and ſelling, and hauing inuented coine, hath ſet it to be a law, or rather a iudge in caſes of inequalitie, to ſee that euery man haue his due and no more. Finally ſhe tempereth with equitie (which may be termed a kind of clemency ioyned to iuſtice) things ſeuerely eſtabliſhed by law, to the end that exact iuſtice may not proue to be exact wrong. And where as lawes not tempered by diſcreet Iudges, are like tyrants ouer men: this equitie was held by *Plato* to be of ſuch importance, that when the *Arcadians* ſent vnto him, deſiring him to ſet them downe lawes to be ruled by, he vnderſtanding that they were a people not capable of equitie, refuſed flatly to make them any lawes at all. *Ageſilaus* ſaid, that to be too iuſt, was not onely farre from humanitie, but euē crueltie it ſelf. And *Traian* the Emperor wiſhed Princes to link equitie & iuſtice together, ſaying, that dominions were otherwiſe inhumanely gouerned. The Ægyptians alſo to ſhew that lawes are to be adminiſtred with equitie, expreſſed iuſtice in their *Hieroglifikes* by a left hand opē, meaning, that as the left hand is ſlower and weaker then the right: ſo that iuſtice ought to be aduiſedly adminiſtred, and not with force or fury. And the opinion of ſome was, that the axes and rods which were accuſtomably borne before the Romane Conſuls, were bound about with bands; to declare, that as there muſt be a time to vnbind the axes before they could be vſed to the death of any man: ſo ought there to be a time to deliberate for them that execute the law; wherein they may conſider whether that which the rigor of law commaundeth may not without impeachment of Iuſtice be tempered and reduced to benignitie and equitie. To conclude, Iuſtice is ſhe that maintaineth common vtilitie, that giueth the rule, the order, the meaſure and manner

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of all things both publike and priuate, the band of humane conuerſation and friendſhip. She it is that maketh man reſemble God, and ſo farre extendeth her power in the coniunction of mens minds, that ſhe not onely knitteth honeſt men together in ciuill ſocietie, but euen wicked men and theeues, whoſe companies could not continue, if among their iniuſtices Iuſtice had not ſome place. She is of ſo rare goodneſſe and ſinceritie, that ſhe maketh man, not onely to abſtaine from taking anothers goods, but alſo from coueting the ſame.

Indeed (ſaid M. *Dormer*) if Iuſtice be ſuch a vertue as you haue deſcribed, me thinke that we haue ſmal need of other vertues; for ſhe comprehendeth them all within her ſelfe.

So doth ſhe (anſwered I) if ſhe be generally conſidered as before hath bin ſaid. But if we call her to the company of the other vertues, as here we place her, ſhe hath as much need of them as they of her, if ſhe ſhall produce thoſe effects which we haue ſpoken of. For as one vice draweth another after it, as do the linkes of a chaine the one the other: euen ſo are the vertues much more happily linked together in ſuch ſort as they cannot be ſeuered. But though a man be endued with them all, yet is he called a iuſt man, a valiant, a prudent, or a temperate man, according as he inclineth more to this then to that, or in his actions maketh more ſhew of the one then of the other: for our naturall imperfection wil not ſuffer any one man to excel in them all; which made me ſay a while ſithens, that it is ſo hard a thing to be magnanimous, ſince the vertue of Magnanimity muſt be grounded vpon all the reſt. But to excell in iuſtice, is a thing moſt glorious; for it is ſaid of her, that neither the morning ſtarre nor the euening ſtar ſhineth as ſhe doth. And *Heſiodus* called her

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the daughter of *Iupiter*. Whereupon *Plato* ſuppoſing, that who ſo embraced Iuſtice contracted parentage with *Iupiter* the King of Gods and men, accounted the iuſt man had gotten a place very neere vnto God.

Verily (ſaid M. *Dormer*) and not without cauſe. For it behoueth him that will be iuſt to be voide of all vice, and furniſhed with all other vertues. And therefore me thinketh, he that ſaid Iuſtice might wel be without Prudẽce, conſidered ill what belonged to Iuſtice. For Prudence is moſt neceſſary to diſcerne what is iuſt frõ what is vniuſt; and a good iudgment therin can no man haue that wanteth Prudence: without which iudgment, Iuſtice can neuer rule wel thoſe things that are vnder her gouernment. And as *Ageſilaus* ſaid of Fortitude, ſo thinke I of Iuſtice, that if ſhe be not guided by Prudence (which is aptly called the eie of the mind) ſhe works more harme thẽ good.

You thinke truly (ſaid I) and of this vertue the courſe of our author draweth me to treate, & to declare of what importance ſhe is to humane things, and how beneficial. But let me firſt put you in mind that hitherto hath bin ſpoken but of thoſe vertues which haue their foundatiõ in the vnreaſonable parts of the mind: of which mind they are the habits, conſiſting in the meane betwixt two extremes, and buſied about the affects & actions of men. Likewiſe hath bin declared how the affects come from the powers or appetites of the ſoule, to wit, the concupiſcible and the iraſcible, and how all commendable actions proceed from election, before which Counſell muſt go. And albeit we made mention there of Prudence, yet it was then referred to a fitter place to talke thereof more largely, when the drift of our diſcourſe ſhould bring vs thither. Now therefore being come to that place which is proper to her, I am to ſpeake of therof. But before I proceed

ceed any further, you must vnderstand that there be two sorts of vertues: for some are morall, concerning manners, of which we haue discoursed hitherto, and shewed how they are grounded in those parts of the mind that are deuoide of reason. Others are of the mind or vnderstanding, in which respect they are called Intellectiue; and of them henceforth must be our speech. But you must remember, that though it was said, that those morall vertues were founded in those parts of the mind wanting reason, yet were they guided by the light of reason. And this light of reason (as much as concerneth mens actions) is nothing else but Prudence, which is a vertue of the vnderstanding, and the rule and measure of all the morall vertues concerning our actions and affects: euen as sapience or wisedome is the guide and gouernesse of speculation. And forsomuch as reason is capable of two intellectiue vertues, whereof the one is actiue, and the other speculatiue, this latter intendeth alwaies the knowledge of truth: & the first is busied about the knowledge of what is good. Which good, when it is come to the height of his perfectiō in our actions, is the end of them; and then haue we attained that furthest and absolute terme or bound, vnto which we haue directed all our ciuill actions. Hereupon *Plotinus* said, that there were in vs two principles or originall causes of doing; whereof the one is the mind, which cals vs to contemplatiō: the other is reason, guiding vs to ciuill actions; and from her doth that which is good & faire neuer depart. And though it may be obiected, that both these intellectiue vertues are exercised in or about the knowledge of truth, as indeed they be; yet is it to be aduertised, that it is in diuers respects that they be so exercised. For that part which is exercised in contemplatiō, is busied about truth simply; that

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is to ſay, about thoſe things that neuer change, and are alwayes the ſame; as God firſt of all; then all the vniuerſall things which nature hath produced: about which Prudence hath nothing to do to buſie her ſelfe, becauſe they are not ſubiect to mans counſell, nor to his election: and of ſuch things properly is truth the ſubiect: which truth (as *Plato* ſaid) is the guide to lead men to al goodnes. But Prudence worketh properly about ſuch things as are ſubiect to change; and may be & not be; may be done or not done; and (when al is ſaid) are fortunable: of which there is no certaine and infallible truth, as is of things eternall. Neuertheles Prudence in this inconſtancie of things ſenſible, ſeeketh alwayes to apply it ſelf to that which is moſt likely to happen, and doth ſeeme moſt probable to the diſcourſe of reaſon. And this alſo is that truth about which ſhe diſcourſeth, ſeeking ſtill to chuſe that which is or ſeemeth to her beſt and moſt faire. Without Prudence can no vertuous operation be brought to paſſe. For ſhe onely foreſeeth and knoweth what is conuenient and ſeemely: and withholdeth a man at all times from vice or any voluntary wicked action: ſo that he that is not honeſt cannot be prudent. It is neither art nor ſcience, but an habit of the mind, neuer ſeuered from reaſon, in the diſcourſing of thoſe things about which man is to vſe reaſon, for priuate or publike benefit. So as it may well be ſaid, that in reſpect of the ſubiect it is all one with that ſcience which is called Ciuil: but in reſpect of the reaſon of the one & of the other, they be differẽt. For Prudence is in the prudent man principally for his priuat good and profit, and next for the publike weale: but the ciuil or politike man conſidereth that which is profitable to the Common-wealth. And though both be buſied about the benefit of mankind according to reaſon, yet ſo farre

forth as the prudent man reſpecteth his priuat good, it is called in him Prudence. But when it is applied to the vniuerſal cõmoditie of the Cõmonweal, it is called the ciuil facultie or ſcience. Which facultie without prudence wil be of ſmal effect in gouernment: the rule wherof it fetcheth frõ Temperance, which is called the preſeruer of Prudence. Neuertheles the prudẽt man may at once prouide both for his priuate affaires & for the publike, though his office be rather to cõmand others to execute things then to do himſelf. And albeit in that point *Socrates* was deceiued, ſaying that Prudẽce was all the vertues together, yet is ſhe ſo inſeparable a companiõ vnto them all, as if ſhe be taken frõ them, they remaine of ſmal valew or effect. The office of this vertue, is to conſider what is profitable, and to apprehend it: and likewiſe to eſchew all that is hurtful. And to diſcourſe of things ſenſible and vſuall, thereby to ſhew what is fit to be choſen, and what to be forſaken. In regard wherof *Plato* ſaid that Prudenee guided vs to happines of life, and imprudence made vs miſerable and vnhappie: affirming that ſhe onely directed vs to do all our affaires wel, yea & to know our ſelues. Among the repreſentations of vertues, Prudence is commonly ſet with a looking-glas in her hand: which by all likelihood is done to giue vs to vnderſtãd, that as the glaſſe being cleere ſheweth a man his face; ſo Prudence wel vſed ſhewes to him himſelf, making him to know what he is, and to what end created. The knowledge wherof works in him, that as he trauels to attain for himſelf profit & goodnes; ſo acknowledging himſelfe to be borne for the good alſo of others, endeuoreth to direct the affaires alſo of his parẽts, friends and Cõmon-weale to the ſame end of profit & goodnes. Now although it hath bin ſaid, that Pudence is a ſcience of good and euil, yet is it to be vnderſtood that ſhe is not properly termed a ſcience; but is (as was ſaid euẽ now) ſo

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far frō it, that ſhe is buſied about things caſual which may happen and not happen, wherof there can be no certaine ſcience: wheras Science laboreth about things certaine & eternal. Prudence conſidereth what is profitable & good; Science ſearcheth out truth ſimply. And as theſe two be different the one frō the other: ſo is there difference betweene the wiſe man & the prudent. For the wiſe man being ſtil buſied about the cauſes of things, and the maruellous effects which they produce by the meanes of Gods goodnes, is as it were out of the world, litle reſpecting any profit, which the prudent hath ſtill regard vnto. For the wiſe mā hath his mind alwaies raiſed to the contēplation of ſublime things, whereby theſe baſer of the earth ſeeme to him worthy no eſtimation, the rather becauſe he knoweth right well that nature hath need of very little to ſuſtaine her. And although *Plato* ſay that thoſe men are called wiſe, who by the light of reaſon, know what is profitable, not onely for themſelues and particular perſons, but generally for the commonweale, he there vſeth the name of a wiſe man according to the cōmon maner of ſpeech, and not properly. But that you may the better vnderſtād my authors meaning, you muſt giue me leaue to enlarge a litle the ground of this his diſtinction. You are therfore to conſider, that there be three ſeueral things in vs, to wit, ſenſe and feeling, vnderſtanding and appetite. Of which the firſt is the beginning of no action properly, becauſe it is common to vs with brute beaſts, who are not ſaid to do any action, for that they want iudgement and election. The appetite, ſo farre forth as it is obedient to reaſon, either followeth or eſchueth things preſented thereunto: and in this part Counſell hath place and election, as hath bin formerly ſaid: which election is the inducement to action, for thereby we worke either good or euil; and it is prouoked by the appetite, though reaſon brideling the

concupiſcible deſire be the miniſter of good electiõ. But the vnderſtanding ſtretcheth furder then ſo. For it trauels about things eternal, neceſſary, and ſo true as they neuer change, nor can be any other then as by nature they haue bin framed. But it is buſied about this truth two manner of wayes; for either it ſeeketh the knowledge of principles, from whence true concluſions are drawne; or elſe of principles that be the ori ne of things. If we conſider the vnderſtanding according to the firſt manner, it breedeth ſcience in vs, which commeth from the knowledge of true principles, which are the grounds of true concluſions. And in this ſort do we know all things naturall and corporall, yet eternall and immutable, as cauſes naturall, nature her ſelfe, time, place, the elements, heauen, the firſt mouer, ſo farre forth as he is applied to a moueable body (for ſo far forth as he is a ſimple ſubſtance, vnmoueable, indiuiſible, free from all change: and as he is alone by him ſelfe infinite, neither body, nor vertue contained in a bodie, the firſt of all things naturally moued, yea before the matter it ſelfe, & al other the properties attributed to that ſimple, pure and diuine nature, it is a thing not appertaining to the naturall Philoſopher to treate of him) and generally all other things natural. But taking the vnderſtanding according to the ſecond way, it raiſeth vs vp to the knowledge of that diuine power, from which all things great and ſmall, mortall and immortall, haue their beginning: and this knowledge is called wiſedome: which, together with vertue, we attaine by the meanes of Philoſophie, the onely ſchool-miſtris of humane and diuine learning, and the true guide to commendable life and vertuous actions, being indeed the greateſt gift that God giueth to man in this tranſitory life. Now as theſe vertues before ſpecified direct vs to that perfecteſt end that man

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in this world can attaine vnto by his vertuous deeds: so doth this habit, called wisedome, conduct him to a farre more excellent end then this ciuill or politike end. And if that which vertue guideth vs vnto, be worthy to be called perfect in this world, this other (which wisedome leadeth vs vnto) may well be termed most perfect: because this diuine habit addresseth vs to the knowledge of the most pure, simple, and excellentest nature, which is God eternall and immortall, the fountaine of all goodnesse, and infallible truth, the onely and absolute rest and quiet of our soules & minds. For which cause *Plato* said, that humane things, if they were compared to diuine, were vnworthy the employing any study in them, as being of no price or estimation at all: for they are rather shadowes of things then things indeed, euermore fleeting and slippery, as dayly experience teacheth vs. But being as we are among men, and set to liue and conuerse with them ciuilly, the ciuill man must not giue himself to contemplation, to stay vpon it as wisedome would perswade him, vntill he haue first employed his wit and prudence to the good and profit as well of others as of himselfe. Giuing them to vnderstand, how man is the perfection of all creatures vnder heauen, and placed as the center betweene things diuine and mortall: and shewing to them how great is the perfection of mans mind, make them know how vnworthy & vnfit it is for a mā to suffer those parts that he hath common with brute beasts to master and ouer-rule those by which he is made not much inferiour to diuine creatures: and causing them to lift vp their minds to this consideration, instruct them so to dispose and rule through vertuous habits those parts which of themselues are rebellious to reason, as they may be forced to obey her no otherwise then their Queene and mistris.

miſtris: and through Fortitude, Temperance, Iuſtice, and Prudence, with the reſt of the vertues that ſpring from them, frame their behauiour, and direct all their actions to that end which we haue intituled by the name of ciuill felicitie, to wit, that perfect action or operation according to vertue in a perfect life, whereof hath formerly bin largely diſcourſed. Which felicitie once attained, is of that nature, that no man which is poſſeſſed thereof can become miſerable or vnhappie. For vice only can reduce man to be miſerable, and that is euermore baniſhed from felicitie, whoſe conuerſation is onely with vertue: to whom ſhe is ſo faſt linked and tied in the mind of man, that he hath no power to diſſolue or ſeuer the ſame. And this felicitie is not only a degree, but euen the very foundation of that other, which we may attaine by the meane of wiſedome. For after we haue once ſetled and gounded our ſelues in the morall vertues, and done well in reſpect of our ſelues, and alſo holpen others as much as we could, we may then raiſe our thoughts to a higher conſideration, and examining more inwardly our owne eſtate, find that this moſt excellent gift of vnderſtanding hath bin giuen vs to a further end and purpoſe then this humane felicitie: and therfore bend all our wits to a better vſe of our ſelues, which is to take the way of that other felicitie, ſo to place our ſelues, not onely aboue the ordinary ranke of men, but euen to approch (as neere as our frailtie will permit) to God himſelfe, the laſt end of all our thoughts and actions. From this perfect knowledge of our ſelues we aſcend by degrees to ſuch a height, as leauing all worldly cares, we apply al our ſtudies to the ſearching of diuine things, to the end that by attaining the vnderſtanding and knowledge of our maker, and the Creator of all things, we may plainely

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diſcerne that whatſoeuer is here among vs on earth, is but ſmoke and duſt: and that to be euen glutted with all the good that this life can affoord, is but a poſſeſſion of ſmoke, and a ſhadow of the true good which is aboue. And ſo knowing that the mind is the true man, giuen vnto vs of ſpeciall grace to guide the body, we may turne our ſelues to that happineſſe which maketh vs immortal, by raiſing the mind to the height of that heauenly felicitie: the ſweetneſſe and delight whereof, is ſo much greater then that of humane felicitie, (though without this the other cannot be) as the habit of that excellent power of the vertue intellectiue, is employed about a more noble obiect, then that which the vertue actiue doth intend. For it is euermore buſied about things eternall and vniuerſal, and about the contemplation of the moſt high and gracious God. Of this excellent degree of felicitie hath *Ariſtotle* ſpoken in his firſt and tenth books of Ethikes, declaring how it ought to be the finall end of all our operations, and hath attributed this excellent kind of faculty to thoſe men only who are properly called Sages or wiſe men: becauſe they, by the meanes of actions and of ſciences, finding that theſe mortall things are not able to bring a man to full and perfect happineſſe, do ſo raiſe themſelues from theſe baſer cogitations, as they apply their mind and vnderſtanding wholy to the knowledge of diuine eſſences. And ſuch men (ſaith he) as haue attained that degree, are rather to be eſteemed diuine then humane. For whiles they liue in contemplation, they are not like men liuing among men, compoſed of body and ſoule, but as diuine creatures freed from mortall affections ariſing from the body, and bent onely to that, which may purchaſe the neuer-ending felicitie of the ſoule; which according to *Plato* and *Ariſtotle*, is the true man.

And to this opinion did our Sauiour Chriſt (who is the infallible veritie) giue authoritie and confirmation, when he ſaid, that we ought to haue ſuch care of that ſoule which is in vs according to the image of God, that we ſhould eſteeme nothing (how great or precious ſoeuer the world eſteemed it) at ſo high a rate, as for the purchaſing thereof we ſhould hurt or looſe the ſame: for his words are, *What auaileth it a man to gaine all the world and looſe his owne ſoule?* By this opinion of theſe two Philoſophers, we may plainly vnderſtand, that euen in that darkneſſe of auncient ſuperſtition, God had yet giuen ſuch light of reaſon to the mindes of men to illumine them withall, that they ſaw how through ſciences and wiſedome they were to ſeeke the way that ſhould leade them to their perfect felicitie, that is, to God Almightie himſelfe, who is ſuch an end as no other end can be ſuppoſed beyond him; but to him all other ends are directed, as to the true and moſt happie terme, bound or limit of all vertues and vertuous actions, and of ciuill felicitie it ſelfe. But becauſe that diuine part of the Intellectiue ſoule which is in vs, is to haue conſideration not onely of our preſent ſtate of life, but alſo to that eternitie, wherein our immortall mindes, made to the likeneſſe of God, are to liue with him eternally. Therfore did *Ariſtotle* fitly teach, that men ought to bend and frame their minds wholy to that true and abſolute end: for that the minde being diuine, it is his proper office to ſeeke to vnite it ſelfe to his firſt principle or beginning, which is God. Neither hath his diuine Maieſtie of his aboundant grace beſtowed the vertue intellectiue vpon man to any other end, then that he might know it to be his ſpeciall dutie to raiſe himſelfe to him, as to the author and free giuer of all goodneſſe: and as he hath beſtowed on him a ſoule made to his own

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likenes, ſo he ſhould therewith bend his endeuour to be like him in all his actions, as farre as the corruption contracted by the communion of the bodie will permit. Which thing the *Platonikes* conſidering, haue ſpoken much more largely thereof then *Ariſtotle*, following therein the ſteps of their maſter. But ſome will ſay, that *Ariſtotle* ſpake the leſſe thereof, thinking that the ſoule of man, euen concerning the vnderſtanding, was not immortall; becauſe it ſeemeth to them, that when the ſoule hath no more the ſenſes of the bodie to ſerue her as inſtruments whereby ſhe vnderſtandeth and knoweth, ſhe ſhould no longer liue. For ſince nature cannot ſuffer any thing to be idle in the world, and the ſoule wanting the bodie can haue no operation, therefore they thinke it is to be concluded, that with the bodie ſhe muſt needs fall and die: for that if ſhe ſhould happen to remaine after ſhe were ſeparated from the bodie, yet ſhe ſhould not haue any operation, inſomuch as hauing the vnderſtanding for her proper operatiõ, and ſeeing ſhe cannot vnderſtand but by the miniſtery of the ſenſes, from which ſhe can haue no helpe when ſhe is looſed from the bodie, it followeth that ſhe hath no operation, and then muſt ſhe be idle in nature, which is in no ſort to be allowed. But my author (as afore is ſaid) doth thinke, that theſe men miſtake *Ariſtotle*, not conſidering that he, ſpeaking as a natural Philoſopher of the ſoule, was not to treate thereof but naturally; and in ſo doing, was to reſtraine himſelfe within the bounds of nature: according to which, he is not to conſider any forme ſeparate from the matter, from which we (as all other natural things) haue our bodies. This *Ariſtotle* conſidering and knowing, that as a natural Philoſopher he was not to ſpeake of the Intellectiue ſoule, ſaid, that vnderſtanding being ſeparated from the

other powers of the minde, as a thing eternall, ſeuered from the corruptible part, it appertained not to him to treate thereof in that place, where he ſpake of the ſoule as ſhe was the actor of the bodie, and vſed it as her inſtrument. For he ſaw wel inough, that though the vnderſtanding tooke beginning with the bodie, becauſe it was the forme thereof; yet was it not the actor of the body, ſo as it ſhould vſe any member thereof as an inſtrument: but was onely a forme that was to exerciſe all the other powers of the other ſoules. For it is likewiſe *Ariſtotles* opinion, that where the vnderſtanding is in things corruptible, there hath it alſo the faculties of all the other ſoules within it ſelfe. Which thing he ſhewed more cleerely in his firſt booke *de Partibus Animalium*, ſaying, that to ſpeake of the Intellectiue ſoule all that might be ſayd, was not the office of a naturall Philoſopher. And this for two reaſons. The one is, that the Intellectiue ſoule is no actor of the bodie, becauſe ſhe hath in her no part of motion, either of her ſelfe, or accidentally. For ſhe neither increaſeth nor diminiſheth the bodie, ſhe nouriſheth it not, nor maintaineth it; for theſe are functions appertaining to the vegetatiue ſoule; ſhee chaungeth it not, nor mooueth it from place to place; for that is the office of the ſenſitiue ſoule: and theſe be the motions which the bodie can haue from the ſoule (ſauing generation and corruption, which are changes made in an inſtant): therefore inaſmuch as ſhe is intellectiue, ſhe is not ſubiect to the conſideration of the naturall Philoſopher. The other reaſon is, for that the naturall Philoſopher conſidereth not the ſubſtances ſeparated from the matter, and therefore his office is not to conſider the excellencie of the Intellectiue ſoule, which is not the actor of the bodie, though

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ſhe be the forme thereof. And therefore *Ariſtotle* telleth vs in his ſecond booke of Phyſikes, that the terme or bound of the naturall Philoſphers conſideration, is the Intellectiue ſoule. For albeit he may conſider the ſoule ſo farre as ſhe moueth and is not moued; as he may alſo the firſt mouer: yet doth he not conſider her eſſence, nor the eſſence of the firſt mouer: for this appertaineth to the Metaphyſike, who conſidereth of the ſubſtances ſeparated and immortall. And hence commeth it that *Ariſtotle* treating in his booke of Phyſikes of nature, as ſhe is the beginning of all mouings and of reſt; when he is come to the firſt mouer who is immoueable, yet moueth all that is moued in the world, proceeded not any further to ſhew his nature: vnderſtanding right well, that the naturall Philoſophers office was not, to conſider any thing that is ſimply immoueable, as well in reſpect of the whole, as of the parts, as the firſt mouer is. But let vs (without queſtioning further thereupon) hold this for certaine, not onely by that which Chriſtian Religion teacheth vs, but alſo by that which *Ariſtotle* hath held, that our ſoules are immorall. For if it were otherwiſe, we ſhould be of all other creatures that nature produceth the moſt vnhappie: and in vaine ſhould that deſire of immortalitie (which all men haue) be giuen vnto vs. Beſides that, man, as man, that is to ſay, as a creature intellectiue, ſhould not haue that end which is ordained for him, which is contemplatiue felicitie. Neither is it to the purpoſe to ſay, that ſuch felicitie is not attained by morall vertues, but by wiſedome only, or that there be but few ſo wiſe as to ſeek this excellent felicitie, and infinite the number of thoſe that thinke but little vpon it: for all men are borne apt vnto it, if they will apply their minds vnto the ſame.

And though among all generations of men there ſhould be but three or foure that bent their endeuour to attaine it, they onely were ſufficient to proue our intention, becauſe it is moſt certaine, that the number of fooliſh men is infinite, who not knowing themſelues, cannot tell how to vſe themſelues, & direct their endeuours to that which is the proper end of man. Of whom it is ſaid, *People on whom night commeth before Sunne-ſet*. A wicked generation, whoſe whole life-time flieth from them vnprofitably, in ſuch ſort, as they can ſcarce perceiue that they haue liued. For although there be infinitely more ſuch in this world then of quicke and eleuated ſpirits, yet ought not we to endure, that their negligence, who know not themſelues to be men, ſhould preiudice the mindes of ſuch as know what they are, and raiſe their thoughts carefully to diuine things. And therefore leauing their opinions that will needs ſay, that *Ariſtole* impiouſly and madly hath held the contrary, it ſhall be beſt to proceed in our diſcourſe of the felicitie that is to be attained by contemplation.

I pray you (ſaid Captaine *Carleil*) ſince there is a contrarietie of opinions amõg Philoſophers, concerning the immortalitie of the ſoule, and that the knowledge therof appertaineth to the better vnderſtanding of this contemplatiue felicitie, let vs heare, if your author giue any furder light thereunto, ſince ſuch good fellowes ſeeke to caſt ſo darke a miſt before our eyes, vnder the cloke of *Ariſtotles* opinion. For albeit you ſpake ſomewhat of it yeſterday, ſo farre as concerned our maner of learning according to *Ariſtotle*, yet was it but by the way, and not as it concerned this felicitie: and if ſuch a matter as this were twiſe repeated, it could not but be profitable to vs, though it be ſomewhat troubleſome to you.

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Whereupon I ſaid: that which my authorwas not willing to vndertake, you preſſe me vnto, as if you were the ſame perſons, and had the ſame ſence that thoſe introduced by him had: and therefore ſince you alſo will haue it ſo, I am content to cloſe vp this your feaſt with this laſt diſh; notwithſtanding that the euening draw on, and that to ſpeake thereof at large would aske a long time. But knitting vp, as well as I can, a great volume in a little roome, I will deliuer vnto you that which the ſhortneſſe of our time wil permit, and pray with mine author his diuine Maieſtie, who hath giuen vs an immortall ſoule, that he wil vouchſafe vs his grace to ſay ſo much and no more of this matter, as may be to his glory, and to all our comforts. Know ye then that theſe men, that out of *Ariſtotles* writings gather our intellectiue ſoule to be mortall, take for their foundation and ground this; that the ſoule is the actor of the bodie, and vſeth it but after the maner before mentioned. And to maintaine this their opinion, they wreſt diuers places of his vntruly, and contrary to the mind of this great Philoſopher, as ſhall be declared vnto you. True it is, that while the intellectiue ſoule is the forme of the body, ſhe hath ſome need of him to vnderſtand. For without the fantaſie we can vnderſtand nothing in this life, ſince from the ſenſes the formes of all things are repreſented vnto vs, as yeſterday was declared. And this did *Ariſtotle* meane to teach vs, when contrary to the opinion of ſome former Philoſophers he ſaid, that ſenſe and vnderſtanding was not all one, although there be ſome ſimilitude betweene them. And becauſe the eſſences of things are knowne by their operations, according to *Ariſtotle*; and that the intellectiue ſoule vnderſtandeth (which is a ſpiritual operatiõ;) it followeth that ſimply of her owne nature ſhe is all ſpirit, and therefore immortall,

immortall, for elſe to vnderſtand, would not be her propertie. Whereunto alſo *Ariſtotle* agreeth, in ſaying, that ſome parts of the ſoule are not conioyned to the bodie, and therefore are ſeparable: and that the vnderſtanding and the cõtemplatiue power was another kind of ſoule, and not drawne from the power of matter, as the other two are, whoſe operations were ordained for the Intellectiue ſoule, inſomuch as ſhe is the forme of the bodie: which ſheweth plainely that ſhe is eternall and immortall. And in the twelfth of his Metaphyſikes, making a doubt, whether any forme remaine after the extinguiſhing of the matter, he ſayd doubtfully of the other two, that not euery ſoule, but the Intellectiue onely remained. And here is to be noted, that his opinion was not (though ſome would haue it ſo) that the fantaſie was the forme of the bodie, for that dieth with the bodie, as ſhall be ſhewed hereafter: but he conſidered the vnderſtanding it ſelfe, as a ſoule, and as the forme of the bodie; and not as a ſeparable intelligence, the loweſt of all others, and common to all men, as *Theophraſtus* and *Themiſtius* (though diuerſly) haue thought. Neither yet that it was God Almightie, as *Alexander* ſuppoſeth: for God is not the forme of our bodies, nor hath any man euer doubted whether God were immortall. So as our vnderſtanding is neither God, nor yet a ſeparate intelligence, cõmon to all mẽ, like thoſe that gouerne an vniuerſal ſpheare, as they aboue mentioned haue thought, & as ſome of our Chriſtians haue dreamed; who being raiſed to Eccleſiaſticall dignitie, haue choſen rather to follow the Greeks vanity and the Arabians, then fauour the religious and true interpreters of *Ariſtotles* mind. Whereas they ought rather to haue rooted ſuch opinions out of mens mindes, as apt to draw them to perdition, and not to maske them

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with the vizard of naturall Philoſophers: as if things naturall, that may ſeeme contrary to Chriſtianitie, were to be ſet before men in writing, to be confirmed by naturall reaſons apparant at leaſt, though not true, to perſwade their mindes amiſſe. But *Iohannes Gramaticus* among the Greekes hath declared *Ariſtotles* mind aright; and ſo hath he that is called the Angelicall Doctour in ſundry places as a moſt excellent ſpirit and a religious man, whatſoeuer *Scotus* write againſt him. And what better teſtimonie neede we haue of the vanitie of theſe mens interpretations, then *Ariſtotle* himſelfe? who moſt effectually ſheweth the ſame, where he ſayth, that the waxing old of man proceedeth not from the Intellectiue ſoule, but from the bodie wherein ſhe is (which neuertheleſſe is to be vnderſtood as ſhe is the forme thereof:) and in ſo ſaying, declareth, that euery man hath his Intellectiue ſoule: which ſoule is a meane betwixt ſeparated ſubſtances and corporall; and therefore partly ſhe communicateth with the bodie to informe the ſame, and partly ſhe vſeth (as proper to her) the vertue of the ſeparated ſubſtances (as much as her nature may beare) in the vſe of vnderſtanding. And ſince it is cleere, that in nature the moſt perfect things containe the leſſe perfect, I cannot conceiue from whence proceedeth the frenſie of theſe men, that will rather draw the ſoule Intellectiue to be mortall then immortall; ſeeing that to vnderſtand is the moſt ſingular operation that the ſoule hath, and to whom the powers of the other ſoules are referred, as to the better end, and obey as hand-maides to their miſtreſſe, in ſuch as propoſe to themſelues to liue like men. Neither doth the reaſon alledged by ſome ſerue, who ſay, that becauſe there is great imperfection in the Intellectiue ſoule in compariſon of the ſeparate intelligences,

it ſheweth the ſame to be mortall. For if this reaſon were true, they might as well by the ſame conclude, that the ſeparate intelligences were alſo mortall. For ſince *Ariſtotle* ſayth, that onely the firſt intelligence (who in his phraſe is the firſt mouer) is perfect; and that all the other compared to him are vnperfect, (imperfection being in theſe mens fancie the cauſe of mortalneſſe) it muſt follow, that as imperfect, they ſhould be mortall: which is as contrary to *Ariſtotles* mind, as any thing can be. Wherefore we muſt not ſay, that imperfection in the intellectiue ſoule (in reſpect of the intelligences ſeparated) cauſeth the ſame to die with the bodie, ſince her office dependeth not on the bodie: but it is onely to be ſayd, that ſhe ceaſeth to informe the bodie through the defect thereof, & not of her ſelf; who being freed from the bodie, remaineth neuertheleſſe perfect in her being. For albeit ſhe haue ſome reſpect to the bodie whiles ſhe informeth the ſame, yet hath ſhe not her abſolute being from it. And therefore ſayd *Ariſtotle*, that the vertue of the ſenſe is not equall to the vertue of the vnderſtanding; for that a mightie or ſtrong Senſible, weakeneth, and oftentimes corrupteth the ſenſe; whereas from an excellent Intelligible, the vnderſtanding gathereth greater vertue: which thing could not be ſayd, if the vnderſtanding were as theſe people ſuppoſe, a ſeparate intelligence, wherof the particulars did participate. Wherefore we muſt needs ſay he meant of the vnderſtanding of euery particular man, as of the forme of this man, and that man: for he ſpake of the vnderſtanding of particular men, and not of intelligences, as thoſe men haue belike dreamed. And this ſheweth (howſoeuer any thinke the contrary) that as well the Agent vnderſtanding and the poſſible alſo

(whereof

(whereof this is ordained as matter to that, and both neceſſary to vnderſtand) are eſſentiall parts of the ſoule, and not two ſeparate intelligences, as *Themiſtius* would haue them. The reaſon likewiſe which ſome alledge, is not good, when they argue, that the ſoule being the forme of the bodie, ſhould euer haue a deſire, after ſhe were ſeparated from the ſame, to reunite her ſelfe againe thereunto: but the bodie being rotten and corrupted, her deſire in that behalfe ſhould be vaine. For I ſay, that ſince the ſoule hath informed the body, ſhe hath done as much as to her appertained, neither is ſhe to deſire any further (to ſpeake naturally) then ſhe hath accompliſhed: and therefore ſhe remaineth as a ſeparate intelligence. Which hath made the Peripatetikes to affirme, that the ſoule ſeparated from the bodie, is not the ſame that ſhe was, when ſhe was in the bodie; becauſe that ioyned to the bodie ſhe was the forme thereof, but ſeparated ſhe can no more be ſo. But this difficultie, which naturall Philoſophers haue not knowne how to reſolue as they ought, our bleſſed Sauiour the Sonne of God hath fully reſolued, by riſing againe the third day (not to ſay any thing of others raiſed by him) and promiſing to vs the like reſurrection.

This (ſaid my Lord Primate) all true Chriſtians beleeue: but ſince we are debating of *Ariſtotles* opinions, where he ſaith, that the paſſible vnderſtanding dieth, and ſome of his Interpreters ſay, that it is the poſſible vnderſtanding, how ſhall we make this to agree with the immortalitie of the ſoule?

Well inough (ſayd I:) for they that ſo interpret him deceiue thẽſelues: for there is as great difference (as *Ariſtotle* himſelfe teacheth) betweene the paſſible ſoule and the poſſible ſoule, as betweene that which is eternall and

that which is corruptible. The paſſible vnderſtanding according to *Ariſtotle* is the fantaſie, or the imaginatiue or cogitatiue power, call it how you pleaſe, the which *Auerroes* ſayd was taken at large, but not properly for the vnderſtanding; and as an inward ſenſe depending vpon the bodie, receiueth the ſenſible kindes from the common ſenſe, and preſenteth them to the poſſible vnderſtanding, which is the place of the intelligible kindes or formes, as *Ariſtotle* in ſundrie places declareth. And who ſo ſhall well conſider *Themiſtius*, where he ſpeaketh of the multiplication of the vnderſtanding, ſhall finde that he ſuppoſed it not as our Chriſtian writers doe, but tooke the vertue fantaſtike for the vnderſtanding, multiplied in particular perſons. And therefore ſhe being mingled with the bodie, faileth alſo with the ſame: and this is that interiour thing which *Ariſtotle* ſaith is corrupted, whereby the vnderſtanding loſeth his vertue (as ſhall be ſhewed) which happeneth not to the poſſible vnderſtanding, becauſe it is an eſſentiall part of the Intellectiue ſoule, not mingled with the bodie, and free from any paſſion, as a diuine ſubſtance. Of which bodie ſhe vſeth no part for her inſtrument to vnderſtand, though ſhe haue neede of the fantaſie to receiue the Intelligible formes whiles ſhe is the forme of the bodie. And this neceſſitie, which the vnderſtanding hath of the fantaſie to vnderſtand, ſheweth the contrarie of that which theſe fellowes inferre, who hold the vnderſtanding to be mortall in that reſpect. For by this it appeareth, that the vnderſtanding proceedeth not from the power of the matter: for if ſo it were, it ſhould haue no neede of the fantaſie, but ſhould it ſelfe be the fantaſie: and therefore *Ariſtotle* right well perceiuing that our vnderſtanding was not fantaſie, nor vſed anie part of the

body

body for an inſtrument, ſayd, that the vnderſtanding came from abroad, as ſhall be declared. It is therefore no good conſequence to ſay, that becauſe the paſſible ſoule dieth, therefore the poſſible ſoule likewiſe is mortall.

Yea but (ſaid M. *Spencer*) we haue frō *Ariſtotle*, that the poſſible vnderſtanding ſuffreth in the act of vnderſtanding: and to ſuffer importeth corruption; by which reaſon it ſhould be mortall as is the paſſible.

Neither is that reaſon (quoth I) ſufficient: for although the name of ſuffering agree with the poſſible vnderſtanding, and with the paſſible (leauing the difference betweene *Alexander* and *Ariſtotle* in that point) the reaſon and manner in them is different. For the ſuffering of the paſſible vnderſtanding tendeth to the deſtruction thereof, whereas the ſuffering of the poſſible is to the greater perfection of the ſame. And for this cauſe *Ariſtotle* telleth vs, that the ſuffering of the ſenſes, and that of the vnderſtanding are not both of one nature: becauſe the firſt breedes deſtruction, and the later perfection; and that therefore an excellent Intelligible giueth perfection to the vnderſtanding, whereas an excellent Senſible corrupteth the ſenſe. But not hauing any other word meete to expreſſe this ſuffering of the vnderſtanding, whiles it is in that act, we vſe the ſame that agreeth to the paſſible, though the reaſon of them both be verie diuerſe. The poſſible vnderſtanding (as hath bene ſayd alreadie) being the place of the Intelligible formes, ſtandeth in reſpect of the Agent vnderſtanding, as the matter in reſpect of the forme: for the firſt is but in power (for which reſpect *Auerroes* called it the materiall vnderſtanding:) and this later is in act. And this Agent vnderſtanding, by illumining the formes which are in him as blind (euen as colours are in things

before they be made apparent to the eye by the illumination of light) vnderſtandeth the kinds of things, and vnderſtanding them vnderſtandeth it ſelfe. For in ſpirituall things, that which vnderſtandeth and that which is vnderſtood, become all one thing: and turning it ſelfe about the vniuerſall kinds, vnderſtandeth withall, things particular. And this is that which the poſſible vnderſtanding ſuffereth from the Agent, receiuing thereby that perfection which you haue heard.

Why (ſaid Maiſter *Spenſer*) doth it not ſeeme, that *Ariſtotle* when he ſaith, that after death we haue no memorie, that he meant that this our vnderſtanding was mortall? For if it were not ſo, man ſhould not loſe the remembrance of things done in this life.

Nay (anſwered I) what a ſillie part had it bene of *Ariſtotle* rather, if he had thought the intellectiue ſoule to be mortall, to ſay that we remembred nothing after this life, when nothing of vs ſhould haue remained? And therefore it may ſerue to proue the immortalitie of the ſoule, and not the corruption, as you ſurmiſe (onely for arguments ſake) that truth may be ſifted out. But our not remembring then, commeth from the corruptible part, which is the vertue of the fantaſie: which being a power of the ſenſitiue ſoule, that keepeth in ſtore the remembrance of materiall things, that vertue which ſhould repreſent them failing in vs, we cannot remember them after death. For the memorie is no part of the vnderſtanding, but of the ſenſitiue ſoule: and therefore *Ariſtotle* ſaid, that memorie came from ſenſe, inſomuch as creatures wanting reaſon haue memorie, though they haue not rememorating as man hath: for thereto is diſcourſe required; which according to *Ariſtotle* is nothing elſe but an action of the vnderſtanding in the vertue imaginatiue.

natiue. Which thing neither in thoſe creatures deuoid of reaſon, nor yet in ſeparated intelligences can haue place, becauſe thoſe want diſcourſe, and theſe are pure acts (as Philoſophers call them.)

Doth not *Ariſtotle* (ſayd my Lord Primate) in his Ethikes ſay, that the contentmẽts and the troubles of thoſe which liue, appertaine vnto the dead, and breede them griefe or delight? And how is it then that he ſhould ſay, we haue no memorie after this life?

Ariſtotle in that place (ſayd I) ſpake in reproofe of *Solon*, who had ſayd, that no man could be accounted happie till after his death: and meant there to ſhew, that although it were graunted that man had memorie after his death, of things done in this life, yet could he not be happie when he was dead, by reaſon of the ſtrange accidents which this life bringeth foorth: and therefore he ſaid not ſimply that we remember; but that ſuppoſing we did, yet could we not be happie when we were dead, ſo making good his opinion againſt *Solon* by naturall reaſon.

Yet (ſayd Maiſter *Spenſer*) let me aske you this queſtion; if the vnderſtanding be immortall, and multiplied ſtill to the number of all the men, that haue bene, are, and ſhall be, how can it ſtand with that which *Ariſtotle* telleth vs of multiplication, which (ſaith he) proceedeth from the matter; and things materiall are alwayes corruptible?

Marrie (Sir ſaid I) this is to be vnderſtood of materiall things, and not of Intelligible and ſpirituall, ſuch as is the vnderſtanding. And that the vnderſtanding might remaine after the matter were gone, as the forme of the bodie, he hath (as before is ſaid) declared in his Metaphyſikes, affirming the Intellectiue ſoule to be perpetuall,

petuall, though it be ſeparated from the bodie, whoſe forme it was.

But how cometh it to paſſe (replied Maiſter *Spenſer*) that the ſoule being immortall and impaſſible, yet by experience we ſee dayly, that ſhe is troubled with Lethargies, Phrenſies, Melancholie, drunkenneſſe, and ſuch other paſſions, by which we ſee her ouercome, and to be debarred from her office and function.

Theſe (quoth I) are paſſions of the vertue cogitatiue, fantaſtike, or imaginatiue, called by *Ariſtotle* (as I haue ſaid alreadie) the paſſible vnderſtanding; and not of the Intellectiue ſoule. Which paſſible vnderſtanding being an inward ſenſe, and therefore tyed to the bodie, feeleth the paſſions of the ſame; whereby it is offended, and cannot performe his office towards the other, but runneth into ſuch inconueniences by reaſon of his infirmitie, and for want of reaſons direction. And whereas *Hippocrates* ſaith that they that being ſicke in minde, and touched with anie corporall diſeaſe, haue little or no feeling of paine; it ſheweth plainely that it is as I haue ſaid. For if you marke it well, this word *feele* explaneth the whole, ſince feeling is a propertie of the Senſitiue ſoule, and the vnderſtanding feeleth not. And in like manner are the words of *Ariſtotle* to be vnderſtood, where he ſaith, that ſuch whoſe fleſh is ſoft are apt to learne, and they that are melancholy to be wiſe. For that the Senſitiue vertue taketh more eaſily the formes or kindes of things in ſuch ſubiects according to their nature, and repreſenteth them to the vnderſtãding, from whence knowledge and vnderſtanding proceedeth, as yeſterday was ſayd. And this happeneth not onely in theſe paſſions, but alſo in all other alterations, as of gladneſſe, of ſorow, of hope and of feare, with ſuch like which appertaine not to the vnderſtan-

vnderſtanding, to which (ſayd *Ariſtotle*) who would aſcribe ſuch affects, might as well ſay that the vnderſtanding layed bricke to build, or caſt a loome to weaue.

Why, (ſayd M. *Spencer*) doth your author meane (as ſome haue not ſticked euen in our dayes to affirme) that there are in vs two ſeuerall ſoules, the one ſenſitiue and mortall, and the other Intellectiue and Diuine?

Nothing leſſe (ſaid I) for that I hold were manifeſt hereſie as well in Philoſophie as in Chriſtianitie. For *Ariſtotle* teacheth vs, that the Vegetatiue and Senſitiue ſoule, or their powers, were in the ſoule Intellectiue, as the triangle is in the ſquare: which could not be if the ſenſitiue were ſeparated from the Intellectiue. And ſpeaking of the varietie of ſoules, and of their powers, he ſayth, that the Senſitiue could not be without the Vegetatiue, but that this latter might well be without the former: and that all the other vertues of all the three ſoules are in thoſe creatures that haue reaſon and vnderſtanding. It cannot therefore be ſayd (according to *Ariſtotle*) that the Senſitiue ſoule in man is ſeuered from the Intellectiue. And becauſe man participateth (as hath bene ſayd) of all the three faculties of the ſoules, I ſee not why theſe fellowes that mention two, ſpeake not of all three as well, ſeeing that in man are the operations of all three. For if they ſay that it ſufficeth to ſpeake of the Senſitiue, by which man is a liuing creature, and containeth the Vegetatiue; why ſhould they not as well ſay, that the Intellectiue alone includeth both the other? and then is there no need of ſeuering at all. By which it may appeere, that this frantike opinion gathered from the Aſſirians, is not onely contrary to *Ariſtotle*, but to reaſon

it ſelfe. For *Ariſtotle* ſaith, that all things haue their being from their formes; and that in naturall things, the more perfect containe the leſſe perfect, when the leſſer is ordained for the more: and that therefore onely the Intellectiue ſoule which containeth within it the natures of both the others, is the onely and true forme of man, malgre all ſuch dolts as would haue man to be (by reaſon of diuers formes) both a brute and a reaſonable creature, who ſeeke to ſet men aſtray from the right way with ſuch fanaticall deuices. Let vs therefore conclude with *Ariſtotle*, that both the paſſible and the poſſible vnderſtandings are vertues of the Intellectiue ſoule, inſomuch as ſhe is the particular and proper forme of euery man, and that as a humane ſoule ſhe is euerlaſting, impaſſible, not mingled with the bodie, but ſeuered from the ſame, ſimple and diuine, not drawne from any power of matter, but infuſed into vs from abroade, not ingendred by ſeede: which being once freed from the bodie (becauſe nature admitteth nothing that is idle) is altogether bent and intent to contemplation, being then (as Philoſophers call it) *actus purus*, a pure vnderſtanding, not needing the bodie either as an obiect, or as a ſubiect. In conſideration whereof *Ariſtotle* ſayd, that man through contemplation became diuine; and that the true man (which both he and his diuine maſter agreed to be the minde) did enioy thereby (not as a mortall man liuing in the world, but as a diuine creature) that high felicitie, to which, ciuill felicitie was ordained; and attained to wiſedome & ſcience, after the exerciſe of the morall vertues, as meanes to guide and conduct him to the ſame. And not impertinently haue the Platonikes (following their maſter in that point) ſayd, that nature had giuen vs ſenſe, not becauſe we ſhould

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ſtay thereupon, but to the end that thereby might grow in vs imagination, from imagination diſcourſe, from diſcourſe intelligence, and from intelligence gladneſſe vnſpeakable, which might raiſe vs (as diuine, and freed from the bands of the fleſh) to the knowledge of God, who is the beginning and the end of all goodneſſe, towards whom we ought with all endeuour to lift vp our minds, as to our chiefe and moſt perfect good: for he onely is our *ſummum bonum*. For to them it ſeemed that the man whom contemplation had raiſed to ſuch a degree of felicitie, became all wholy vnderſtanding by that light which God imparteth to the ſpirits that are ſo purged through the exerciſe of morall vertues; which vertues are termed by *Plato* the purgers of the mind: ſtirring vp therein a moſt ardent deſire to forſake this mortall bodie, and to vnite it ſelfe with him. And this is that contemplation of death which the Philoſophie of *Plato* calleth vs vnto. For he that is come to this degree of perfection, is as dead to the world and worldly pleaſures, becauſe he conſidereth that God is the center of al perfections, & that about him al our thoughts & deſires are to be turned & employed. Such doth God draw vnto himſelfe, and afterwards maketh them partakers of his ioyes euerlaſting: giuing them in the meane while a moſt ſweet taſt euen in this life of that other life moſt happie, and thoſe exceeding delights, beyond which no deſire can extend, nor yet reach vnto the ſame. So as being full of this excellent felicitie, they thinke euery minute of an houre to be a long time that debarreth them from iſſuing out of this mortall priſon, to returne into their heauenly countrey; where, with that vertue which is proper to the ſoule alone, they may among the bleſſed ſpirits enioy their maker: whoſe Ma-

ieſtie and power all the parts of the world declare, the heauens, the earth, the ſea, the day, the night: whereat the infernall ſpirits tremble and ſhake; euen as good men on earth bow downe and worſhip the ſame with continuall himnes and praiſes; and in heauen no leſſe, all the orders and bleſſed companie of Saints and Angels do the like world without end.

This (loe) is as much as mine author hath diſcourſed vpon this ſubiect, which I haue Engliſhed for my exerciſe in both languages, and haue at your intreaties communicated vnto you: I will not ſay, being betrayed by M. *Spencer*, but ſurely cunningly thruſt in, to take vp this taske, whereby he might ſhift himſelfe from that trouble. But howſoeuer it be, if it haue liked you as it is, I ſhall thinke my time well ſpent, both in the tranſlating of it at the firſt, and in the relating of it vpon this occaſion in this manner. For as I ſayd before I began, that I would not tye my ſelfe to the ſtrict lawes of an interpreter: ſo haue I in ſome places omitted here and there haply ſome ſentences (without which this our Diſcourſe might be complete enough, becauſe they are rather points of ſubtiller inueſtigation then our ſpeech required, though the Author therein perhaps aymed at the commendation of a great reader or abſolute Philoſopher:) and in the deſcriptions of ſome of the morall vertues, added ſomewhat out of others. And what hath beene ſayd concerning ciuill felicitie by him, and deliuered in ſubſtance by me, I thinke you will allow to be ſufficient. Since therefore my taske is done, and that it groweth late, with this onely petition, that you will be content to beare with the roughneſſe of my ſpeech in reporting that vnto you, which in his language our Author hath

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eloquently ſet downe, I end.

Here all the companie aroſe, and giuing me great thankes, ſeemed to reſt very well ſatisfied, as well with the manner as with the matter, at the leaſt ſo of their courteſie they proteſted. And taking their leaues departed towards the Citie.

FINIS.



ERRATA.

PAge 12. line 17. climbing. pag. 16. lin. 32 auoyde. pag 68. lin. 14. ſpeake of. pag. 81. lin. 4. meere. pag. 82. lin. 1. Politikes. pag. 95. lin. 10. men. pag. 109. lin. 15. Dioxippus. pag. 140. lin. 15. leaue out *to*. pag. 143. lin 13. ſuppoſing that &c. pag. 145. lin. 6. their marching. pag. eadē. lin. 7. they neuer went. pag. 163. lin. 17. flow. pag. 164. lin. 4. determine. pag. 168. lin. 25. hath man. pag. 173. lin. 9. Platonikes. pag. 199 lin. 17. leaue out *to*. pag. ib. lin. 18. leaue out *vvhich* pag. 216. lin. 5. make ſhew of. pag. ibid. lin. 18. that ſhe be. Pag. 238 lin. 14. himſelfe.